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MODERN 

K 06 tEA 


Zhe Socialist North, Kevolutionary 
Perspectives in the South, and 
Unification 


by KIM 'BY0NG SIK 



International Publishers 


Translated from the Japanese by Takeshi Haga 
and edited by Victor Perlo 

Copyright © 1970, by 

INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS CO., INC. 
All Rights Reserved 


First Edition 


First published in Japanese by Miraisha Publishing Co., 
Tokyo, under the title Basic Problems of Modern Korea 


Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 70-130866 
SBN (doth) 7178-0291-4; (paperback) 7178-0292-2 
Manufactured in the United States of America 


till 

y/j. i 

A'sm PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION 


It is indeed a great pleasure for the author to see his book 
translated into English and presented to the American reader. 

As stated in the Preface to the Japanese Edition, this work 
endeavors to explain the basic problems of present-day Korea 
in the light of Premier Kim II Sung’s theory and policy, which 
for over forty years guided the victorious struggles of the 
Korean people. Here the reader will also learn what forces 
were responsible for blocking the full independence and self- 
determination of Korea, bringing such great distress and un- 
happiness to its people. 

For the American people, it is important to understand cor- 
rectly the present situation in both the North and the South of 
Korea, for this is inseparable from their own destiny as a peo- 
ple. As we learn from history, a nation that oppresses another 
cannot itself be free. In the author’s opinion, if there be any 
people in the world today who should feel this truth most 
acutely, it is the American people. 

The Koreans are a homogeneous people. Throughout their 
history they have fought heroically against invaders. But also 
(hey have always been a peace-loving people; never in their 
history have they threatened or invaded any other country. 

It is important to note that during the past hundred years of 
modern Korea, imperialist invasion began, at the end of the 
I ciidal era, with an American armed ship, the General Sher- 
man, in 1866. Since then the only imperialist invaders have 
been either the Japanese or American. 

These two powers — at times conspiring with each other, and 
al other times in conflict— have occupied either the entire 
country or part of it, practicing their colonial policies. Should 
one seek to discern the difference in their policies, it will be 
found that Japanese imperialism once occupied the whole of 


5 


6 


MODERN KOREA 


Korea and imposed a Japanese governor-general over it, while 
today U.S. imperialism occupies the southern half of the 
country and rules through a Korean puppet regime. 

In July 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, Premier 
Katsura of Japan made a secret agreement with U.S. Secre- 
tary of War Taft, in which Japan recognized American impe- 
rialist occupation of the Philippines in return for U.S. recog- 
nition of Japanese imperialist designs upon Korea. It was 
then that Japan began to plunder Korea, leading to annexa- 
tion in 1910. In the process, her imperialist ambitions grew 
rapidly until, using Korea as a stepping stone, she occupied 
Manchuria, the northeastern region of China, in 1932. From 
there, moving South into China, her aim was to occupy the 
whole of that country and eventually the whole of Asia under 
the slogan of the “Great East-Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.” 
Having launched full-scale war in China, in 1937, Japan at- 
tacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, plunging the entire Pacific into 
war. 

After the Second World War, under American aegis, the 
ground was laid for the revival of Japanese militarism. Fur- 
thermore, great fortunes were amassed by Japanese monopoly 
in the supply of materials for the U.S. armed forces during the 
Korean and Vietnam wars. This fed the rapid recovery of the 
Japanese economy, leading to substantial rearmament and 
to the revival of militarism. 

As is now well established, the secret Johnson-Sato agree- 
ment of January 1965 — a modern version of the Katsura-Taft 
secret agreement of 1905 — provided for the negotiations 
which led to the conclusion of the pact between the puppet 
regime in Seoul and Japan. Through the ROK-Japan treaty, 
Japan gained the right of joint exploitation of South Korea 
alongside American imperialism, as compensation for her 
support of the U.S. aggressive policy in Asia. From this re- 
sulted the U.S.-Japan-ROK triple military alliance and the 


PREFACE TO AMERICAN EDITION 


7 


perpendicular joint strategical system, with the United States 
at the head. 

In November 1969, after the Nixon-Sato talks in Washing- 
Ion, a joint communique announced that South Korea, Taiwan 
and South Vietnam, as well as “other countries” in the Far 
Fast, w’ere of serious concern to the security of Japan. This is 
merely an indirect way of indicating Japan's participation in 
American aggression in Asia, and at the same time reviving 
I he erstwhile dream of the “Great East-Asia Co-prosperity 
Sphere.” 

Thus, in the past century the historical development of 
modern Korea was determined largely by the intrigues and 
intervention of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms, and the 
Korean people were compelled to fight them. One cannot 
understand the problems of modern Korea without knowing 
this historical background. 

At the same time, it is equally important to know that the 
long anti-imperialist struggles of the Korean people, including 
(lie socialist victory in the North, were carried out under the 
revolutionary leadership of Kim 11 Sung, now Premier of the 
I )emocratic People’s Republic of Korea. Inspired by his 
revolutionary theory, the Juche idea, during the past four de- 
cades the Korean people progressed from the national libera- 
lion struggle, to the people’s democratic revolution and to 
the socialist revolution. Through various stages of revolution, 
| Inal victory has been won, despite the extreme devastation 
ol the Korean War, in the foundation of the socialist fatherland 
In ihe North and in socialist construction. 

In South Korea, where fascistic oppression goes from bad 
In worse, revolutionaries and patriots recently organized the 
lie volutionary Party for Reunification, and in a proclamation 
sel forth their program. It is hoped that the world, and parti- 
i 1 1 larly the American people, will understand the significance 
ol this new development. 


8 


MODERN KOREA 


The author did his best to explain the problems of modern 
Korea, basing himself upon Premier Kim II Sung’s theory. He 
can only hope that this will satisfy the reader’s expectations. 
If the work serves to clarify some aspect of the situation, the 
author will be well satisfied. 

In conclusion, the author wishes to express his appreciation 
to James S. Allen, president of International Publishers, for 
his invaluable advice; to the translator, Takeshi Haga, and to 
the English editor, Victor Perlo. 

—The Author 

June 25, 1970, on the 
20th anniversary of the 
outbreak of the Korean War 


PREFACE TO THE JAPANESE EDITION 


This book deals with essential questions concerning pres- 
ent-day Korea on the basis of the ideas and theories, the 
strategy and tactics, developed by Premier Kim 11 Sung. A 
most important source document is Kim II Sung’s report 
delivered at the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the 
founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

Delegates to the celebration from abroad regarded this 
report as a valuable contribution to the theory of socialism, 
pertinent to the international communist movement generally. 

In the report, Kim 11 Sung: 

(1) Analyzed and summed up the Korean people s struggles 
lor the conquest of power, and the successive stages of the 
national liberation revolution, democratic revolution, socialist 
revolution and socialist construction. 

(2) Scientifically clarified theoretical questions of the 
I runsitional period and the proletarian dictatorship, and of the 
complete and final victory of socialism. His solutions repre- 
sented a major, original contribution to Marxist-Leninist 
theory. 

(3) Elaborated the strategy of anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. 
struggle at the present stage, and the basic policy of com- 
pleting the revolution in South Korea and of unifying North 
und South Korea. 

This important report provides a programmatic guide to the 
complete victory of the Korean revolution and contributes to 
ensuring the victory of the international communist move- 
ment and the world revolution. It enriches the treasure-house 
of Marxism-Leninism. 


9 


10 


MODERN KOREA 


The present volume is in three parts. The first deals with 
socialist construction in the Democratic People s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), the second with the revolution in South 
Korea and the unification of the entire country, and the third 
with the relationship between the Korean revolution and the 
world revolutionary struggle. 

The period of 20 years since the founding of the DPRK is but 
a short moment in the 5, 000-years’ history of our Korean people. 
But in these 20 years the Koreans have carried out tremendous 
social, economic and cultural transformations that our fore- 
fathers were unable to achieve in thousands of years. Formerly 
a colonial, semi-feudal society, with a backward agricultural 
economy, the northern half of our Republic has developed 
into a socialist industrial-agrarian country. This was accom- 
plished through difficult socialist construction after the Korean 
War (1950-53). Now it is being developed further into an 
advanced socialist industrial country through implementation 
of the Seven-Year Plan. 

Foreign visitors praise North Korea as an example oi a 
socialist country useful for all countries and peoples. We 
Korean people take boundless pride in having such a splendid 

socialist country as our fatherland. 

This victory would have been unthinkable without the 
correct guidance of Kim 11 Sung, extending over a period of 40 
years. Revolution is a complex and difficult undertaking — to 
destroy the old and create the new. This requires excellent 

leadership, great leadership. 

Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma, but a science. Natuia y, 
it is not necessarily developed only in a big country. Failure 
to develop the science in small countries also, subservience to 
developments in big countries, inevitably leads to dogmatism. 

Kim II Sung’s revolutionary ideas are based on the concept 
of Juche* which rejects subservience and dogmatism. This 


*Pronounced chewche. 


PREFACE TO JAPANESE EDITION 


11 


concept embraces the principle of self-reliance in ideology 
and in politics, in the economy and in military affairs. It 
means to think creatively about all problems ourselves, to 
solve them in accord with actual conditions in our own coun- 
try, independently with our own strength, and in accord with 
our own revolutionary interests. 

Through the Juche principle we can apply to Korea the 
universal truths of Marxism-Leninism, the experience of other 
countries, while opposing subservience and dogmatism. No 
people can carry through revolutionary construction success- 
fully without giving full play to the spirit of self-reliance, in 

this way. . 

The masters of the Korean revolution are the workers 

Party of Korea and the Korean people. The Korean people 
themselves are the decisive factor. Nobody else can carry it 
out for us. No revolution can be exported or imported. 

If a nation becomes subservient, it will lose independence. 
If an individual becomes subservient, he becomes incapable 
of making an independent judgment and becomes a useless 
person. Historical experience in Korea shows that all those 
who were subservient became traitors to the nation. A typical 
example of this is the Pak Chung Hi* clique, which has turned 
South Korea over to plunder and military occupation by U.S. 

imperialism. - 

While upholding the line of self-reliance based on the idea 
of Juche of Kim II Sung, we consider that this idea must 
strengthen proletarian internationalism. For the line of self- 
reliance is inseparable from proletarian internationalism. 
The two must not be counterposed under any circumstances 
or for any reason whatsoever. 

Recently, the U.S. imperialists and the Pak Chung Hi clique 
have been intensifying new war provocation maneuvers more 
and more openly, while the Japanese militarists have been 


Mteferred to in the U.S. press as President Park of South Korea. 


12 


MODERN KOREA 


making serious efforts to reinvade South Korea. We cannot 
overlook the fact, under these circumstances, that slanderous 
attacks are being made on the foreign policy and the indepen- 
dent and principled policy of unifying Korea followed by the 
Democratic People’s Republic. Thus it is necessary to strength- 
en further real friendship between the Korean and Japanese 
people. 

Already many representatives of various circles oi Japan 
have visited the DPRK, and economic and cultural exchanges 
between the two countries are developing. At the same time, 
studies are being made of the politics, economy and culture of 
the DPRK and articles dealing with these questions are fre- 
quently published. However, these studies and articles plain- 
ly are not sufficient to meet the actual need. 

One cannot understand present-day Korea without knowing 
the ideas and theories, strategy and tactics, of Premier Kim II 
Sung, which are related to the basic questions of Marxism- 
Leninism in our era. 

The author wishes to draw special attention to Chapter 4 
of Part I, which outlines Kim II Sung’s important recent 
contribution, “On Some Theoretical Problems of Socialist 
Economy.” 

The author hopes this book will help readers to understand 
the problems of present-day Korea. 


April 10, 1969 


-The Author 


Contents 


Preface to the United States Edition 5 

Preface to the Japanese Edition 9 

PART ONE 

Theory and Practice of Socialist Construction 
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 

I. FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE DPRK 19 

1. Historical Foundations of the DPRK, 20 

2. Historical Significance of the DPRK, 26 

3. Achievements of the DPRK, 38 

II THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND 
THE HISTORICAL MISSION OF 

DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT 69 

I. The Transitional Period, 71 

The Complete Victory of Socialism, 91 

(1) Superiority of the Socialist System, 91 

(2) Requirements for Complete Victory of Socialism, 95 
3. Toward World Socialism, 103 

III SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 111 

I, Essence of the Chongsanri Spirit and Method, 113 

The Daean Work System - Management for 
Industry, 119 

(1) Essence of the Daean System, 120 

(2) Superiority of the Daean System, 126 

(3) Significance of the Daean System, 131 

I. A New System of Agricultural Guidance, 135 


13 


14 


MODERN KOREA 


4. Unified and Detailed Planning, 149 

5. The Chollima Movement, 154 

IV. SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF 
SOCIALIST ECONOMY 160 

1. Problems of Correlation between the Scale of the 
Economy and the Rate of Development of 
Production, 162 

2. Problems of the Means of Production in the Form of 
Commodities and the Application of the Law of 
Value, 173 

3. Problems of the Peasant Market and of its Abolition, 185 

PART TWO 

Revolution in South Korea and Unification of Korea 

I. U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA AND 

THE PAK CHUNG HI REGIME 193 

1. Characteristics of U.S. Imperialist Domination of 
South Korea, 194 

2. Real Nature of the Pak Chung Hi Regime, 207 

II. TASKS AND METHODS OF THE SOUTH 

KOREAN REVOLUTION 213 

1. Revolutionary Tasks of the South Korean People, 214 

2. Forms of Struggle in the South Korean Revolution, 219 

III. UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 224 

1. Basic Policy on Unification, 224 

2. Unification and the Korean Revolution, 236 

IV. THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN 

PEOPLE 241 

I . The Course of the Struggle, 241 

(1) First Period: From the August 15 Liberation to 
Installation of the Puppet Regime, 241 

(2) Second Period: From Establishment of the Puppet 
Regime to the April 1960 Popular Uprising, 244 


CONTENTS 


15 


(2) Third Period: From the April Popular Uprising to 
the Present, 246 

2. The Present Struggle and Its Prospects, 252 

(1) Workers’ Struggles, 253 

(2) Struggles of Peasants, 256 

(3) Youth and Students, 257 

(4) Urban Struggles, 258 

(5) Guerrilla Struggles, 259 

3. The United Revolutionary Party of South Korea, 261 

PART THREE 

The Korean Revolution and the World Revolution 

I. KIM IL SUNG ON ACCELERATION OF THE 

WORLD REVOLUTION 271 

1. The Fight Against U.S. Imperialism, 271 

2. The Simultaneous Fight Against Allies of U.S. 
Imperialism, 275 

II. REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY OF 

ANTI-IMPERIALIST, ANTI-U.S. STRUGGLE 281 

III. KIM IL SUNG ON ULTIMATE VICTORY OF 

WORLD REVOLUTION 290 

I , Historical Position of Contemporary Imperialism, 291 

2. Theory of the Anti-Imperialist, Anti-U.S. United 
Front, 295 

REFERENCE NOTES 
INDEX 


307 

313 







PART ONE 


Theory and Practice 
of Socialist Construction 
in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 


In the past 50 years, the Korean people have fulfilled suc- 
cessfully the tasks of anti- imperialist, national liberation, the 
people’s democratic and socialist revolution in the DPRK, and 
oilier tasks under the leadership of Kim 11 Sung, and they are 
< ontinuing to forge ahead toward the unification of their 
l.ilherland and to complete victory of the socialist revolution 
lliroughout Korea. 


17 



CHAPTER I 


Founding and Development 
of the DPRK 


The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the real 
fatherland of all the Korean people; the standard bearer of 
I heir freedom, independence and happiness; the most power- 
Inl weapon for the construction of socialism and communism, 
which the Korean people have gained through lengthy, fierce, 
i evolutionary struggles. Premier Kim 11 Sung said: 

file Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the real fatherland 
ol .ill the Korean people, and it has their unreserved support and 
love. Our state is completely democratic and stable. It was estab- 
h .hed by the people and relies on the united, solid forces of all the 
people, based on a worker-peasant alliance which is led by the work- 
ing class and which involves broad masses of people in state affairs. 

< )iir Republic is a genuine people's state which ensures all strata of 
I In* people, including the workers and peasants, not only political 
hredom and rights but also material and cultural well-being . 1 

In 1950 U.S. imperialism launched its armed aggression 
against our young Republic. Our people were victorious in 
this bitter and most difficult struggle. Our country dealt a 
disastrous blow to U.S. imperialism, shattering the myth of its 
invincibility and starting it on the long downhill road to its 
nllimate demise. 

Immediately after the 1953 armistice ending the Korean 
War, the U.S, imperialists arrogantly declared that Korea 
would not be able to rise again, even in 100 years. However, 
ihe Korean people smashed this prediction by forging ahead 


19 


20 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


toward socialism and communism, successfully carrying out 
historic transformations. 

The power of the Republic has eliminated completely all 
forms of exploitation and oppression in urban and rural areas, 
a centuries-old aspiration of mankind; has developed the great 
Chollima* movement, the general line of socialist construction, 
and has laid firm foundations for an independent, national 
economy. 

Today, the DPRK has become a really independent nation 
with an advanced socialist system, an independent national 
economy and a flowering national culture. 

Indeed, these years have been a glorious 20 years of struggle 
and victory, of creativity and advance. 


1. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DPRK 

The question of power is the fundamental question in the revolu- 
tion and the vital question on which depend the victory of the revo- 
lution and the success of constructive work [writes Kim II Sung]. 
The working class can achieve complete class and national liberation 
and win in the cause of socialism and communism only when it 
takes power firmly into its hands, constantly enhances its functions 
and role, and steadily strengthens the dictatorship of the proletariat . 2 

As the historical experience of all the revolutionary strug- 
gles of the working class of the entire world shows, the pro- 
letariat cannot liberate the masses of people from exploitation 
and oppression without overthrowing the state power of the 
old bourgeoisie and without establishing its own revolu- 
tionary power. Only when it has achieved political power can 
the working class sweep away all the political, economic and 
social foundations of the exploiting classes and build social- 
ism and communism. 

*The “flying-horse” movement, explained in Part I, Chapter 3, Section 5. 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


21 


In all exploiting societies, political power has been the most 
powerful means and instrument of domination and oppression 
by the exploiting classes against the exploited classes. In 
capitalist society, the last exploiting society that mankind ex- 
periences, bourgeois state power is thus used by the capitalists 
lo oppress and suppress the revolutionary struggles of the 
working class. Consequently, the question of power is the 
fundamental question of revolution and is the life-and-death 
question that determines the success or failure of revolution 
and the achievement of socialist construction. 

That is precisely why all revolutionary struggles of the 
working class should be concentrated ultimately on the ques- 
tion of power and why the political struggle of the working 
class, including armed struggle, is the highest form of class 
si niggle. Because the question of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, too, is a question of power, it is the sharpest ques- 
tion of principle, on which a Marxist-Leninist can make no 
c o nee s s i ons whats oe ver . 

Korean Communists, headed by Kim 11 Sung, consistently 
have paid close attention to the question of power during the 
entire period in which they led the revolution, and they have 
lought firmly for its correct solution. To begin with there is 
the problem of how to conquer power; then the question of the 
appropriate form of exercising power during each stage of the 
involution. The problem also arises of how to prepare revolu- 
tionary cadres to maintain and exercise power. And, finally, 
there* is the question of how to expand and strengthen the 
political, economic and social foundations of people’s power. 

The DPRK is the great achievement of the Korean Com- 
munists and people, through bloody and difficult struggles, 
Im the correct solution of the question of power. The entire 
10 year history of the Republic may be said to have been the 
\ letorious road of struggle for the most correct solutions. 

As early as the 1930’s, Kim 11 Sung defined scientifically the 
question of power, indicated the Marxist-Leninist line for its 


22 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


solution in our country, and personally led the struggles for its 
realization. He regarded revolutionary violence as a necessary 
ingredient of that struggle. He advanced the line of develop- 
ing organized armed struggles with a powerful standing armed 
force based on the broad masses of people under the banner of 
Marxism-Leninism. Kim 11 Sung said: “Without revolutionary 
violence the working class cannot triumph in the struggle to 
overthrow the power machine of the exploiting classes and 
establish political rule.” 3 

When the fascist terror of barbarous, heavily armed Japa- 
nese imperialism raged, there was not even the slightest 
possibility of legal political activity. Thus the method of 
revolutionary violence, of anti-Japanese armed struggle, was 
the only correct line for smashing the terror machine, for 
wresting power from Japanese imperialism by the Korean 
people. As experience has shown, organized violence, that is, 
armed struggle in a national liberation war, is the most de- 
cisive form of political struggle for national liberation. This is 
inevitable in view of the aggressive nature of imperialism. 

Counter-revolutionary violence is the essential method of 
domination used by the exploiting classes. Human history 
teaches us that no ruling class has yet surrendered its power of 
its own accord, and that no reactionary class has retired grace- 
fully from power without resorting to counter-revolutionary 
violence. In fact, imperialists cling more and more desperately 
to violent means in order to maintain their rule as their dooms- 
day approaches. The imperialists not only oppress their own 
people but also launch aggression against other peoples, 
mobilize military forces for the purpose of invading and 
plundering other countries, and take repressive actions 
against any revolutionary advances of oppressed peoples. 
Under these conditions, the liberation struggles of an op- 
pressed people can never triumph without recourse to revo- 
lutionary violence aimed at overthrowing the reactionary 
dictatorial machine of imperialists and their collaborators. 


IOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


23 


The line of anti-Japanese armed struggle presented by Kim 
1 1 Sung followed the Juche principle, in which Marxism- 
Leninism was applied creatively to the concrete realities of 
our country. 

The 15 years of armed struggle by the anti-Japanese guer- 
1 1 lias, organized by progressive workers, peasants and patriotic 
youth under the direct leadership of Kim 11 Sung, developed 
In its highest plane the national liberation struggle of the 
Korean people for independence of the fatherland and laid 
,i linn foundation for the establishment of people’s power. 

In the course of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, Kim II 
Sung clearly defined the character and form of the power to 
hr established in the future. On the basis of a scientific analy- 
sis of national and class contradictions and of social and eco- 
nomic conditions, he defined the character of the revolution 
r. an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution. As 
lm the form of power to be established, he presented the view 
that it should be a people’s revolutionary government based 
no a united front of broad anti-Japanese forces spearheaded 
by the peasant-worker alliance led by the working class. 

This perspective for a people’s revolutionary government 
was clearly laid down in the 10-point program of the Associa- 
lion for the Restoration of the Fatherland, formed on May 5, 
I *>36, as the first Marxist-Leninist national united front in the 
history of our country. For instance, Article 1 of the 10-point 
piogram states: “To mobilize the Korean nation generally and 
imlize a broad-based anti-Japanese united front and thereby 
lo overthrow predatory Japanese imperialist rule and establish 
i genuine people’s government of Korea.” The program also 
tressed the need to organize a revolutionary army and de- 
llned the political, economic and social tasks to be carried out 
In the people’s power. 

II specified policies for realizing freedom of speech, press, 
iNscmbly and association, equality of the sexes, and other 
democratic freedoms and rights. 


24 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


The program called for confiscation of land, enterprises, 
railways, banks, ships, farms, irrigation and other facilities in 
the hands of the Japanese imperialists, and of lands and 
properties owned by traitorous, pro-Japanese elements. These 
fully reflected the basic demands for land reform and nation- 
alization of key industries to be fulfilled in the stage of the 
people's democratic revolution. 

Further, the program called for an eight-hour working day, 
implementation of a democratic system of labor safeguards, 
development of national industry, agriculture and commerce — 
that is, the construction of an independent national economy — 
development of a democratic educational system and national 
culture, and various other tasks. 

In this way, the 10-point program integrated the task of 
national liberation and that of social revolution, thereby 
embracing the basic demands of the working class in the stage 
of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution. 
During that period there was a view prevalent that revolution- 
ary power everywhere had to take the same form as in the 
USSR, namely to be exercised through Soviets of workers and 
peasants deputies. Advocates of this line ignored the character 
of the immediate revolution and wrongly demanded that 
socialism be realized at once, starting with liberated guerrilla 
bases. They also advocated elimination of all private owner- 
ship of land, including that of working peasants as well as 
landlords, and the forced establishment of collective cul- 
tivation. 

This view confused stages of revolutionary struggle and did 
serious damage to the revolutionary movement in Korea. 
However, Kim II Sung led those who considered it necessary 
to strive for establishment of a people's revolutionary govern- 
ment based on a broad united front of anti-Japanese forces. 
These were spearheaded by the worker-peasant alliance, in 
turn led by the working class. The line of a people's revolu- 
tionary government was of great significance. It corresponded 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


25 


(o similar tendencies in the world Communist movement, in 
llu* formation of broad anti-imperialist and anti-fascist united 
IVonts, and the struggle to create people’s democratic revolu- 
I ionary governments by the national liberation forces. 

Kim II Sung consciously prepared revolutionary cadres for 
establishing people's power in the future, while undergoing 
licrce anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. Thus, the guerrillas 
were tempered by the study of Marxism-Leninism and by 
practical struggles, and they won the wholehearted confi- 
dence of the people by fighting devotedly for the interests of 

I he masses. Many revolutionary leaders were trained in Kim 

II Sung’s Juche ideas, which were fostered in various revolu- 
tionary organizations, including the Association for the Res- 
toration of the Fatherland. Successful preparation of these 
■ ore leaders enabled them to become effective government 
and Party leaders after liberation, and quickly to expand and 
strengthen the people's power. 

During the anti-Japanese armed struggle valuable experi- 
ence was gained for the establishment of people’s power. The 
practical struggle proved that people's power could be estab- 
lished only through revolutionary violence and that only 
people's power can represent the interests of the broad masses 
ol people in all walks oflife under the leadership of the work- 
ing class. 

lixperience in the course of the rigorous anti-Japanese con- 
lliet showed that the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance 
should be given full play in all areas of people's power; the 
i evolutionary line of independence, self-reliance and self- 
i Irlonse should be the guide to action so that the people's 
power may be strengthened and developed, and its tasks 
ul I iciently fulfilled; the leadership should carry out thor- 
oughly the mass line, constantly improve its capacity and 
methods of action so that people's power may surely main- 
liim firm ties with the masses. 

In this way, the form of power to be established was clearly 


26 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


defined. Revolutionary cadres for establishing people's power 
were trained and tempered in the course of the bitter anti- 
Japanese armed struggle, organized and developed for the 
conquest of power. Rich experience for the operation of 
people’s power was gained through management of the 
people’s revolutionary government established in the guer- 
rilla bases and liberated areas. 

As Kim II Sung wrote: “The Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea is a political power which inherited the brilliant 
revolutionary traditions of the glorious anti-Japanese armed 
struggle waged by the Korean Communists and patriotic 
people and is a great revolutionary achievement won by our 
people through an arduous struggle against the internal and 
external enemies under the leadership of our Party.” 4 


2. HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DPRK 

The Marxist-Leninist line of people’s power, presented by 
Kim II Sung during the anti-Japanese armed struggle, was 
realized fully and thoroughly after liberation in the northern 
half of the Republic. 

The foundation for the establishment of people’s power laid 
during the anti-Japanese armed struggle had a decisive effect 
on its implementation after liberation in our country and on 
strengthening and developing it. It was on this foundation that 
the question of power, the most fundamental and difficult 
question in a revolution, was correctly solved after liberation 
from Japanese imperialism. And people’s power quickly was 
strengthened and developed on the basis of that firm foun- 
dation. 

Under conditions in which the U.S. imperialists were oc- 
cupying South Korea and foreign and domestic reactionaries 
were herded together there, opposing the founding of a 
unified independent state for the Korean people and schem- 


I OUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


27 


mg to split the nation, the policy of constructing a powerful 
democratic base in the northern half was the correct Marxist- 
I icninist political line. Kim 11 Sung explained it as follows: 

Under existing circumstances, the tasks confronting the Com- 
munists in North Korea were to carry through a democratic revolu- 
tion against the remnant forces of imperialism and the feudal forces 
mid to build a unified, democratic independent state, by uniting their 
i.mks promptly and rallying the broad masses of the people around 
themselves. Without energetically furthering the revolution in North 
Korea, already liberated, and creating a powerful revolutionary base 
there to meet the aggressive policy of the U.S. imperialists, we could 
not plan successfully for the country's unification and the all-Korea 
\ letory of the revolution. 5 

From the moment the U.S. imperialists landed in South 
Korea after World War II, Premier Kim II Sung understood 
their aggressive nature and foresaw the complexities and 
difficulties ahead for the Korean revolution. He started to 
« onstruct a powerful base for its victory. 

The formation of a broad united front to rally the masses of 
people in all walks of life was the first question to be solved 
oiler the Liberation. It was on this basis that a really potent 
people’s power could be established.* 


'In those days, the right opportunists, welcoming the U.S. imperialist aggres- 
<»i forces as if they were a liberation army and disregarding the interests of 
I lie overwhelming majority of the people, but representing the interests of 
I uicllords and capitalists, asserted that a bourgeois republic should be 
Intmded. On the other hand, the left opportunists, ignoring the objective law 
>1 l he social development of the country, demanded that the power of pro- 
!• I. irian dictatorship should be established immediately after the Liberation 
I a -.kipping over the stage of democratic revolution. 

Subsequent developments show clearly that these assertions reflected a 

• uniter-revolutionary desire to divorce workers and broad sections of the 
i m nple, beginning with workers and peasants, from the revolution and there- 
in In destroy the revolution. These developments also show that the Marxist- 
I i ii mist line of establishing people’s power, presented by Kim 11 Sung, was 

• In only correct line. 


28 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


Thus, early in 1946, a united front was formed of different 
parties and groupings, democratic forces of various social 
strata. The old machinery of Japanese colonial rule was 
smashed thoroughly by mobilizing broad sections of the 
masses in the struggle. People’s committees were organized 
in all corners of the country, on the basis of which the Pro- 
visional People’s Committee of North Korea, apolitical power 
of a new type, was founded. This was by nature a people’s 
power, relying on the democratic national united front of anti- 
imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic forces, based on the 
worker-peasant alliance led by the working class. In function, 
it was a people’s democratic dictatorship. 

Its basic task was to carry out the 10-point program of the 
Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland and the 20- 
point program presented in March 1946, and to build a strong 
democratic revolutionary base in North Korea. The provisional 
regime enabled the Korean people completely to wipe out the 
old machinery of colonial domination of Japanese imperialism. 
It operated as a dictatorship against subservient capitalists, 
traitors to the nation, pro-Japanese elements and other re- 
actionaries. At the same time it guaranteed complete democ- 
racy for the broad masses of people, including national 
capitalists. Premier Kim II Sung wrote: 

The Party formed a united front with all the political parties, all 
groups and democratic forces of all strata, and organized and mobi- 
lized the broad masses of people to wipe out, first of all, the old rul- 
ing machinery of Japanese imperialism thoroughly and set up state 
power of a new type. Thus it solved the question of power, which is 
the key issue in revolution. The state power we have set up is 
genuine people’s power, based on the worker-peasant alliance led by 
the working class and representing the interests of the people of all 
strata, and it has become a powerful weapon for revolution and 
construction . 6 

A series of democratic reforms — beginning with land reform, 
nationalization of key industries, rights of labor, equal rights 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


29 


lor women — which the Provisional People’s Committee of 
North Korea carried out successfully, not only eliminated the 
economic foundations of landlords, comprador capitalists and 
ill I other reactionary classes and opened up a broad road of 
social progress, but also consolidated the social and economic 
basis of the people’s power. They were decisive in turning 
I he northern half of the Republic into a powerful democratic 
base of the revolution. 

I ,and reform is an urgent question that should be solved in 
I lie stage of democratic revolution. It was of special impor- 
lauce for Korea, then a backward colonial agricultural country 
where the peasantry formed the overwhelming majority of the 
population. Only if the land question is solved correctly can 
I lie peasantry be liberated from feudal landlord exploitation, 

• an the economic base of the reactionary forces, deeply rooted 
in the countryside for several centuries, be done away with. 

I lms the broad peasant masses can be won to the side of the 
i evolution, raising their political enthusiasm, and the bases for 
democratizing the political, economic and cultural life of a 
« uuntry can be strengthened. The winning of the masses is 
(lie vital question that determines the success or failure of the 
icvolution, and to win the broad masses of peasants to the side 
nl the revolution was of decisive significance at the time. 

Above all, the correct solution of the land question makes it 
possible to expedite the development of agricultural produc- 
II ve forces, which have been stagnant, by freeing them from 
Irudal fetters and promoting the rehabilitation and develop- 
ment of the national industry and economy in general. 

The Provisional People’s Committee defined clearly the 
kind of lands to be confiscated, taking fully into consideration 
I lie relations of class forces in the countryside, the relations of 
Lmdownership and the centuries-old aspirations of peasants 
lor land. Land reform was carried out by confiscation and dis- 
tribution without compensation. 

First, as a result of land reform, feudal landownership, the 
.oeial and economic base of the undemocratic reactionary 


30 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


forces, was done away with once and for all in the rural vil- 
lages of the northern half of the Republic. Peasants, liberated 
from bondage, faced a bright future, free to develop agricul- 
ture rapidly and improve their living standards. 

Second, the land reform changed the countryside in the 
northern half of the Republic from a stronghold of reaction 
into a stronghold of democracy. The freed peasants became 
masters of their lands, a basic force for constructing a pros- 
perous, powerful, united, democratic independent state, 
together with the working class, the most progressive class 
of the country. 

Third, the reform was the first complete land reform ever 
carried out in the Far East, and has encouraged the liberation 
struggles of the oppressed peoples of the East who are fight- 
ing against imperialism and domestic feudal forces. 

The nationalization of key industries was decisive in wiping 
out the political and economic bases of the imperialists and 
domestic reactionaries and in promoting the general rehabili- 
tation and development of the national economy. While the 
imperialists and subservient capitalists control the main 
arteries of the economy, they will continue to plunder and 
exploit, and a country cannot attain sovereignty and indepen- 
dence or economic development. Only when the state has a 
firm hold on the basic means of production and has socialized 
them can the political and economic bases of the imperialists 
and domestic reactionaries be wiped out. Then the country 
can develop its national economy, increase the welfare of the 
entire people, and lay the foundation for a socialist economy. 

The Provisional People’s Committee implemented the Law 
on the Nationalization of Important Industries in August 1946. 
Under it, all large factories, mines, power stations, railway 
transport, telecommunication facilities, banks and commercial 
and cultural establishments were made the property of the 
Korean people, the only legitimate owners of these facilities. 
Further, factories and other enterprises owned by pro- 


I OUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


31 


lapanese elements and traitors who had fled with the Japanese 
were confiscated without compensation and became the prop- 
erly of the people. 

It was not for the good of the Korean people that the Japa- 
nese imperialists developed industry in Korea. It was to secure 
large colonial profits by plundering the rich resources of our 
country and by exploiting the Korean people. Moreover, the 
lapanese imperialists also utilized many Korean industrial 
enterprises for the purpose of supplying military goods for 
I lieir aggressive war. The Korean people were forced to lead a 
difficult life of extreme hunger and poverty just before Lib- 
eration. However, this unjust and humiliating system was 
done away with once and for all, and the factories, mines, 
power plants, railways, banks and other enterprises became 
ihe property of the Korean people, to be used to develop a rich 
and powerful fatherland and increase public welfare. 

As a result of the nationalization of key industries, the root 
causes of social ills basically were removed in the northern 
half of the Republic, and socialist relations of production were 
created for the first time in Korea. Democratic reforms, 
beginning with the Labor Law and the Law on the Equality 
of the Sexes, were enforced, putting an end to unlimited ex- 
ploitation of the working class and liberating women from 
I eudal subordination. Women acquired the same rights as 
men in all spheres of social life. 

Moreover, the Provisional People’s Committee successfully 
,( lived the question of national cadres, particularly important 
oi the construction of a new society. Not only did it achieve 
encouraging results in the training of national cadres, but it 
also prepared a revolutionary armed force to defend the 
people’s democratic system from enemy aggression in estab- 
lishing the Korean People’s Army on February 8, 1948. 

In this way the line of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, 
democratic revolution presented by Kim II Sung in the days of 
anti-Japanese armed struggle was carried out completely in 


32 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


the northern half of the Republic, and the Provisional People’s 
Committee of North Korea successfully carried out its his- 
torical mission. 

Radical changes were effected in social, economic and class 
relations in the northern half of the Republic, a people’s 
democratic system was established and a powerful revolu- 
tionary base for an all-Korea victory was founded. In other 
words, all colonial and semi-feudal components were re- 
moved, and socialist economic relations, based on state and 
cooperative economy, came to occupy a leading position in all 
areas of the people’s economy, with capitalist relations con- 
fined to only small commodity production by private farms 
and handicraft enterprises in urban areas and to some com- 
merce and small-scale industry. Concerning class relations, 
landlords, comprador capitalists, pro-Japanese elements and 
traitors were eliminated and working people became the 
masters of the country, the leading role of the working class 
increased and the worker-peasant alliance was consolidated. 
In this way, the balance of forces developed decisively in 
favor of the revolution. 

These developments showed that transition to the socialist 
revolution was on the order of the day and that conditions for it 
had been created. With deep insight, Kim 11 Sung programmed 
the further development of people’s power for the successful 
carrying out of the tasks of the socialist revolution. On Novem- 
ber 3, 1946, the first democratic election in the history of 
Korea was held in the northern half of the Republic. And the 
People’s Committee of North Korea — no longer “Provisional” 
— the first proletarian dictatorship in the country, was created 
in February 1947 at the people’s assemblies of provinces, 
cities and counties of North Korea. 

The People’s Committee of North Korea, functioning as the 
organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat, carried out tasks 
for the transition to socialism and fought for development of 
the people’s economic plan. It achieved successful results in 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


33 


this struggle. The people’s economic plan for the fiscal year 
of 1947 was the first economic plan in the history of our coun- 
try. When it was made public, waverers and reactionaries 
placed obstructions in the way of its implementation. But the 
People’s Committee of North Korea organized powerful 
workers’ production emulation movements, headed by mem- 
bers of the Workers Party in factories, mines and rural com- 
munities. The plan was carried out successfully through an 
upsurge of labor enthusiasm, dealing a shattering blow to 
obstructionists. 

This success established firmly the leading position of 
socialist economy. By 1947 state-controlled industry ac- 
counted for 80.2 per cent and private industry for only 19.8 
per cent of industrial output. Mining was completely state- 
controlled. Industrial production jumped 70 per cent, and 
labor productivity 51 per cent, in fiscal 1947 in comparison 
with the previous year. 

The following year’s plan was also fulfilled successfully. 
These results, combined with democratic reforms, further 
expanded and consolidated the social and economic basis of 
people’s power and provided the foundations for construction 
of a Republic. In addition, a large number of core revolution- 
ary cadres were brought up in the course of the fulfillment of 
the people’s democratic revolution, and broad sections of the 
people were politically awakened. 

These positive factors created a firm foundation for a 
sovereign, democratic, united, independent state, the Demo- 
cratic People’s Republic of Korea, in 1948. Kim 11 Sung wrote 
of this step: 

On the basis of great socio-economic changes in the northern 
sector, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was founded in 
September 1948, according to the general will of the entire Korean 
people, amidst a nationwide struggle against U.S. imperialists and 
their stooges, who had become more pronounced in their colonial 
enslavement policy and maneuvers to split our nation. 7 


34 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


After liberation from Japanese imperialism a sihmtion 

entirely different from that which prevailed in Noith Korea 

was created in South Korea. . , , . 

U S. imperialism followed a complete colonial enslavement 
nolicv as soon as it occupied South Korea on September 8, 
1945, and carried out two basic policies for this puipose. ey 
suppressed politically all the initiatives of the South Korean 
people opposed to the colonial enslavement policy and all 
democratic forces. They mobilized and encouraged all the 
Reactionary forces willing to help the aggressive policy of 
splitting the Korean nation and turning Korea into a colony 
iffain Thus people’s committees that had been set up on the 
initiative of the people immediately after “n were 
ordered disbanded. Reactionaries at home and abioad we 
gathered in South Korea, and former agents of Japan became 
the stooges of U.S. imperialism and began to oppose the pe 
pie. Economically, the U.S. imperialists obstructed the de- 
velopment of Korea’s industry and national economy and tol 
lowed a policy of subordinating them to the U.S. economy. 
They disposed at will of factories and enterprises formerly 
owned by Japanese imperialism in the name o entity 
assets ” selling them to pro-Japanese elements, hartor , 
greedy businessmen and American entrepreneurs They 
even destroyed some outright. Instead rf dtatrib^gte^to 
farmers they cooked up a plunderous organ called Shin Ha 
p"bh Corporation,* which began to exploit the farmmg 
masses more ruthlessly than had the Japanese imperialists. 

‘The predecessor of Shin Han Public Corporation was the notorious Toyo 

="S2s“9~r.:= 

of land rentals in kind were raked in. 


IOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


35 


In this way, South Korea was again plunged down the road 

10 bankruptcy, misfortune, ruin and subordination. The 
policy of aggression and colonial enslavement followed by the 
United States necessarily aroused strong anger and anti- 
American, national salvation struggles among the South 
Korean people. 

At the end of World War II Soviet troops, together with 
Korean and Chinese patriotic forces, smashed the Japanese 

1 1 mies on the continent of Asia. Soviet troops were temporari- 
ly in North Korea, while American troops seized control of 
South Korea. A Soviet-U.S. Joint Committee was set up to 
liieilitate the unification of all Korea under a single demo- 

• ratio government. However, the U.S. imperialists sabotaged 
l lie meetings of the Joint Committee and moved to set up their 
own puppet regime in South Korea, thereby revealing their 
intention to perpetuate the division of the country. 

This action stimulated and intensified the national salva- 
tion struggles of the masses in South Korea. It erupted in a 

• harp, violent struggle at the time of the “separate election” 
in May 1948, when more than 140 polling stations and a num- 
ber ol police stations were destroyed and burned. 

lo save Korea from this grave national crisis, Kim 11 Sung 
nhmitted the draft Provisional Constitution of Korea for dis- 

• ussion by all the people North and South and he proposed 
I lm election of an all-Korea supreme legislative assembly 
•• n <>ugh a general, direct, equal and secret ballot. At the same 
*m* % he called on the political parties and social organizations 

• I South Korea to hold a South-North joint conference to 
<PI>ose the “separate election” and to discuss ways and means 

• •I .living the nation. 

In response to this call, such a joint conference was held in 
ISongyang on April 20, 1948. At the conference, Kim II 
•img reported on the political situation and the tasks for the 
unification of the fatherland. On the basis of his report, the 
• uilerence adopted a resolution completely exposing the 


36 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


fraudulent nature of the planned “separate election and 
called on the people to boycott it. The conference, atten e 
from right to left irrespective of political persuasions, gave u 

supportto Kim II Sung’s report. 

Defying the Korean people’s opposition, the United States 
forcibly carried out the “separate election,” resorting to fascist 
terror and suppression, and it cooked up a puppet regime 
consisting of a group of landlords, subservient capitalists and 

* On June 29, 1948, a conference of leaders of various political 
parties and social organizations of North and South Korea 
decided to hold an all-Korea general election on August to 
organize a supreme legislative organ, in line with the proposal 
of Kim II Sung. Participating in the general election, he 
according to this decision, were 99.97 per cent of the total 
eligible voters in North Korea and 77.52 per cent in South 
Korea, despite ruthless suppression by the United States an 
its stooges. As a result of the election, 572 deputies to the 
Supreme People’s Assembly were elected from the North an 
South The first session of the Supreme People s Assem y, 
held in Pyongyang in September 1948, named the country the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, adopted a constitu 
tion and established a government of the Republic headed by 

Premier Kim 11 Sung. . 

The founding of the DPRK was in accord with the unani- 
mous desire of all the Korean people to win freedom and 
independence for their fatherland. It was an event of historic 
significance in the revolutionary struggle of the Korean peo- 
ple. It was also a brilliant victory for the Korean people, umtec 
firmly around the Workers Party of Korea under the leadership 
of Kim II Sung, in their tenacious struggle for a prosperous, 
sovereign, independent state. 

As a result of the founding of the Republic he Korean 
people achieved a homeland, becoming a powerful and digni- 
fied people no one would dare to insult, people of a sovereign, 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


37 


independent state, people who were building their fatherland 
on their own, with sovereignty completely in their hands. The 
Korean people, under the banner of the Republic, made its 
dclmt anew on the stage of history, and the fatherland, which 
had been obliterated from the map of the world for a long 
lime, took its place shoulder to shoulder with the world’s 
countries, large and small, on an equal footing. 

As a result of the founding of the Republic, the Korean 
people acquired a more powerful weapon with which to 
achieve socialism and communism. That weapon is the dic- 
tatorship of the proletariat, making it possible for them to 
assure the overwhelming superiority of the revolutionary 
lorees over the counter-revolutionary forces on a nationwide 
' ale, to smash all possible maneuvers of the imperialists and 
i dictionaries and to accelerate the revolution and socialist 

• oustruction. 

Finally, the founding of the Republic gave boundless 
>1 length and encouragement to the entire Korean people who, 
with their destiny in their hands, had risen in revolutionary 
1 1 aggie to create a bright, new life for themselves and to unify 
die divided fatherland. At the same time, it increased decisive- 
d I lie national pride and confidence of the people, who had 
I 'i i mne masters of their own country. Today the South Korean 
I>le, encouraged by the victory achieved in revolution and 

• instruction in the northern half of the Republic, are develop- 

tenacious struggles in defiance of fascist suppression and 
" piession to realize national unification under the banner of 
dn Republic. 

Indeed, the DPRK is the banner of freedom and indepen- 

1 for the entire people, the symbol of their victory and 

l"iv, and a powerful weapon in the struggle to achieve the 
mitl ication of the fatherland and the building of socialism and 
•'Nimunism. 


38 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


3. ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE DPRK 

In the 20 years since its founding, the Republic has tra- 
versed a glorious and victorious road under the leadership o 
Premier Kim 11 Sung and fulfilled its role as a weapon lor 
socialist revolution and construction. It has strengthened 
constantly the functions of the dictatorship of the proletary 
and carried out revolutionary tasks in all domains, including 
political, economic, cultural and military affairs. 

The political power of the Republic smashed revolts by the 
defeated exploiting classes and secured the leading position of 
the state sector in the economic field, while restnc g 
capitalist development, fought for the planned development 
of the national economy and achieved great results. 

On the basis of the plans of 1947 and 1948, the two-year eco- 
nomic plan for 1949 and 1950 was adopted. In those days, pre- 
parations for a socialist transformation of the relations of 
production were set into motion, and substantial results were 
achieved in eliminating the colonial distortions of the econ- 
omy and laying the foundations for an independent national 

e °However, this preparatory work for the transition to social- 
ism had to be suspended when U.S. imperialism launched its 
predatory armed aggression against the North on ^ June 25, 
1950. The hard-fought three-year war for defense of the father 
land was the most severe trial for the Republic and the entire 

Korean people. r .1 

The Workers Party of Korea and the government of the 

Republic put everything on a wartime footing in response 
,0 Premier Kim II Sung’s eal) "All for Victory in the War, and 
organized and mobilized the people for a decisive struggle. 
The people fought heroically with patriotic devotion and sell- 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


39 


sacrifice. The Korean People's Army engaged in fierce 
counter-offensives to liberate areas in the southern half, then 
in strategic retreat and again in hard-fought battles for re- 
newed advance and in defense of positions. In the midst of 
intensified enemy air-raids, workers, farmers, youths and 
students in the rear concentrated on wartime production, 
supported the front, and surmounted all obstacles and dif- 
liculties to insure victory. 

1 he peoples of the socialist countries, beginning with the 
Soviet Union, actively extended material and moral assistance 

10 the struggle of the Korean people. The Chinese sent volun- 
Iccrs, who shed their blood to help the Korean people in the 
war. Together with the socialist countries, all progressive 
countries and people of the world denounced the aggression 
n| U.S. imperialism and supported the Korean people in their 
lust struggle. 

In the United States, American Communists and other anti- 
imperialists opposed the war, and were persecuted severely 
l>y the ruling class. Later, mass opposition to the war spread in 
I lie United States, and helped hasten its end. 

U.S. imperialism mobilized tremendous quantities of the 
liitcst type of combat equipment and materials and resorted to 
barbarous methods and means of warfare unprecedented in 
military history.* But it suffered an irretrievable defeat for the 
In si time in its history at the hands of the Korean people who 
•ought heroically, following the strategy and tactics of Kim 

11 Sung. 


'IS. imperialism mobilized an armed force of two million men on the Korean 
•"'•it. including one-third of its army, a large part of its Pacific Fleet, and 

• miles of 15 satellite countries. At the same time, it used all modern arms 
M *'Pt the atomic bomb. In the three years of the Korean War, the United 

• ' lies suffered losses in personnel and military equipment 2.3 times larger 
»!• 111 il had suffered in the four years of battles in the Pacific theater in World 
Win II. 


40 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


The Fatherland Liberation War was a hard-fought anti- 
imperialist struggle against the allied forces of international 
reaction, headed by U.S. imperialism. It was at the same tune 
a sharp class struggle against the enemies of *e People. The 
great historic victory of the Korean people m the war was an 
epochal event of great historical significance for devetop- 
ment not only of the Korean revolution but a so of the worW 
revolution. The world anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle 

^Thetictory of the Korean people in the Fatherland Libera- 
tion War was a victory for Kim 11 Sungs revolutionary ideas 
and for his strategy and tactics. The victory demonstrated that 
free people who fight for the independence and progress of 
their fatherland, under the leadership of a Marxist-Lenims 
Party are invincible. It showed also that the decisive factor 
ta vi'ctoTvTn war is not the kind of weapons used or technical 
superiority but the power of the united people, who are firmly 

convinced of the justness of their cause. 

The outcome of the war set back U.S imperialism, which 
boastfully had declared itself the “mightiest in the world, 
shattering the myth of its “world leadership and signaled the 
beginning of its decline. Furthermore, it shattered the aggres- 
sive designs of U.S. imperialism toward the countries of 
socialist camp, safeguarded the eastern outpost of the socialist 
camp and contributed to the defense of world peace and 

secunty^atheriand Liberation War strengthened decisively 
the subjective revolutionary capacity of our country, s 
result of severe trials during the war, the people were awak- 
ened more and tempered more, and the People s Army de- 
veloped into an invincible revolutionary army, well trained 
politically, ideologically and in military technique, an 
equipped with rich combat experience. At the same time 
several hundreds of thousands of revolutionary cadres we 
trained in the blazing flames of war. They were to be the 
precious foundation for the victory of the revolution. 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


41 


After the war, the North Korean people were faced with 
I he grave task of converting the armistice into a lasting peace, 
rebuilding the destroyed economy as soon as possible, im- 
proving the impoverished people's living conditions quickly, 
•md thereby strengthening the northern half of the Republic, 
I Ik* base of the Korean revolution, politically, economically 
.md militarily, and converting it into a powerful material 
lorce for the unification of the fatherland. 

The sixth plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean 
Workers Party, called on August 5, 1953 to consider these 
pressing tasks of the revolution, decided to promote postwar 
lolmbilitation and development of the people's economy in 
llnee basic stages, according to a proposal of Kim II Sung. 

The first was a preparatory stage for general rehabilitation 
•md development of the people's economy, a period of six 
months to one year in which preparations and adjustments 
were to be made for general rehabilitation of the economy. 
In I lie second stage, it was decided to carry out a Three-Year 
I Ian for the rehabilitation and development of the people's 
• i onomy and to recover prewar levels in all economic 
In, inches. In the third stage, a Five-Year Plan would be 
worked out to complete the first stage of industrialization in 
North Korea and to lay the foundations for socialist indus- 
hlulization. 

The basic line of postwar economic construction was the 
M.irxist-Leninist theory of expanded reproduction applied 

suit the requirements and possibilities of economic devel- 
opment in the northern half of the Republic. It was a revolu- 
llonary line, reflecting the Juche principle of constructing 
m independent national economy as soon as possible, in the 
pit it of self-reliance. 

\ 1 1 essential feature was the priority development of heavy 
industry while simultaneously developing light industry and 
ijp (culture. Without first developing heavy industry, it is 
impossible to develop light industry or agriculture, nor is it 
Possible to secure expanded reproduction. Heavy industry 


42 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


is the most important base of the economy and is a cential 
factor in successfully solving all problems. It is only when 
heavy industry is developed that socialist industrialization 
can be realized and a firm foundation laid for a powerful, in- 
dependent national economy. In other words, heavy industi> 
is the material basis for a country’s political and economic 
independence. Without it, the economy cannot be inde- 
pendent or national and the national defense capability can- 
not be built up. 

The country had conditions favorable for the development 
of heavy industry, despite the limitations of the colonial 
economy. In particular, it has vast mineral resources. If 
these mineral resources were developed and utilized coi- 
rectly, it would be possible to develop a decisive heavy 
industry. 

The Party’s program was for the country to create its own 
heavy industrial base, which would be equipped with new 
techniques, developed mainly on the basis of domestic natuial 
resources, and would be able to provide domestic manufac- 
ture with materials, fuels, power, machinery and equipment 
necessary for the people’s economy of the northern half of 
the Republic. It would also rely on its own technical cadres. 
This was precisely the program for creating an independent, 
modern heavy industry, on th e Juchs piinciple. 

Further, most important was to develop heavy industry 
not for its own sake but in a manner that would serve directly 
and most effectively the development of light industry and 
agriculture. This would lay the foundation for socialist in- 
dustrialization and would supply the clothing, food and 
shelter which the people required. When heavy industry 
of all types was developed, a powerful base for simultaneously 
developing light industry and agriculture would be created. 

Moreover, without developing light industry and agricul- 
ture, it would be impossible to restore and improve the living 
standards of the people, impoverished by wartime destruc- 


IOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


43 


lion. Indeed, there was a pressing need to improve the 
people’s living conditions as soon as possible. 

Industry in North Korea, distorted to satisfy the specific 
requirements of Japanese colonialists, included hardly any 
light industry. It was difficult to decide under what condi- 
tions light industry was to be developed and to settle on its 
specific content. 

Furthermore, our agriculture was extremely backward, as 
might be expected under colonial conditions and, to make 
matters worse, it was largely destroyed by the war. Without 
developing agriculture, it was impossible to supply raw 
materials to light industry, or to improve living conditions. 
Kim II Sung wrote of this period: 

We suffered from a shortage of able technicians, and we did not 
Imve equipment, either. We had to develop light industry at the 
mine time as we were rehabilitating heavy industry, under con- 
ditions where the economy had been seriously damaged by war. 

I here is no precedent for this in the annals of other countries. 

II we study the history of the industrial development of other 
< mmtries, we will see that in many, heavy industry was developed 
I li si, and later light industry was developed, while in other coun- 
tues, light industry was developed first, to accumulate funds, and 
llirii later heavy industiy was constructed. 

However, in our country, if heavy industry only had been de- 
i loped, when the people had only the clothes on their backs be- 

■ misc of the war and when the towns and countryside had been 
ili'vustated, it would have been impossible to provide the people 
villi clothing, food and shelter. 

I herefore, we had to develop heavy industry and, at the same time, 
ll«bl industry and agriculture as well. 8 

I'liis was a completely untrodden path, one that had never 
I 'li followed even by a socialist country, let alone by a 

■ ipltalist country. 

As might be expected, anti-Party elements in the Party, 
revisionists and dogmatists at home and abroad, made a 
'"mini attack on this line, charging that undue importance 


44 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


was being given to heavy industry when people are suffer- 
ing- machinery does not produce food. They argued, in effec , 
that everything should be channeled into consumer goods, 
whatever the future might be, and they opposed the con- 
struction of a foundation for an independent national 

< C However, the Party and the government turned back these 
attacks and resolutely defended Kim II Sung’s program for 
postwar economic rehabilitation and development, mobiliz- 
ing the people to fight for its fulfillment. In only nine months 
alter the armistice the tasks set for the first stage tie pie 
paratory stage of general rehabilitation and development ol 
the economy- were carried out successfully. 

In this short period, several scores of thousands of tempo- 
rary houses were built in towns and countryside; rehabili a- 
tion and construction in tbe countryside were started. Prices 
were lowered and living conditions of the people were be- 
ginning to improve. Destroyed cities and factories rose horn 
the debris and were restored and repaired. Large ceramic 
plants were constructed in all parts of the country and were 
preparing for production. A large number of industrial and 
agricultural enterprises, beginning with the Kangson Steel 
Works, Songjin Steel Works, Sunghori Cement Factory and 
Komusan Cement Factory, mines and other enterprises, were 
already either partially or wholly in production while many 
enterprises in light industry, including Nampo Glass Factory 
and Pyongyang Spinning Mill, were being readied lor full- 

On the basis of these successes, the Party proposed a Th 
Year Plan for the rehabilitation and development of t e 
people’s economy for 1954-1956. This was the second stage^ 
The basic task of the Three-Year Plan was to raise industrial 
and agricultural production to their prewar levels, to develop 
rapidly every sector of the people’s economy, science cul- 
ture and arts and to provide a strong economic foundation 
for improving the living standards ol the people. 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


45 


The Three-Year Plan was intended not only to restore 
the war-torn people’s economy. Its main task was to eradicate 
every vestige of distortion in the economy inherited from long 
colonial rule by Japanese imperialism, and ensure priority 
development of heavy industry for the purpose of laying the 
foundation for socialist industrialization of the northern half 
of the Republic. At the same time, the purpose was also to 
rehabilitate and develop light industry and agriculture in 
order to stabilize and improve the living conditions of the 
people, which had been lowered by the war. 

For instance, the Three-Year Plan envisaged a 2.6-fold 
Increase in total industrial production in fiscal 1956, the final 
year of the plan, as compared with 1953. A 1.3-fold advance 
was planned for the production of the means of production, 
mid a two-fold increase for the production of consumer goods. 
These goals were far in excess of their respective prewar 
1949 levels. 

In the sphere of agriculture, it was planned during the 
1 1 n ee-year period to increase grain output to the level of 
1949, when the highest grain production was recorded, to 
expand further the mechanization of agriculture, and to lay 
• lie foundation for its rapid development. 

Concerning the life of the people, the plan proposed that 
production of foodstuff and daily necessities in 1956 was to 
lie double that of 1949. A five-fold increase in the output of 
« olton fabrics and more than a three-fold gain in the manu- 
facture of rubber shoes was envisaged for the same period. 

The plan called for an increase in labor productivity of 
/(i per cent in industry and 74 per cent in construction. 

'The workers succeeded in fulfilling these important tasks 
ni I wo years and four months, or ahead of schedule, by dis- 
playing initiative and good will and by fighting heroically 
lor I he fulfillment of the tasks set by the Party. 

Total industrial production of state-run and cooperative 
■ nlcrprises in 1955 was 2.3 times greater than in 1953 and 56 
i 'Ci cent higher than the prewar level. The production of the 


46 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


means of production rose 3.1-fold in 1955 oyer 1953 and con- 
sumer goods, 1.7-fold. In other words, by the end of January 
1955, industrial production of state-run and cooperative 
enterprises exceeded the level set for 1956 in the Three-7 eai 

In comparison with 1949, by 1955 output of means of pro- 
duction was up 51.7 per cent, while output of consumers 
goods was up 48.3 per cent. Thus the preferential develop- 
ment of heavy industry was carried out, along with the rapi 
rebuilding and development of light industry and agriculture. 

Concerning heavy industry, production of the machine 
building and metal working industry climbed 2.3-fold; oie 
extraction, 107 per cent; the metallurgical industry, 109 per 
cent, and construction materials manufacturing, • ° 

All these industries exceeded their prewar levels. 

In light industry, output of the spinning and weaving indus- 
tries jumped 2.2-fold; paper manufacturing, 106 per cent; 
leather and shoemaking, 196 per cent. Production of the food 
processing and pharmaceutical manufacturing industries 
rose 120 and 260 per cent, respectively, during the plan 

Pe in°agriculture, encouraging results were also achieved. In 
the two years of 1954 and 1955, 37,700 chongbo * 'of land were 
brought under cultivation for the first time, while irrigation 
work in South Pyongan province made progress -43 waei 
reservoirs and 568 pumping stations were repaired or newly 
constructed. Construction work in this respect was expanded 

on a larger scale in 1956. As a result, between 1954. and April 
1956 the area of irrigated land was increased b> . , 

chongbo through state capital investments and riverem- 
bankment construction work to prevent flooding of 100,000 
or more chongbo of farmland was completed. 

The number of farm machinery leasing stations rose three- 


*A chongbo equals a hectare or 2.47 acres. 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


47 


Ibid between 1953 and 1955, and the number of tractors (in 
terms of 15 hp units) climbed 3.9-fold. A large number of 
power-driven farm machines, including threshing machines, 
were turned out for agriculture. 

On the basis of results accomplished during the experi- 
mental period 1953-1954, the trend toward agricultural co- 
operatives was phased into a mass movement in 1956. Thus, 
by the end of February 1956, 14,651 agricultural cooperatives 
were organized, comprising 65.2 per cent of total farm house- 
holds and accounting for 62.1 per cent of the total land under 
cultivation. 

The people's material and cultural levels were measurably 
improved during the plan period. Thus, national income in 
1955 rose to 160 per cent of 1953 and to 111 per cent of the 
prewar year 1949. As a result of four postwar reductions in 
I he prices of consumer goods, prices in state-run and coopera- 
llve stores fell as much as 40 per cent in 1955 as compared 
with 1953. Together with this, the wages of industrial and 
clerical workers rose 35 per cent on an average during 1955 
alone. 

Of special importance regarding the fulfillment of the 
Iliree-Year Plan was the fact that, during the plan period, 
socialist elements were especially developed in all branches 
ul the economy and that these elements came to occupy a 
ilmninant position, providing a powerful material foundation 
lor a socialist transformation of the people's economy. 

Thus, in industry, production of state-run and cooperative 
industrial enterprises which was 90.7 per cent of total in- 
dustrial production in fiscal 1949, rose to 98.3 per cent in 
1955. Further, hitherto in agriculture, socialist sectors, in- 

• hiding state farms, stock-breeding farms and agricultural 
I. ii m machine leasing stations, accounted for only 3.2 per cent 

• •I total agricultural production. In 1955, however, these 
icctors, together with agricultural cooperatives, took a lead- 
ing position in agriculture. In the distribution of commodities, 


48 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


the proportion of state-run and cooperative commerce to total 
distribution of retail commodities rose from 56.5 to 84.6 per 
cent in the same period, with only 15.4 per cent left to private 

As a result of successful fulfillment of the Three-Year Plan, 
the tasks set for the second stage of postwar economic rehabil- 
itation and development -completely erasing the damage 
done by the war to all branches of the economy and raising 
industrial and agricultural production to their prewar levels - 
were fulfilled ahead of schedule. The Korean people became 
self-sustaining and able to promote socialist construction 
more vigorously. The most difficult postwar rehabilitation 
work was thus carried out successfully in a short period -only 

three to four years — after the war. 

Thus the stage was set for Premier Kim 11 Sung to propose 
a long-range Five-Year Plan, the first of its kind in Korean 
history, at the Third Congress of the Workers Party of Korea 
(April 1956). The basic task of the Five-Year Plan, started in 
1957 was to lay the foundations for socialism in oui counti} 
and to solve the basic problems of food, clothing and shelter 

The most important task in the construction of the basis of 
socialism, which was to be implemented during the Five-Year 
Plan period, was to complete the socialist transformation of 
the relations of production in the towns and countryside and 
to establish the socialist system generally. Only through the 
socialist transformation of the relations of production and 
overall establishment of the socialist system is it possible to 
eliminate all the socio-economic sources of exploitation and 
oppression, to give full play to the essential superiority ol 
the socialist system, to develop rapidly the productive foices 
of the country and improve decisively the lives of the people. 

In particular, the socialist transformation of agriculture was 

the most pressing revolutionary task. It had to be started im- 
mediately following the completion of land reform so the 
agrarian question finally could be solved by drawing broad 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


49 


sections of the farming masses onto the road of socialism and 
leading them to participate in the construction of socialism 
and communism. 

The political power of the Republic, relying on the basic 
program for the socialist transformation of agriculture, carried 
out this difficult and complex task successfully in a short 
period of only four to five years. Kim 11 Sung wrote: 

In carrying out the socialist transformation of agriculture, we 
determined properly the stages and tempo of the development of 
agricultural collectivization and the forms and sizes of the collectives 
by creatively applying the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism 
lo suit the specific conditions of our country, and we strictly ad- 
hered to the Leninist voluntary principle and brought the peasants 
(o realize the advantages of the cooperative economy through 
practical examples and, on this basis, promoted this movement 
efficiently. 9 

Earlier, as a result of the successful implementation of the 
land reform, landlord ownership of land was completely 
eliminated, and the land became the property of its tillers. 
Thus, agriculture developed at a rapid tempo and the living 
conditions of the peasantry improved markedly. Economic 
lies between town and countryside, industry and agriculture 
were also strengthened, further consolidating the worker- 
peasant alliance. 

However, although land reform was a far-reaching, revolu- 
l ionary transformation of great political and economic sig- 
nificance, it alone was not sufficient to solve the agrarian 
question finally or to develop agricultural production de- 
cisively. 

As a result of the land reform, small-scale commodity pro- 
duction in the form of private farms became dominant in the 
countryside. As is well known, this situation breeds capital- 
ism and a bourgeoisie. It goes without saying, however, that 
in our country where political power was in the hands of the 


50 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


people, led by the working class, the basic means of produc- 
tion were concentrated in the state. Even though land reform 
had been completely carried out, such a process of class dif- 
ferentiation in the country necessarily was greatly restricted. 
Whatever the case may be, where private commodity economy 
prevailed, it was impossible to improve radically the living 
standards of farmers or to eliminate the sources of exploita- 
tion and poverty in the countryside. 

Further, where there were small-scale, scattered private 
farms, it was impossible to develop agricultural production 
in a planned way, nor was it possible to achieve expanded 
reproduction. This situation necessarily came into conflict 
with the large-scale, greatly concentrated, socialist industry, 
which had been rebuilt and developed according to the state 
plans in the postwar period, and was achieving expanded 
reproduction. 

It was possible to solve this contradiction only by trans- 
forming private farms into socialist cooperatives. 

The solution to the agrarian and agricultural question in 
the stage of the socialist revolution was to eliminate all 
capitalist elements from the countryside, to liberate the 
peasantry from all forms of exploitation and oppression once 
and for all by transforming private farms into socialist collec- 
tive farms and to liberate agricultural productive forces com- 
pletely from the fetters of the old relations of production based 
on private ownership. 

Particularly in the postwar situation, in which the economy 
and the lives of the people were seriously destroyed and im- 
poverished, was such a solution most pressing. If the contra- 
diction between socialist industry and private farms had been 
left as it was, not only would the development of agriculture 
have been hampered, but also the balance between industry 
and agriculture would have been destroyed, and the problem 
of foodstuffs would not have been solved. 

Accordingly, the sixth plenum of the Central Committee 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


51 


of the Workers Party of Korea (August 1953) presented the 
task of establishing agricultural cooperatives. 

Preparations had already been made gradually, even before 
the war, for agricultural collectivization. Land reform elimi- 
nated landlords, and rich farmers received a shattering blow 
when they were forbidden to sell or purchase land, to use 
mortgages, or to have their land cultivated by tenant peasants. 
At the same time when key industries were nationalized, 
material conditions were provided for the socialist transfor- 
mation of agriculture. Various forms of cooperative labor on 
the farm, including the organization of traditional draught-ox- 
joint-use teams and mutual-aid labor teams, which had been 
developed and spread during the war, increased the spirit 
of mutual assistance and the desire for cooperative manage- 
ment among the farmers. 

After the armistice, the Party actively supported the policy 
of collectivization of agriculture. Relying on poor peasants 
who accepted the policy, and on Party activists, a number of 
agricultural cooperatives were organized in each county. 
These were experimental agricultural cooperatives. In this 
stage, the Party and the government extended positive guid- 
ance and aid in control and management of agricultural 
cooperatives. They supplied chemical fertilizers, agricultural 
machinery and building material; loaned foodstuffs and seed; 
advanced funds; cut the tax rate in kind, and offered labor 
assistance. As a result, agricultural cooperatives were able 
gradually to display their superiority, to demonstrate the ad- 
vantages of cooperative management in practice. 

By 1954 the per unit area yield of crops on cooperative 
farms increased by 10 to 50 per cent as compared with that 
on private farms, and cash income increased two to seven 
limes as well. In addition, powerful organizational and 
political activities, developed by the Party among the peas- 
ants, led to the participation not only of poor peasants but also 
of middle peasants in the cooperative movement, thus making 


52 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


it possible for the movement eventually to reach nationwide 
development. 

A particularly important problem at this stage was to deter- 
mine the correct form of cooperative management and inte- 
gration of the means of production in keeping with the actual 
situation. This was of great significance for involving more 
middle peasants in the cooperative movement and in pre- 
venting mistakes. 

On the basis of a scientific analysis of actual circumstances 
in the rural districts and of farmers in the country, Kim II 
Sung set forth three forms of cooperative management and 
integration of the means of production: 

1. Permanent mutual-aid labor units for collective farm 
work. 

2. A semi-socialist form of distribution, according to 
labor and land, with farm management itself carried out 
jointly after land integration. 

3. A completely socialist setup in which distribution is 
made solely according to labor, after land and other basic 
means of production are integrated. 

The Republic conducted a campaign to enlist the farming 
masses in these three forms of cooperative management. In 
the course of this campaign, the principle of free choice 
always was strictly observed, although the movement was 
never allowed to develop spontaneously. In promoting the 
cooperative movement, the Republic constantly held fast to 
the correct class policy of relying firmly on the poor peasantry 
and strengthening its alliance with the middle peasants while, 
at the same time, placing restrictions on well-to-do farmers, 
instead of expropriating their land, so that they might grad- 
ually adapt themselves to actual conditions. 

An important factor was to decide the proper size for agri- 
cultural cooperatives. At the outset, they were comparatively 
small, one cooperative covering about 40 to 100 farm house- 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


53 


holds. Under existing circumstances, this size was most 
reasonable. 

Numerical growth in cooperative farms proceeded parallel 
with their qualitative strengthening. Of great significance 
in this respect was an intensive course given as a guide by 
the Party to the agricultural cooperatives, once or twice a year, 
from the beginning of 1955. This concentrated program was 
given to several thousand leading members of both central 
and local organs at a time. It was of decisive significance in 
further consolidating agricultural cooperatives politically 
and economically. 

State assistance by the working class to the agricultural 
cooperatives was also strengthened decisively, as is proven 
by the fact that state funds invested in agriculture after the 
war amounted to the huge sum of 12 billion won* This ac- 
corded with principles expressed by Lenin at a corresponding 
period of the development of socialism in the USSR: “A 
social system emerges only if it has the financial backing of 
a definite class. ... At present we have to realize that the 
cooperative system is the social system to which we must 
now give more than ordinary assistance. . .” 10 

By 1956 more than half of all farms were members of cooper- 
atives, and their superiority’ was manifest. Thus the Workers 
Party of Korea at its Third Congress, April 1956, set the task 
of completing agricultural collectivization during the first 
Five-Year Plan. The task was accomplished, in fact, by August 
1958. 

This was a great revolutionary gain and was a brilliant vic- 
tory for the agrarian policy of the Party. As a result, our farm 
villages were able to do away with the social and economic 
sources of all forms of exploitation and oppression, as well as 
of poverty. All the peasants became socialist worker-farmers 
and the farm villages in the northern half of the Republic 

•About $5 billion at the rate of $0,403 for the North Korean t von. 


54 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


became advanced socialist farm villages. Further, this victory 
completely freed the agricultural productive forces from all 
the fetters of the old relations of production, thus paving the 
way for unlimited development of agricultural productive 
forces. On the new socialist basis, the worker-peasant alliance 
was consolidated further, which contributed toward strength- 
ening the political and economic foundations of the people s 
power. 

Thus, North Korea’s most important task in the stage ot 
socialist revolution, the socialist transformation of the rela- 
tions of production in the rural areas, was carried out success- 
fully in the short period of four to five years after the war. 

It is by no means an easy task to convert private agricultural 
farms, comprising several million peasants, into socialist 
farms, on the basis of their free choice, and in such a shoit 
span of time. It could only be achieved through fierce class 
struggle. 

Vacillating elements opposed the program, pleading it was 
“premature.” This was expressed in their questions: “What is 
the reason for collectivization now when North and South 
still remain divided?” and, * Is collectivization really possible 
when there are no farm machines available?” In the course of 
the program, also, some objectionable actions were observed, 
such as a tendency to concentrate efforts solely on increasing 
the number of cooperatives and on organizing cooperatives 
too high in level or too large in scale. 

The Party maintained that, even where the material and 
technical foundations of farm villages are weak and where the 
agricultural productive forces have not yet reached a suffi- 
ciently high level of development, socialist transformation of 
production relations in rural districts is unavoidable when 
farmers demand it and when it accords with the objective 
laws of the development of the revolution, and that, in such 
a case, it must be pushed forward resolutely. 

Moreover, the Party adhered strictly to the Leninist pnnci- 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


55 


pie of voluntary cooperative formation so that the farmers 
should be convinced of the superiority of cooperative farms 
through actual examples, and the program should be promoted 
on the basis of their conviction. Particularly, the voluntary 
principle was applied not only to middle peasants, but also to 
all other classes in the farm villages, including even well- 
to-do farmers. In other words, the Party adopted the policy 
of gradually remolding well-to-do farmers in the process of 
the collectivization movement, though it placed strict re- 
strictions on their acts of exploitation. Since the drive for 
agricultural cooperatives was accompanied by fierce class 
struggles, the Party was always faithful to the Marxist-Leninist 
class policy of depending on the poor peasants, of strengthen- 
ing their alliance with middle peasants, and of restricting and 
gradually remolding big farmers. 

Along with agricultural collectivization, the conversion of 
urban handicrafts and capitalist commerce and industry into 
socialist forms is an important component of the socialist 
revolution. 

During the period of Japanese colonial rule, the important 
sectors of the economy were under the complete control of 
Japanese monopoly capital and the role of Korean national 
capital was insignificant, since very strict restrictions were 
placed upon its development. 

Even after the liberation of Korea, capitalist commerce and 
industry, which were weak from the very outset, played an 
even less important part because of the successful nationaliza- 
lion of key industries, which assumed a leading position in the 
people’s state-managed socialist sector. Further, owing to war 
damage, capitalist commerce and industry suffered so severe a 
decline that it was almost impossible to tell them from handi- 
craft in scale of operations. 

Under these circumstances, the conversion of capitalist 
commerce and industry to socialist forms became urgent in 
the postwar period. The Republic adopted a policy of enlisting 


56 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


people engaged in capitalist commerce and industry in various 
forms of cooperative enterprises in conformity with their 
actual conditions and, by so doing, succeeded in giadually 
orienting them to socialism. In this way, they were able to 
make a clean break with their past, when they had not earned 
their livelihoods with their own labor but with others labor, 
and to become socialist workers, producing material wealth 
through their own labor. 

Thus, in the northern half of the Republic, the socialist 
transformation of the relations of production, in both the rural 
and urban communities, was completed by August 1958, and 
socialism was firmly established in cities and villages. This 
was an event of truly great historical significance in the de- 
velopment of the Korean revolution. As Kim 11 Sung wrote. 

As a result of the socialist transformation of private handicrafts and 
capitalist trade and industry, as well as the completion of agricultural 
collectivization, the socialist forms of economy came to hold undivid- 
ed sway in our towns and countryside. This opened a wide avenue 
for the rapid development of the country s productive forces and 
made it possible to liquidate the sources of exploitation and poverty 
which had existed for thousands of years and to improve the material 
and cultural standards of the people markedly. 11 

The basic task for socialist construction during the period of 
the Five-Year Plan was to lay the foundation for socialist 
industrialization and build a base for the development of an 
independent national economy. As a result of its successful 
fulfillment, North Korea advanced from the period of rehabili- 
tation into a period of technical innovation. 

The Five-Year Plan was devised as the first stage of this 
technical innovation. It aimed at further consolidating the 
foundations for an independent national economy by laying 
the bases for socialist industrialization during the plan peiiod 
and by creating the facilities for equipping all sectois of the 
economy with up-to-date technology, dhe Plan also aimed at 
solving the food, clothing and housing problems, the basic 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


57 


problems of the people's existence, during the five-year period 
and to this end concentrated on grain production, textile 
industries and housing construction. In short, the task of the 
Five-Year Plan in the realm of socialist construction was to 
achieve a rationally coordinated, balanced solution to the 
problems of economic construction and people's living 
conditions. 

Building the foundations for socialist industrialization 
meant wiping out completely the colonial distortions of indus- 
try and constructing an independent and modern socialist 
industry. It meant converting the northern half of the Repub- 
lic from a backward agricultural country into a socialist in- 
dustrial-agricultural state by overcoming the backwardness of 
agriculture and building a self-reliant and independent 
economy. This was the main thrust of the Five-Year Plan 
looking toward future socialist construction. 

Kim II Sung said: “By the construction of a self-reliant and 
independent economy is meant the building of a country 
where we can meet all our needs ourselves and can live a 
decent life, that is, a country of self-sufficiency." 12 

In the course of implementing the Five-Year Plan, the 
Workers Party of Korea and the people were again confronted 
by new difficulties and trials. 

During the period between 1956 and 1957, when the Five- 
Year Plan was in its initial stage, differences appeared within 
the international communist movement and, availing them- 
selves of this opportunity, the world's imperialists and re- 
actionaries evolved large-scale anti-communist campaigns. 
Keeping pace with these international movements, the U.S. 
imperialists occupying South Korea and their South Korean 
stooges greatly intensified their reactionary offensive against 
I he northern half of the Republic. At the same time, within 
l lie Party itself, anti-party revisionist elements conspired with 
external forces, exploiting this complicated situation, and 
made a frontal challenge to the Party. 


58 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


There were also many problems hampering economic 
construction, such as insufficient materials or funds to accom- 
plish the gigantic Five-Year Plan. People’s lives were hard. 
To cope with this complex and difficult situation at home and 
abroad, the Party urged all to work and fulfill successfully the 
Five-Year Plan. Premier Kim 11 Sung wrote: "We could rely 
only on our Party members and our people. The Party decided 
to surmount the difficulties and trials by placing confidence 
in Party members and the masses of the people and by mobi- 
lizing their efforts.' ” 13 

At the December 1956 plenum of the Party’s Central Com- 
mittee, the tasks to be accomplished during the first year of 
the Five-Year Plan and the methods of fulfilling them were 
discussed and decided. The Party adopted the line of advanc- 
ing the revolution and construction, frustrating all attacks by 
enemies within and without, by relying upon the revolution- 
ary zeal of the people and by inspiring them to bring about a 
great upsurge in socialist construction. 

After the plenum, members of the Political Committee of 
the Party Central Committee, as well as other leaders, toured 
difficult factories and farm villages to acquaint the working 
people with the problems facing the Party and to inspire them 
to surmount all difficulties and trials. 

In response to the Party appeal, the North Korean workers 
strongly supported the Party Central Committee and success- 
fully introduced great innovations on all fronts of socialist 
construction. They found hidden resources to overcome short- 
ages and smashed old records and norms. Thus industrial 
production recorded an annual growth rate of 40 to 50 per cent, 
and in agriculture a rich harvest was reaped. Both towns and 
rural communities changed in appearance for the better day 
by day and the people’s living standard also improved rapidly. 

It was during this great upsurge in socialist construction 
that the historic Chollima (Flying Horse) movement was 
initiated. This movement was adopted by the Workers Party 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


59 


of Korea as its general line for socialist construction. And in 
this way, the tasks of the Five-Year Plan were overfulfilled 
ahead of schedule: the plan to increase total industrial pro- 
duction 2.6 times was fulfilled in only two and a half years, 
and that to raise production indices of important industrial 
products was fulfilled as a whole or overfulfilled in four years. 

As a result, gross industrial production in the Republic rose 
3.5 times during the four years from 1957 to 1960, inclusive, 
with the output of the means of production climbing 3.6 times 
and that of consumer goods 3.3 times. Thus, in spite of the 
serious war damage, industrial output of the Republic rose 
as much as 7.6 times over the prewar year of 1949. 

In the industrial sector during this period, material and 
technical foundations were laid for developing the backward 
colonial industry, completely destroyed by the war, into an 
independent and modern industry in a short time and, by 
achieving this, for equipping all sectors of the people’s econo- 
my with up-to-date technology and thereby further improving 
the people’s living standards. 

Good results were also obtained in agriculture. The funda- 
mental task of the Five-Year Plan for agriculture was to 
strengthen the material and technical basis of agriculture and 
rapidly to increase agricultural production. 

Following the completion of agricultural collectivization, 
(he Party immediately got started on the technical innovation 
of agriculture — irrigation, electrification and mechanization. 

By the end of 1960, the problem of irrigation, which was of 
primary importance, basically was solved. Further, during 
this period, electricity was supplied to 92.1 per cent of the ri 
(smallest administrative unit) in rural communities through- 
out the country, or to 62 per cent of the total number of farm 
households, and electric power came to be used extensively, 
not only for lighting but also as motive power for various 
operations, such as pumping water, threshing and feed proc- 
essing. Mechanization, considered to be the most difficult 


60 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


task in the technical innovation of agriculture, also made re- 
markable progress. Compared to 1956, the number of factories 
producing farm machinery approximately doubled in 1960. 
Also during this period, the total number of tractois in use 
increased 4.2 times (in terms of 15 h.p. units) and the area 
cultivated by them jumped 10 times. Thus, the level of mech- 
anization in agriculture was raised substantially. As a lesult, 
grain output reached a high of 3.8 million tons, 32 per cent 
more than in 1956. 

Agriculture in the Republic became socialist and made 
significant progress toward laying the material and technical 
foundations for an advanced socialist agriculture. 

A marked improvement was also witnessed in the material 
and cultural aspects of the people’s lives. The task of solving 
basically the food, clothing and housing problems was ful- 
filled successfully. In 1960, national income increased 2.1 
times over 1956, and the wages of industrial and office woik- 
ers showed a 2.1-fold advance during the same period. Kim 
II Sung wrote on this: 

Thanks to the successful fulfillment of the postwar Three-Year 
Plan, our country went over from the period of rehabilitation to the 
period of technical reconstruction. Our Party and the Government 
of the Republic defined the Five-Year Plan as the first stage in the 
technical reconstruction and set the task of laying the basis of 
socialist industrialization in this period to solidify more firmly the 
foundations of an independent national economy and create condi- 
tions for equipping all branches of our people's economy with 
modern technique in the future . 14 

At its Fourth Congress (September 1961), the Workers 
Party of Korea summed up the results achieved by the fulfill- 
ment of the Five-Year Plan and adopted a long-range Seven- 
Year Plan for promoting socialist construction. The Seven-Year 
Plan called for equipping all branches of the people’s econ- 
omy with up-to-date technology by realizing socialist in- 
dustrialization, for radically improving the people’s living 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


61 


conditions and culture and for achieving socialism. The ful- 
fillment of all these tasks would convert Korea into a socialist 
state with modern industry and an advanced agriculture. 
This was the aim of the Seven-Year Plan. 

Thus, it can be said that the Seven-Year Plan was a stage in 
the overall technical revolution. 

Technical revolution [said Kim II Sung] is a momentous evolu- 
tionary task which will relieve our people, now free from exploitation, 
of arduous labor, enable them to produce more material wealth while 
working with ease, and ensure them a more bountiful and cultured 
life. Accomplishment of the technical revolution will solve the most 
important problem for the ultimate victory of a new social system in 
our country, which inherited centuries-old backward productive 
forces . 15 

To accomplish an all-round technical revolution in the 
northern part of the Republic was of particularly great sig- 
nificance. Because of the long colonial rule by Japanese 
imperialism, Korea was unable to carry out an industrial 
revolution and to go through the stage of capitalist develop- 
ment in a normal way. Consequently, it had inherited back- 
ward productive forces from the old society. 

If this were not the case, if Korea were an advanced capital- 
ist country, the technical revolution would not have been so 
important for the building of socialism. In an advanced 
capitalist country, people produce a great deal of social 
wealth as a result of having achieved industrialization through 
an industrial revolution. Machinery and techniques have been 
developed considerably, and the question of technical 
revolution is comparatively simple to solve if the working 
class were to win state power and socialize the means of 
production. 

However, in a backward agricultural country like Korea, 
which did not follow a normal course of capitalist develop- 
ment, the question of technical revolution is extremely impor- 
tant and very difficult to solve, even after the seizure of state 


62 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


power by the working class and socialization of the means 
of production. Carrying out a technical revolution and training 
as many technicians as possible, after all, boils down to a 
single objective -completely wiping out the backwardness 
inherited from the old society and converting Korea in a short 
period of time into a rich, advanced and strong industiial 
state. 

The successful completion of a technical revolution pre- 
supposes the achievement of a cultural revolution. In other 
words, unless the ranks of scientific and technical cadres are 
expanded greatly and unless all the working people are 
equipped with knowledge and skill sufficient for the effective 
operation of modern machinery, a technical revolution cannot 
be carried out successfully. Thus there is a close relationship 
between a technical revolution and a cultural revolution and 
therefore it was decreed in the Seven-Year Plan that these 
two revolutions be carried out simultaneously. 

In order to fulfill the long-range tasks of the Seven-Year 
Plan successfully, the Party constantly reiterated the need to 
adhere to the basic line for postwar economic construction 
the preferential development of heavy industry, while at the 
same time developing light industry and agriculture in order 
to achieve all-round scientific and cultural development. 

The entire working people of the Republic struggled to 
accomplish the program put forward by the Party in the Seven- 
Year Plan. However, for several years following the Caribbean 
crisis in October 1962, U.S. imperialists’ aggressive machina- 
tions became much more open and the internal and external 
situation of the Republic also became extremely tense. 

In order to meet this situation. Premier Kim II Sung, at the 
fifth plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee held at 
the end of 1962, proposed to push forward economic construc- 
tion parallel with a defense buildup. On the basis of this line, 
the Party and the government hammered out a series of im- 
portant measures aimed at reorganizing economic construc- 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


63 


lion generally and at decisively strengthening defense capac- 
ity as well. Kim II Sung pointed out: 

What is most important for our revolutionary struggle and con- 
struction is to reorganize the work of socialist construction in general 
in keeping with the actual situation and to accelerate both economic 
construction and defense buildup, in parallel, so that our defense 
capabilities may be increased further to cope with the aggressive 
maneuvers of the enemy. This is the basic strategic line which our 
Party has already been implementing for several years in accordance 
with the change in the situation. It is necessary for us in the future, 
too, to adhere firmly to this policy of the Workers' Party and develop 
our work accordingly . 16 

The problem of how to combine economic construction 
with defense buildup is fundamental, having direct bearing 
upon success or failure in building socialism and communism 
in a country. The problem is based on the objective fact that, 
while imperialism still exists, the proletariat after gaining 
state power has to carry out the revolution and construction 
under conditions of encirclement by international capitalism. 

Under these circumstances, it is inevitable that imperialism 
should resort to all forms of aggression, direct or indirect, as 
well as to various subversive activities. Therefore, after gain- 
ing state power, the proletariat must concentrate its efforts on 
building up powerful defense capabilities to defend its gains 
against imperialist aggression and subversive machinations, 
while energetically promoting economic construction to im- 
prove material and cultural standards. 

It is important to guard against possible deviation either to 
economic construction or to defense buildup, correctly to 
combine the two. It is an ultra-leftist deviation to emphasize 
only defense buildup without economic construction on the 
grounds that should war break out, everything will be de- 
stroyed. And it is a right-wing revisionist deviation to over- 
emphasize economic construction, on the presumption of 
peace, without boosting defense capability to a sufficient 


64 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


level. A correct combination of economic construction and 
defense buildup is a necessary requirement of Marxism- 
Leninism. 

The parallel promotion of economic and defense construc- 
tion required that the long-range tasks of the Seven-Year Plan 
he carried out completely and that the quality of production 
and construction be improved decisively in all fields thiough 
effective utilization of the existing economic foundations. The 
Plan called for strengthening the national defense capability 
to provide an impregnable fortress and for all necessary 
arrangements to cope with any surprise attack by the U.S. 
imperialists and their underlings. For this purpose, the line 
decreed that the military plan of the Party fully be carried out 
— the line of arming the People’s Army and the entire people, 
politically and ideologically first of all, and turning the 
People’s Army into a modernized cadre army, and also of 
converting the whole country into a fortress. 

Subsequent developments proved the correctness of the 
line. Today, North Korea has been converted into an impreg- 
nable fortress fully capable of coping with any armed aggres- 
sion by the U.S. imperialists and their underlings, and a 
powerful defense setup, encompassing all the people, has 
been completed. 

In the field of socialist economic construction, too, the 
northern half of the Republic has again entered a period of a 
great upsurge. In fiscal 1967, for example, total industiial 
output recorded a growth rate of 17 per cent as against the 
target figure of 12.8 per cent. Further, the growth rate of in- 
dustrial production was set at 24 per cent for fiscal 1968. How- 
ever, even according to a preliminary survey, the growth rate 
of industrial production in 1968 far exceeded that of 196 / and 
is expected to overfulfill the target figure. 

In the plan for 1968, the year of decisive significance for 
the fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan, targets for a series of 
industries, such as coal, chemical fertilizer, nonferrous metals 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


65 


and timber, were attained one after another, all ahead of 
schedule, and it is expected that all the production targets for 
industry will be fulfilled completely by the end of 1969. In 
the held of agriculture, grain production increased 16 per 
cent in fiscal 1967 over fiscal 1966, and in fiscal 1968 it rose 
11 per cent over fiscal 1967. 

It is obvious that when fulfilled, the Seven-Year Plan will 
be a significant event. Successful fulfillment of the plan will 
not only strengthen the socialist system of the Republic, but 
will also bring about a great advance in the struggle for the 
complete victory of socialism and create favorable conditions 
foi the Korean people s struggle for the reunification of their 
country. Successful accomplishment of the Seven-Year Plan 
will convert Korea into a socialist industrial state. 

Let us now review some of the indices showing the principal 
results achieved by the government and by the people in the 
northern half of the Republic during the 20-odd years of revo- 
Jution and construction since the founding of the DPRK. 

In the field of socialist economic construction, a strong 
foundation has been laid in the sectors of heavy and light 
industry resulting in a big leap in industrial production. 
2 ind us*ia] Production in 1967 increased 22 times over 
1948. Specifically, total output in 1967 of the machine-tool 
industry, the core of heavy industry, increased 100 times, and 
the share of output of the machine industry in total industrial 
production rose from 7.4 per cent to 31.4 per cent. As a result 
insofar as machinery and equipment are concerned, Korea has 
nearly attained self-sufficiency. 

The rapid progress made in heavy industry, particularly in 
he machine-tool industry, means that there is a nucleus fora 
n m base of a powerful independent national economy. It is a 
great victory for the economic policy of the Workers Party of 

orea, which constantly has given priority to the development 
ot heavy industry. 

A powerful light industrial base has also been established 


66 


THEORY AMD PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


and is being developed rapidly. Today in North Korea all the 
people’s consumer goods are domestically made. For the de- 
velopment of light industry, the development of local indus- 
tries is important. Today, in the northern half of the Republic, 
local industries are producing half of the total consumer goods, 
thus playing an important role in promoting the general de- 
velopment of the economy. Compared with the period right 
after the Liberation, when there was hardly any light industry 
and when Korea was still unable to produce even very simple 
light industrial products, this rapid development of light in- 
dustry is of great significance. 

In the sphere of agriculture, thanks to the completion ot 
collectivization and subsequent technical improvements, the 
agricultural productive forces have made striking progress. In 
1967, grain production registered a 2.7-fold increase over the 
period after the Liberation. As a result, today North Korea not 
only has become completely self-sufficient in food but also 
has a considerable amount of food in reserve. This means that 
even though North Korea’s geographical and natural condi- 
tions are inferior to South Korea’s for agricultural production, 
these handicaps have largely been overcome. 

Thus, during these 20-odd years, the building of a socialist 
economy in the northern half of the Republic has made amaz- 
ing progress. 

In the sectors of education and culture, the nine-year com- 
pulsory technical education system took effect in 1967. Today, 
one-fourth of the entire population in North Korea, or 2,690,000 
persons, are studying at schools of varying levels. Tuition is 
completely free. Further, at present the number of engineers, 
technicians and specialists working in all sectors ot the peo- 
ple’s economy has reached 425,700, representing a 19 ° 
increase over the period just after the armistice (July 1953). In 
this way, in the northern half of the Republic, powerful ranks 
of technical cadres have come into being and continuously 
are being expanded. This is a great victory for the Party s 
policy of concentration on the training of national cadres. 


FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK 


67 


The rapid progress in economic construction has brought 
about a decisive improvement in the material and cultural 
standards of the people. For example, national income per 
capita in 1967 showed a nine-fold increase over 1946, a 4.4- 
fold advance over 1949. In 1968, the average amount of dis- 
tiibution per farm household increased 14 per cent in grain 
and 13 per cent in cash over the previous year. If the following 
facts are taken into consideration— complete abolition of tax 
payment in kind, establishment of a free medical treatment 
system, implementation of the nine-year universal compul- 
sory technical education system, and so on — it is clear that 
there has been rapid improvement in the material and cultural 
standards of the people. 

As for results in the field of national defense, these were 
shown to the entire world by our victory in the recent Pueblo 
incident.* Today, in the northern half of the Republic, an effec- 
tive national defense setup has been completed and the whole 
country has been converted into a steel-walled fortress. As 
was demonstrated by the Pueblo incident, the heroic Korean 
People s Army has developed into a strong cadre army, with 
modern equipment and military technique. 

Thanks to our achievements in all fields of socialist con- 
struction, in the field of national defense, in the consistent 
stand of the Republic against U.S. and world imperialism and 
in its upholding an independent and principled foreign 
policy, the embodiment of the Juche idea of Premier Kim 11 
Sung— thanks to all these factors the international prestige of 
l lie Republic has been heightened as never before. This fact 
is eloquently demonstrated by the statements made by many 
el the representatives from various foreign governments, 
lorcign political parties and social organizations who attended 
I lie ceremony held to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the 
founding of the Republic. 


I In* Pueblo , a U.S. spy ship which had intruded into North Korean waters, 
" » s captured with its crew by the armed forces of the DPRK in January 1968. 


68 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


All this demonstrates, on the strength of the realities of the 
Republic, the correctness of the ideas and theories of Kim 11 
Sung on the direction of the revolution and construction, as 
well as the correctness of the line and policies of the Workers 
Party of Korea under his leadership. Historical experience in 
the development of Marxism-Leninism clearly teaches that 
the validity of a theory is always tested by the touchstone of 
revolutionary practice. 


CHAPTER II 


The Transitional Period and 
the Historical Mission of 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat 


In his works, particularly in Section 2 of On the Further 
Consolidation and Development of the Socialist System in the 
/ emocratic People’s Republic of Korea, his report at the 20tli 
Anniversary of the DPRK, Premier Kim II Sung made a Marx- 
ist-Lenimst analysis of the progress of socialism in the 
northern half of the Republic, the present state of the revolu- 
tion and construction in socialist countries and other questions, 
and on this basis he clarified the most pressing problems of 
the world revolution. 

To achieve the complete victory of socialism, the working 
class must overthrow the bourgeoisie, seize power and estab- 
. the dictatorship of the proletariat, making the transition 
I mm capitalism to socialism. The dictatorship of the proletar- 
iat will be converted into a world system through a series of 
socialist revolutions in various countries and through the 
expansion and development of the socialist camp on a world 
scale. In other words, this is a question of the relation between 
I ie transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
fundamental to Marxism-Leninism. Such problems are not 
only very difficult and complex, but are the most pressing and 
practical ones confronting the socialist countries today in 
i evolution and construction. 

For countries such as Korea, where the working class has 
conquered power and established a dictatorship of the pro- 


69 


70 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


letariat, it is vital to the success of the revolution to work ou 
correct theoretical propositions concerning the transitional 
period: How to understand the significance and nature of the 
transitional period, how to set the various tasks of the transi- 
tional period according to its different stages, an 0 
analyze inter-relationships between the transitional period 
and the dictatorship of the proletariat. 

Despite the importance of these questions to the revo u ion, 
there has been insufficient clarification and various deviations 
have been committed, with the result that immeasurable 
damage has been done to the practical struggles for socialist 
and communist construction. This urgent pro em e ‘ 
solving correctly, theoretically, the question of the transitional 
period and the dictatorship of the proletariat- was accom- 
plished by Kim 11 Sung, in detail, on the basis of the revo u 
tionarv principles of Marxism-Leninism. 

His ideas and theory were developed in his work, On 
Questions of the Transitional Period from Capitalism to 
Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. In this wor 

lie said: 

As with all other scientific and theoretical questions, questions 

/J*— p™* 1 »" d diM r h ; p °V ri, 

should be solved on the basis of the ]uche idea of our Part*. We 
should never try to solve these questions dogmatically by becoming 
slaves to the classical propositions on this question, nor should we be 
influenced by subservient ideas and follow others in the solution 
these questions. 1 

In the interpretation of classical propositions it is essential 
to understand the historical circumstances and the premise on 

which the classical works were based. Only on this basis is 
possible to understand the content of 

and to grasp their revolutionary meaning. If the historical 
“ImstancL are ignored, it will lead inevitably .0 a one 
sided and dogmatic interpretation or to a revisions 
pretation that seriously distorts the revolutionary content. 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


71 


Specifically, if a classical proposition is applied mechani- 
cally to a changed situation, wthout considering the historical 
circumstances and theoretical premises related to the proposi- 
tion, not only will a fundamental error be committed in the 
theoretical solution of the question but a decisive error in 
practice will also result. Thus, to solve the problems of the 
transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat, it 
is necessary to base ourselves firmly on the revolutionary 
propositions of Marxism-Leninism and, at the same time, to 
uphold the Juche idea of applying them creatively to suit the 
constantly changing and developing actual conditions of the 
revolution. 


1. THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 

In the historical process of revolutionary transition from 
capitalism to socialism or communism there is inevitably a 
certain period of time usually referred to as the transitional 
period. 

There is no doubt of this, either theoretically or practically. 
There is no doubt that the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the 
working class and the seizure of power by the workers does 
not mean the immediate and complete realization of social- 
ism or communism. 

As Kim II Sung explains: “The conquest of power by the 
working class is only the beginning of the socialist revolution, 
mid in order to build a complete socialist society, it is neces- 
sary to work for the revolution continuously and to lay the firm 
material foundations for socialism.” 2 

To assure the total victory of socialism, the working class 
must complete, within a certain historical period of time, a 
sm ies of tasks defined by the concrete historical conditions of 
nvspective countries as well as by the general revolutionary 
principles of Marxism-Leninism. 


72 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


What, then, is the most fundamental characteristic of this 
transitional period? Premier Kim 11 Sung says: “The historical 
process of transition from capitalism to socialism is accom- 
panied by sharp class struggles.” 3 

It is clear that the transitional period from capitalism to 
socialism must combine characteristic features of the two 
socio-economic systems. Hence sharp struggles are inevitable 
between the newly born socialism and capitalism, which was 
defeated but not yet completely eliminated. 

The capitalist class is stripped of its political power and 
means of exploitation by the first onslaught of the working 
class, and it suffers a decisive defeat. But this does not mean 
the elimination of the capitalist class as a class. Some of the 
socio-economic foundations of the capitalist class and its in- 
ternational base still remain, and resistance continues, much 
stronger than before. Small-scale commodity production, still 
widespread in towns and villages, continues to furnish a 
socio-economic foundation for capitalism, and vacillating 
peasants and lower middle class people provide an important 
potential political foothold that can be used for the revival 
of capitalism. 

The socialist transformation of the relations of production 
in the town and countryside, or the complete victory of the 
socialist revolution, smashes this resistance of the capitalist 
class and completely does away with its economic base. This 
means complete elimination of the capitalist class as a class. 

However, we cannot say even after this that capitalism has 
been eliminated completely or that socialism has triumphed 
completely. Even at this stage, remnants ot capitalism and 
hostile elements of the exploiting class still remain, and they 
constantly conspire with foreign imperialism to revive 
capitalism. Further, as long as old ideas still deeply rooted in 
the consciousness of the working masses — individualism and 
egotism — remain, it cannot be said that capitalism has been 
eliminated completely, since these ideas are ideological 
survivals of capitalism. 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


73 


Where there are still distinctions between the town and the 
countryside and class distinctions between the workers and 
peasants, we cannot say that vacillations among lower middle 
class people, including the peasantry, have been overcome 
completely. Therefore we cannot say that the proletariat has 
completely won over the petty bourgeoisie. Kim II Sung says: 

We cannot say that socialism has been strengthened, nor can 
we say that socialism has completely triumphed until the petty 
bourgeoisie ceases to waver and comes to support us com- 
pletely. We can say we have realized socialism completely 
only when the petty bourgeoisie has come to support us 
positively.” 4 

From the standpoint of productive forces, we cannot say 
that the establishment of the socialist system is followed 
immediately by complete socialist industrialization, apart 
Irom what may occur in some developed capitalist countries. 
A certain period of time is still needed to develop productive 
loices to the high level required for socialism. 

In the final analysis, we cannot say that socialism has tri- 
umphed completely over capitalism even where the socialist 
revolution has completely triumphed and the socialist system 
has absolute power. Even in this stage, struggles between 
socialism and capitalism continue. 

The entire historical period of transition from capitalism to 
socialism is one of sharp struggles between socialism and 
capitalism, a period of class struggle in its sharpest form. This 
is the fundamental characteristic and, consequently, the 
important content of the transitional period. As Kim 11 Sung 
states: ‘ Struggle between the new and the old, between prog- 
ress and conservatism, between positive and negative, be- 
tween collectivism and individualism, and, in general,’ be- 
tween socialism and capitalism -these are the content of the 
revolutionary struggle we wage.” 5 

Other questions, too, concerned with the transitional period 
■md the dictatorship of the proletariat, can be solved correctly 
on the principles of Marxism-Leninism only when the essen- 


74 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


tial content of the transitional period and its basic character- 
istics are understood from the standpoint of class struggle and 
uninterrupted revolution. 

The focal question of where the transitional period ends 
naturally should be approached from this standpoint. If the 
basic characteristic of this period is sharp class struggle 
between emerging socialism and moribund capitalism, the 
most important task in the transitional period should be not 
merely the defeat of capitalism but its elimination, that is, the 
end of capitalism in all domains -politics, economy, culture 
and ideology— and the complete victory of socialism. It is 
clear that the period of transition ends when this task has 

been carried out successfully. . 

When we say “complete victory of socialism, what do we 
mean? What will be the content of such a society? A complete 
socialist society should include all sectors: politics, economy, 
culture and ideology, as well as productive forces, relations of 
production, the base and the superstructure. 

However, the decisive index encompassing all elements 
and the only index is “elimination of classes,” or the realiza- 
tion of a classless society. To achieve a classless society, it is 
necessary not only to defeat the exploiting classes, expropriate 
their property, and abolish them as a class, but also to abolish 
private ownership as a whole, eliminate distinctions between 
town and countryside, and erase class distinctions between 

workers and peasants. 

The entire society will have become the working class and 
the proletariat will finally have won over all the petty bour- 
geoisie only when class distinctions between workers and 
peasants have been eliminated and the petty bourgeoisie, 
including the peasantry, have been converted into the work- 
ing class. Kim 11 Sung states: 

The complete victory of socialism will be realized only when 
class distinctions between the worker and the peasant have been 
eliminated and when the petty-bourgeois strata of people, particular- 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


75 


ly the farming masses, have come to support us positively. Until the 
peasantry has been transformed into the working class, their support 
for us cannot be firm enough, even when they say they support us, 
and vacillations to a certain extent among them will be unavoidable. 6 

A complete socialist society is, therefore, one in which 
classes have been eliminated completely — that is, a classless 
society. However, elimination of classes requires not only the 
powerful material basis of socialism, that is, industrialization, 
but also presupposes the ideological remolding of all members 
of society to the progressive ideas of the working class — 
collectivism and communism. 

For instance, elimination of class distinctions between 
worker and peasant will be possible only when agriculture 
has been mechanized, electrified, chemicalized and irrigated, 
leading to a rapid development of agricultural productive 
forces. Kim II Sung says: 

A society — where the hostile classes persist in sinister activities 
and the corrosive action of old ideas continues, where there still 
remain distinctions between towns and countryside and class dis- 
tinctions between the working class and peasantry, where indus- 
trialization of the country has not been realized fully and the material 
and technical bases of socialism have not been laid firmly — cannot 
yet be called a wholly triumphant socialist society. 7 

Thus, in referring to a complete socialist society, its overall 
scientific content should be defined not only from the stand- 
point of production relations, nor of development of produc- 
live forces, nor of the superstructure, but from a standpoint 
encompassing all these aspects, and especially the realization 
of a classless society. 

Basically, transition from capitalism to socialism entails 
all-round transition from one socio-economic formation to a 
new socio-economic formation essentially different in quality. 

I he transition should be carried out in all areas of politics, 
economy, culture and ideology. Since the transitional period 
contains features of both capitalism and socialism, the transi- 


76 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


tional period will end when the characteristic features of 
socialism are victorious, or at least have attained decisive 
superiority over the capitalist system in all sectors. Kim 11 
Sung says: 

We may say that the tasks to be carried out in the transitional 
period from capitalism to socialism have been realized when we have 
won the petty-bourgeois strata of people to our side by advancing 
socialist construction and when class distinctions between the work- 
ing class and the peasantry have been eliminated. 

In this way, unlike right and left deviationists, it seems to be 
correct for us to set a line of demarcation for the transitional period 
at classless society. 8 

This applies to all countries. But each country will have 
specific tasks to carry out in keeping with its historical 
conditions. 

For instance, in some capitalist countries, most peasants 
have already been converted into agricultural proletarians, 
and the productive forces of agriculture are on the same high 
level as those of industry, although significant differences in 
working conditions remain. In such conditions, it is possible 
in a comparatively short transitional period to realize a class- 
less society, following the overthrow of the exploiting classes 
through a socialist revolution, their expropriation, and trans- 
formation of their property to people’s property. 

Under such conditions, there is not a great distance separat- 
ing the complete victory of the socialist revolution and the 
realization of a classless society or the complete victory of 
socialism, because the difficult and long-term task of eliminat- 
ing class distinctions between workers and peasants is not a 
requisite in the transitional period. But, it goes without 
saying, in this case, too, it is necessary to liquidate the rem- 
nants of the exploiting classes and of the old ideas still remain- 
ing in the consciousness of people. Unless this task is fulfilled, 
it cannot be said that socialism has triumphed completely or a 
classless society has been realized, nor can it be said that the 
transitional period has come to its end. 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


77 


The situation is more complex in a backward capitalist 
society. Such a country is characterized by the fact that the 
peasantry comprises a large majority of the total population 
and a peasant economy carries predominant weight in the 
national economy. Also, industry is markedly backward. 
Under such historical conditions, the tasks to be solved in the 
transitional period are naturally more difficult and complex. 

In the first place, the working class, which has overthrown 
the exploiting classes and expropriated their property, is not in 
a position to expropriate the property of the petty bourgeoisie, 
including the peasantry. Furthermore, even rich farmers are 
excluded from the scope of expropriation, with only restric- 
tive measures applied to them. 

Consequently, the victorious working class is required to 
absorb small-scale commodity production and capitalist 
enterprises gradually into large-scale socialist cooperative 
(arms and other enterprises through all forms of positive aid 
by the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the basis of free 
choice and example, and also by determined struggles. In 
other words, the working class has a task of unparalleled 
difficulty— the transformation of small-scale commodity pro- 
duction and capitalist enterprises into large-scale socialist 
enterprises, establishing the undivided sway of the socialist 
system. 

The problem of eliminating class distinctions between 
workers and peasants and between town and countryside is 
posed for the first time in the transitional period, under the 
socialist system. 

Theie are other problems during this period: liquidating 
remaining segments of the exploiting classes, smashing the 
machinations of hostile elements, eliminating the corrosive 
action of old ideas and substituting progressive ideas, col- 
lectivism and communism, and raising substantially the level 
ol the productive forces of agriculture. 

Thus the establishment of a socialist system in a backward 
capitalist country in the transitional period to socialism, fol- 


78 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


lowing the socialist transformation of relations of production, 
does not immediately mean the realization of a complete vic- 
tory of socialism or of a classless society. It is necessary to 
continue the revolution after the establishment of the socialist 
system in order to eliminate class distinctions between work- 
ers and peasants and distinctions between town and country- 
side. Only then can it be said that the transitional period has 
come to its end. Consequently, the transitional period of a 
backward capitalist country is necessarily longer than that of a 
developed capitalist country. Where people have cast off the 
colonial yoke of imperialism, the problem is particularly 
difficult and complex. 

It is an irrefutable law of historical development that a 
people who have emerged from imperialist colonial subjuga- 
tion must traverse the road of socialism in order to march 
toward freedom and happiness, national independence and 
prosperity. Kim 11 Sung says: “Historical experience shows 
that a people who have gotten rid of the colonial yoke of 
imperialism must take the socialist path.” 9 

A backward colonial or semicolonial country is character- 
ized not only by the dominance of the peasantry and of back- 
ward farms in its total economy, but also by the fact that 
its industry is colonial in character. Such a country has to 
carry out the tasks of the transitional period without having 
gone through the normal development of capitalism and with 
the backward productive forces of a colonial agricultural 
country. 

Because of this, the characteristics of its transitional period 
are distinct from those of a developed capitalist country 01 
even a backward capitalist country. In the first place, the 
country has to pass through a preparatory stage before going 
into the transitional period to socialism. In other words, 
people who have won independence have to crush all lesist- 
ance and subversive maneuvers of foreign imperialists and 
domestic reactionary forces, shatter the colonial imperialist 
agencies of domination and, at the same time, sweep away all 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


79 


the economic footholds of imperialism and domestic reaction, 
laying the foundations for an independent national economy 
and a progressive social system, a people’s democratic sys- 
tem, under the leadership of the working class. 

The most important of these tasks in this stage is to over- 
throw imperialism and the domestic reactionary forces — land- 
lords and capitalists and eliminate their socio-economic 
basis. To do this, land reform and nationalization of key in- 
dustries are of decisive significance. 

When key industries are nationalized, a socialist economic 
system will be established which will gradually increase its 
leading role in the economy, and all conditions for entering 
the period of transition to socialism will have been created. 
This preparatory period is known as the stage of the people’s 
democi atic Tevolution , and its form of power is called the 
dictatorship of people’s democracy. It is led by the working 
class and is based on a worker-peasant alliance. In this sense, 
it may be said to perform essentially the function of a dicta- 
torship of the proletariat, relying on a broad united front, 
including even national capitalists, spearheaded by a worker- 
peasant alliance. 

In short, in the stage of the people’s democratic revolution, 
liquidation of the capitalist class in general is not a prerequi- 
site; the important task is elimination of the comprador 
capitalists who are in collusion with imperialist forces. 

The dictatorship of the proletariat is established when all 
the tasks of the people’s democratic revolution are fulfilled 
and new tasks to be carried out in the transitional period to 
socialism are posed: socialist transformation of relations of 
production, rapid development of backward productive forces, 
and socialist construction to achieve rapid industrialization. 
National capitalists are to be educated and remolded into 
socialist working people. And private ownership of the means 
ol production, including especially capitalist ownership, is 
lo be abolished completely, as are distinctions between work- 
ers and peasants and between town and countryside. 


80 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


The tasks to be carried out under a socialist system by a 
backward colonial or semicolonial country have characteristic 
features distinct from those of a backward capitalist country. 
These features are related, first of all, to the fact that it has 
inherited the backward productive forces of a colonial, agri- 
cultural country. Thus development of the productive forces, 
which should have taken place under capitalism, has to be 
undertaken by the socialist system, a situation that will 
affect greatly the task of eliminating distinctions between 
workers and peasants and between town and countryside. 
Referring to this question, Kim 11 Sung says: 

Because we failed to experience the stage of capitalist develop- 
ment in a normal way, we have to fullill in our era of socialism the 
task of developing productive forces, which ought to have been car- 
ried out under capitalism. There is no need, however, to make our 
society capitalist, to foster capitalists, to overthrow them and then, 
after that, to construct socialism, because we failed to solve the task 
which ought to have been solved in the capitalist stage. The working 
class that has seized power is required, instead of reviving capitalist 
society, to carry out under the socialist system the tasks that ought 
to have been carried out in the bourgeois revolution to provide the 
basis for constructing a classless society. 

We must by all means lay the material foundations of socialism 
firmly, raise the level of productive forces at least to that of de- 
veloped capitalist countries and completely eliminate distinctions 
between the working class and the peasantry. For this purpose, we 
have to carry out a technological revolution to the extent reached in 
countries which have developed capitalist relations in the country- 
side, to mechanize farm work and carry out chemicalization and ir- 
rigation, and enforce a system of eight working hours. 10 

Because of the extremely difficult and complex nature of 
the problems facing a colonial or a semicolonial country, its 
period of transition to socialism will be comparatively long. 

As has been made clear, the tasks to be carried out in the 
transitional period and its duration are naturally different 
according to the concrete, historical conditions of each coun- 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


81 


try, or depending upon whether it was a developed capitalist 
country, a backward capitalist country, a colonial country or 
a semicolonial country. It is also clear that the tasks to be 
carried out in the transitional period have to be defined cor- 
rectly according to the stage of historical development of the 
transitional period in each country. 

Then, the question naturally is presented: When all these 
tasks in the transitional period have been carried out success- 
fully and when, as a result, a classless society has been real- 
ized, what is the relationship between such a classless society 
and the higher stage of communism? 

Realization of a classless society following the transitional 
period does not mean immediate realization of the higher 
level of communism or the start of a transition to it. Kim II 
Sung says: 

Needless to say, the end of the transitional period does not im- 
mediately lead to the higher stage of communism. Even after the 
end of the transitional period, it is necessary to continue the revolu- 
tion and construction and to develop productive forces to a level 
where each works according to his ability and each receives accord- 
ing to his needs, so that we may pass on to the higher stage of com- 
munism. 1 1 

By the higher stage of communism is meant not only a class- 
less society where class distinctions no longer exist between 
workers and peasants, but also a highly developed society 
where each person works according to his ability and each 
receives commodities and services according to his needs. 
In a completely successful socialist society, a classless so- 
ciety, there still remain distinctions between mental and 
physical labor, and differences in the quality of labor between 
workers and peasants, although class differences between 
them have been ended. The criterion for the pace of progress 
at this stage is related primarily to the level of development 
of the productive forces. 

The order in which these remaining distinctions will be 


82 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


eliminated so far has hardly been discussed and remains to 
be solved. But, apparently, distinctions between mental and 
physical labor will last longest, and will be ripe for elimina- 
tion only after the other distinctions mentioned have been 
abolished. This distinction will disappear only in the higher 
stage of communism, when the productive forces ot society 
have reached a maximum, w'hen all branches of the economy 
have been mechanized and automated, and when all woiking 
people have achieved the levels of engineers and technicians 
and have been educated and remolded into highly cultured 
and conscious communists. 

To determine scientifically the demarcation between a 
classless society and the higher stage of communism, and con- 
sequently to define scientifically the content of each, is of 
great theoretical and practical significance. The conceptual 
content of scientific distinctions between classless society and 
the higher stage of communism can be defined only when the 
process of the historical development of the transitional period 
is analyzed concretely and a clear prospect is opened, scien- 
tifically, for a period beyond the transitional period 01, in 
other words, when the overall construction of socialism and 
communism is placed on the order of the day. 

The question of the relationship between the transitional 
period and the dictatorship of the proletariat is most acute in 
the present stage of development of the world revolution. 
Today, these factors are considered simultaneous and in- 
separable from each other by some who mechanically repeat 
classical propositions of Marxism-Leninism and disregard the 
concrete, historical conditions of the present stage of the 
world revolution. 

Though closely related, the transitional period and the dic- 
tatorship of the proletariat are independent questions and 
strict distinctions should be made between them. 

So long as a revolutionary transition from capitalism to 
socialism is a historical process accompanied by sharp class 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


83 


struggles, and the tasks of the transitional period can be 
achieved only through such sharp class struggles, the dicta- 
torship of the proletariat, as the most powerful weapon of 
class struggle, is the form of power most suited to the char- 
acteristic features of this transitional period. It is clear both 
theoretically and practically that the form of power of the 
working class in the transitional period must be the revolu- 
tionary dictatorship of the proletariat. 

However, the transitional period does not necessarily coin- 
cide in time with the historical period of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. The transitional period covers the entire 
historical period from the establishment of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat to the realization of a classless society. But 
the dictatorship of the proletariat has to be continued as long 
as the revolutionary struggle of the working class continues, 
even after all the tasks of the transitional period have been 
carried out successfully and the transitional period comes to 
an end. On this, Kim II Sung says: 

The historical mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat lies in 
liquidating the exploiting classes and putting down their resistance 
and in gradually eliminating all class distinctions and building 
communism by educating and remolding all the working people to 
revolutionize and working-change them . 12 

Thus, the historical mission of the dictatorship of the pro- 
letariat is not only to overthrow the exploiting classes and 
suppress their resistance, not only to eliminate all class dis- 
tinctions, but precisely to realize communism, the highest 
ideal of mankind. 

The working class is faced with the historic task of establish- 
ing a dictatorship of the proletariat not only within national 
borders but also on a worldwide scale and of constructing 
communism and socialism in an all-round way. Where the 
proletariat has won power, is accelerating the revolution and 
construction, is constantly confronting imperialism under 


84 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


conditions of encirclement by international capitalism; even 
when the tasks of the transitional period have been carried out 
successfully within the national borders of one country or the 
higher stage of communism has been reached, aggressive and 
subversive acts will be continued by capitalism and impel ial- 
ism as long as they remain on earth. Consequently, a dictator- 
ship of the proletariat is an absolute necessity. Kim II Sung 
writes : 

Under conditions where world revolution has not yet been 
achieved and where capitalism and imperialism remain, even if 
communism is realized in one country or in one legion, such a 
society would not be free from the threat of imperialism 01 from the 
resistance of internal enemies who are in conspiracy with external 
enemies. Under such conditions, the state will not wither away even 
if the higher stage of communism is attained, and the dictatorship 
of the proletariat must continue. If revolutions are carried out in all 
the countries of the world in succession and when capitalism is 
destroyed on a worldwide scale and the socialist revolution triumphs, 
the transitional period will coincide with the dictatoiship ol the 
proletariat, and when the transitional period ends, the dictatorship 
of the proletariat will no longer be necessary, with the result that the 
functions of the state will wither away. However, so long as we 
subscribe to the theory that it is possible to construct communism in 
one country or in one region, it is entirely correct to consider the 
transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat separately . 13 

Thus, while the questions of the transitional period and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat are closely related and insepai- 
able, their scientific content should be dealt with separately. 
If one disregards these distinctions and expects the end of the 
transitional period to be followed immediately by the comple- 
tion of the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, thus 
weakening its functions or negating them, irretrievable loss 
will be caused to the revolution and construction. 

Specifically, it is erroneous to say that the transitional 
period ends with the completion of socialist transformation of 
the relations of production and establishment of a socialist 
system. Kim 11 Sung says: 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


85 


It is wrong to think that the dictatorship of the proletariat has be- 
come unnecessary before class distinctions between the working 
class and the peasantry are obliterated, before ideological survivals 
of the old society are eradicated, and particularly at a time when the 
enemies at home and abroad continue to intensify their aggressive 
and subversive activities against socialism . 14 

The mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat under 
socialism is, first, to abolish completely internal and external 
class enemies and smash their resistance and subversive 
maneuvers; second, to advance the ideological revolution 
vigorously in order to revolutionize all working people and 
convert them into the working class, and, third, to promote 
economic construction and further accelerate socialist and 
communist construction. These tasks result from the undeni- 
able fact that class struggle continues even under the socialist 
system as well as from the need for the working class, which 
has acquired power, to push economic construction and 
realize socialist and communist construction. 

It is clear that the class struggle under the socialist system 
is necessarily different in form and content from the class 
struggle under the previous system. The object of class 
struggle during the socialist revolution is to eliminate the 
capitalists as a class. Under the socialist system the class 
struggle is carried out against internal and external enemies. 
But its most important, main content is the ideological revo- 
lution through which workers, peasants and working intel- 
lectuals are remolded. This is done mainly through coopera- 
tion in labor, to establish the unity and cohesion of the people. 

The ideological revolution aims to transform all members of 
society into the working class — particularly the petty bour- 
geoisie, including the peasantry, intellectuals and the urban 
lower middle class. From this standpoint, it may be said that 
aid of the socialist state to the countryside and of the working 
class to the peasantry is a form of class struggle. The supply to 
I he working class of machinery and to the peasantry of chem- 
ical fertilizer and large-scale irrigation projects is aimed at 


86 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


eliminating the peasantry as a class and converting it into the 
working class. 

At a time when left and right opportunist deviations are 
cropping up on this question, it is of special practical signifi- 
cance to understand correctly the characteristic features of 
the form and content of class struggle under socialism. 

Apart from deliberate counter-revolutionary views, various 
theoretical and practical deviations in connection with the 
questions of the transitional period and the dictatorship of 
the proletariat spring mainly from the dogmatic or revisionist 
interpretations of classical propositions. It goes without saying 
that a thorough stand of Juche should be maintained in 
approaching the classical propositions on these questions. In 
other words, it is necessary to evaluate correctly the historical 
circumstances and the theoretical premises on which a 
classical proposition was based, to grasp its revolutionary 
essence and to apply it creatively to the new, changed and 
developed, concrete historical conditions of the revolution. 

When Marx defined socialism and introduced the question 
of the transitional period, it is clear that he had in mind 
developed capitalist states such as Britain. These developed 
states were completely capitalist, not only in the cities but 
also, largely, in the countryside, and capitalist relations pre- 
vailed in the whole society. In England for example, there 
were no peasants; and there were agricultural laborers in the 
countryside side by side with workers in towns. Thus, there 
were no class distinctions between the working class and the 
peasantry. 

Under these historical conditions, the elimination of class 
distinctions between workers and peasants was not posed as a 
task to be carried out in the transitional period. But in this 
case, too, the historical necessity for a transitional period 
could not be denied; the elimination of the remnants of the 
exploiting classes and the old ideas in the consciousness of 
people was posed as the task to be carried out. 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


87 


On this premise, Marx thought that when the proletariat 
overthrew the capitalist class by a socialist revolution and 
expropriated their property for all the people it would be 
possible to carry out the tasks of the transitional period in a 
comparatively short time and to proceed to the higher stage 
of communism. In other words, Marx regarded the period 
from the conquest of power by the proletariat in a developed 
capitalist state to transition to socialism as comparatively short. 

Marx also presented the questions of the transitional period 
and the dictatorship of the proletariat from the standpoint of 
an uninterrupted revolution. 

Thus, Marx presented these questions on the premise that 
proletarian revolutions would occur almost simultaneously 
and continuously in the principal capitalist countries of 
Europe and that the world revolution would triumph in a 
comparatively short period of time. Living in the pre-monopo- 
ly capitalist era, Marx was unable to see clearly the uneven 
political and economic development of capitalism. On these 
premises, he thought that the dictatorship of the proletariat 
corresponded in time to the transitional period or, in other 
words, that the transitional period and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat were inseparably related to each other. 

On that theoretical premise, Marx’s classical propositions on 
the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat 
were wholly correct. And Lenin’s views on the transitional 
period and the dictatorship of the proletariat were basically a 
continuation and extension of Marx’s proposition, developed 
to correspond to the more complex conditions of monopoly 
capitalism, of the stage of imperialism. 

Lenin, continuing Marx’s stand on the historical necessity 
for a transitional period, deduced that theoretically there 
was no doubt that there would be a certain period of transition 
from capitalism to communism, and he exposed sharply the 
counter-revolutionary nature of arguments which denied the 
historical necessity for such a transitional period. 


88 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


Lenin also grasped the essential content of the transitional 
period from the standpoint of class struggle, regarding the 
period as one of struggle between moribund capitalism and 
emerging communism and, consequently, as a period of un- 
precedentedly sharp and acute class struggle. 

Continuing Marx’s revolutionary stance, Lenin never inter- 
preted the classical propositions in a dogmatic way or applied 
them mechanically. In interpreting and applying Marx s 
propositions, Lenin started from the concrete, historical con- 
ditions of Russia, a backward capitalist state, whose peasantry 
comprised an overwhelming majority of the total population 
and whose peasant farms contributed an overwhelmingly 
large weight in the economy. In other words, class distinctions 
between the working class and the peasantry had not been 
eradicated. 

Under these circumstances, Lenin regarded the elimination 
of class distinctions between workers and peasants as a diffi- 
cult and complex task to be carried out in the transitional 
period. According to Lenin, despite the fact that the working 
class had overthrown the capitalist system and seized power, 
there were still class distinctions between workers and peas- 
ants. Such a society was not a complete socialist society, still 
less a communist society; it was precisely a transitional 
society. 

Consequently, Lenin considered that in order to realize 
socialism it was not sufficient to overthrow the capitalists as 
a class, but it was also necessary to eliminate class distinctions 
between the working class and the peasantry. He regarded 
socialism as a complete abolition of classes. It is clear that 
Lenin regarded the period from the establishment of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat to the realization oi a classless 
society as a transitional period from capitalism to socialism 
or communism. 

Needless to say, this definition of Lenin’s on the transitional 
period was fundamentally correct. And the propositions pre- 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


89 


sented in Marxist-Leninist works were all correct in the light 
of then prevailing historical circumstances and of their 
theoretical premises. 

Today, however, right and left opportunists, completely 
disregarding the historical circumstances and theoretical 
premises of classical propositions, are greatly distorting their 
revolutionary content and are causing serious confusion by 
interpreting them in a dogmatic or a revisionist way. 

The right opportunists regard the transitional period as the 
time from conquest of power by the working class to the 
victory of the socialist system and consider that this period 
coincides with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Starting 
from this, they consider that the historical mission of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat ends with the completion of the 
transitional period. 

According to the right opportunists, socialist tasks tend to 
be confined to the areas of economic construction, with the 
result that the abolition of class distinctions and the victory of 
an ideological revolution, and other tasks, are neglected 
completely. This means abandoning the class struggle and 
surrendering to counter-revolutionary economism. 

The counter-revolutionary character of right opportunism is 
expressed in mechanically equating in time the transitional 
period and the dictatorship of the proletariat, in considering 
that the function of the dictatorship of the proletariat ends 
with the establishment of socialism and in denying the role of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat under the socialist system. 

This results in emasculating the functions of the dictator- 
ship of the proletariat as the most powerful weapon of class 
struggle and for building socialism and communism, the most 
essential functions of a socialist state, and is, in effect, an 
abandonment of the revolution. 

It is clear that such a right opportunist view is diametrically 
opposed to Marxism-Leninism and is based on a counter- 
revolutionary idea and standpoint. Kim II Sung says: 


90 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


To regard the transitional period at an end when the socialist 
system triumphs issues from the ideological attitude of discontinuing 
class struggle with the remnants of the overthrown exploiting classes 
at home, and of carrying on the world revolution while living in 
peace with world imperialism. Further, an argument is advanced 
that the dictatorship of the proletariat ceases to exist with the end of 
the transitional period. But how can it be so?... This is fundamentally 
wrong. 15 

On the other hand, left opportunists, starting with the idea 
that communism will be attained only many generations 
ahead, regard the transitional period as one that extends from 
capitalism to the higher stage of communism. This view is 
practically the same as not drawing any line of demarcation 
for the transitional period at all. 

What is necessary is to grasp correctly the characteristic 
features of each historical stage of development up to the 
higher stage of communism, to analyze scientifically the con- 
crete historical conditions of each stage, and to define correct- 
ly the revolutionary tasks for each of these stages. Herein lies 
the revolutionary significance of the transitional period. If its 
termination is obscured by extending its duration to the higher 
stage of communism, the working class will not be able to have 
correct, Marxist- Leninist strategy and tactics in each historical 
stage in the development of the revolution during the long 
period of time up to the stage of communism. 

Furthermore, left opportunists not only consider that the 
transitional period will extend to the higher stage of com- 
munism, but also assert that communism cannot be realized in 
a single country. According to them, it will be impossible to 
realize communism before the world revolution is completed. 
The left opportunists, therefore, scream about “class struggle,” 
but ignore the concrete tasks of elimination of class distinc- 
tions, construction of socialism, and advance to communism. 
They end up in confusion in practice. 

As is already clear, the form and content of class struggle 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


91 


are defined differently according to each stage of the develop- 
ment of the revolution, and it is impermissible to regard them 
as the same under any circumstances. Left opportunists, 
failing to understand the dialectic development of the form 
and content of class struggle, confuse the class struggle under 
the socialist system with class struggle in the stage of the so- 
cialist revolution, with the result that the working masses are 
pitted against each other, greatly damaging the political and 
ideological unity of the working masses, which should be the 
basis of social relations under socialism. 

Kim II Sungs clarification of the question of the transi- 
tional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat demolishes 
these right and left opportunist deviations, which already have 
pioved bankrupt in practice. His theory on these questions is 
not only a creative development of Marxism-Leninism, but 
also is of piactical significance for the international commu- 
nist movement, and particularly the practical struggle of the 
working class for the construction of socialism and commu- 
nism. 


2. THE COMPLETE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM 

(1) Superiority of the Socialist System 

Capitalism is the road of exploitation and oppression, sub- 
jugation and decline. Socialism is the only way to eliminate all 
forms of class exploitation and national oppression, to guar- 
antee real freedom and happiness for all people, and to realize 
complete national independence and prosperity. Therefore, 
socialism and communism represent the bright future of man- 
kind. This is the irrefutable truth, completely borne out in 
theory and practice. This truth has been demonstrated fully 
by the experience of the Korean people in their revolutionary 
struggle. All the great victories won by the Korean people 
during the past 20 years in revolution and construction under 


92 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


the banner of the Republic have been achieved because they 
have advanced steadily along the road of socialism. All the 
achievements of the Korean people demonstrate clearly the 
essential superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist 
system. 

In defining the socialist system, Kim 11 Sung says: 

The socialist system is the most advanced social system, under 
which power is in the hands of the masses of the people; production 
is developed steadily in a planned way, on a high scientific and 
technical foundation, for the purpose of systematically enhancing 
the welfare of the people on the basis of public ownership of the 
means of production; all kinds of exploitation and oppression have 
been abolished for all time; and each works according to his ability 
and takes his share according to the quality and quantity of his work . 16 

Socialism from the standpoint of power is the state and 
social system whose political power is firmly held by the 
popular masses, headed by the working class. Thus, viewed 
from the relations of production, it is the social system in 
which all private or capitalist ownership of the means of 
production has been eliminated completely and social 
ownership is in control. Therefore, under these conditions, 
the prime motive of production is systematically to increase 
the welfare of all the people. The most modern scientific and 
technical facilities are provided in order to supply the ever- 
increasing material and cultural demands of the masses and, 
on this basis, production is developed in a planned way at a 
rapid pace. Herein lies the basic characteristic of socialist 
production. The argument that the tempo of economic develop- 
ment is slowed down under the socialist system as its eco- 
nomic development and scale expand has nothing in common 
with the Marxist-Leninist view on the nature of socialist 
production. 

Finally, if viewed from the relations of distribution, in the 
socialist system the right to work is guaranteed to all and the 
socialist principle of distribution is enforced: Each works 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


93 


according to his ability and receives according to the quality 
and quantity of his labor; all exploiting classes have been 
liquidated and their socio-economic foundations have been 
wiped out; profit from the labor of others and their oppression 
have been abolished for all time. The fruits of all labor, direct- 
ly or indirectly, belong to the workers themselves. Therefore, 
socialism is the most advanced social system, whose realiza- 
tion mankind has desired for many centuries, superior in all 
respects to the capitalist system. 

First, it is superior in regard to the fact that the people hold 
political power, that the masses enjoy completely guaranteed 
democratic rights. In the northern half of the Republic, all 
people participate in the country’s politics freely, exercise 
their sovereign political rights for their revolutionary cause, 
have free choice of jobs according to their ability and aptitude, 
work and learn to their hearts’ content, and live happily. Con- 
versely, under capitalism, where capitalists, landlords and 
other exploiting classes hold power, no political rights or 
freedoms are securely guaranteed for the majority of the peo- 
ple. Historical experience demonstrates that bourgeois 
democracy is essentially a democracy for the capitalists and 
landlords, and means dictatorship to the overwhelming major- 
ity of the masses. 

Second, concerning the means of production under social- 
ism, working people are not only in control of the government 
but also are the masters of production and labor. There is no 
“alienation of labor” because the proletariat works for their 
state, for their society and for themselves. This is the powerful 
basis that enables the masses to give full scope to their 
creative capacity and talent and to increase production rapid- 
ly. As against this, under capitalism, the means of production 
are owmed by capitalists and landlords and the purpose of 
production is to bring them more profit. The masses work to 
sustain a bare living. Labor presupposes exploitation and, 
consequently, workers are alienated completely from the 


94 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


products of their labor, which belong to the capitalists. 
Workers are guaranteed the right to live only on the premise 
that they are exploited. Under such conditions, it is clear that 
the producing masses have little interest in production tech- 
nique. 

Third, in the socialist system, all sectors and enterprises of 
the people's economy are linked together, have a common 
purpose and interest, and are directed in a unified and 
planned way by the central economic planning body. Con- 
sequently, it is possible to develop a planned and balanced 
economy, to mobilize and utilize all human and material 
resources and the production potential of the state effectively 
and to a maximum. Under capitalism, there is anarchy of pro- 
duction, and economic crises due to overproduction are 
inevitable. 

Fourth, under socialism, production is used entirely to 
improve the welfare of the people and, as a result, this system 
is characterized basically by a continual improvement in the 
people's living standard together with rapid development of 
production. As against this, the inevitable result of capitalism 
is the starvation and poverty, unemployment and pauperiza- 
tion of a substantial part of the working masses, an increasing 
gap between rich and poor, between the workers needs and 
their satisfaction. The above is the basic content of the 
superiority of socialism over capitalism. 

Since socialism and capitalism are as described, it is 
historically necessary for a people liberated from colonial 
enslavement to press ahead on the road to socialism. Histoiical 
experience clearly shows that if people, freed from imperialist 
exploitation and oppression that has continued for scores of 
years or for centuries, hope to realize complete national in- 
dependence and liberation, real freedom and happiness for 
the people and autonomy and prosperity for the nation, there 
is no alternative for them but to march along the path of 
socialism. 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


95 


In order for a liberated people to realize complete national 
independence and liberation, it is necessary for the masses, 
headed by the working class, to hold political power firmly. 
And it is necessary for them to use it as a powerful weapon to 
smash the subversive activities of foreign imperialists and 
domestic reactionaries if they are to eliminate the colonial 
domination and eradicate all the economic foundations of 
imperialism and domestic reaction. They are required to 
strengthen their revolutionary forces and establish a pro- 
gressive social system, while socializing the principal means 
of production, and striving to construct a powerful indepen- 
dent national economy and culture. Only by so doing, can the 
liberated people take the shortcut to freedom and happiness 
and to national independence and prosperity without going 
through the trials and struggles unavoidable under capitalism. 

It is important for people who have won political indepen- 
dence to never allow domestic reaction to wrest political 
power away from them. If domestic reactionaries should gain 
control, they will ally themselves with foreign imperialists 
and surrender national independence and freedom, returning 
the country to a declining neo-colonial status. This has been 
borne out by history. 

The historical experience of the Korean people in their 
long revolutionary struggle demonstrates the irrefutable 
truth that a people liberated from imperialist colonial enslave- 
ment should advance steadily toward socialism and commu- 
nism, the future of mankind. 

(2) Requirements for Complete Victory of Socialism 

It is the task of the working class and the socialist state, after 
the foundations of socialism have been laid, to carry on the 
revolution in politics, economics, culture and all other areas 
and to realize the complete victory of socialism. Today, the 
Korean people are facing this great, still unattained revolu- 
tionary task. 


96 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


The continuation of the revolution in all areas after the 
socialist system has triumphed and the foundations of social- 
ism laid is the objective law of the development of socialism. 

First, even after the victory of the socialist system it is 
necessary to wage a continuous struggle against the remnants 
of the deposed ruling classes. Experience of the revolutionary 
struggles in Korea teaches that the overthrown ruling classes 
continue to resist for a long time. They never abandon their 
dream of regaining power, even after they have been liqui- 
dated as a class and deprived of their bases. Their resistance 
is due to the class nature of the exploiters and, at the same 
time, is related to the fact that while imperialism still exists 
they receive positive support from foreign imperialists. 

Second, even after the socialist system has been established, 
age-old, feudalistic, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas, 
which are ideological survivals of the exploiting classes, still 
remain deeply rooted in the ideology and consciousness of 
the masses. These ideas are a negative factor in the develop- 
ment of revolution and construction. 

They take the form of “excessive centralism, localism and 
other egocentric tendencies in the control and management 
of socialist economy. Needless to say, these ideas peitain to 
the main factors which determine the changed character ol 
the socialist society and it requires obstinate struggles to root 
up these ideas completely and to remold the ideology and 
consciousness of the working masses to collectivism and 
communism. The control of socialist production relations 
creates material conditions decisively favorable for furthering 
the ideology and consciousness of communism. It is true that 
the dominant ideas of a socialist society are communist ideas. 
But this does not mean that the struggle to remold the ideology 
and consciousness of the working people in a socialist society 
can be weakened. On the contrary, the historical experience ol 
socialist countries shows that the political and ideological 
education of the working people should be strengthened 
constantly and decisively. 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


97 


Third, even after the victory of the socialist system, there 
remain for a considerable period distinctions between town 
and countryside and between the working class and the 
peasantry. The principal class distinctions remaining in a 
socialist society are those between the working class and the 
peasantry. These distinctions are also a main factor determin- 
ing the transitional nature of socialism. Consequently, the 
working elass can say that a completely classless society has 
been achieved only after the peasantry has been elevated to 
its level in ideology, consciousness, culture, morality and 
other areas. 

Fourth, even after the victory of the socialist system, it is 
necessary for the working class to continue to develop socialist 
production to a level suitable for socialist and communist 
society and to improve the living standard and culture of the 
people. In order to establish socialism firmly, it is necessary, 
above all, to lay the proper socialist material and technical 
foundations. Generally speaking, socialism demands that 
productive forces be raised to a level of development far 
higher than the material and technological levels inherited 
from capitalism. 

All-round development of all kinds of machinery and 
technology and full development of productive forces are 
possible only in a socialist system that has destroyed the 
narrow framework of capitalist relations of production. 
Machinery, technology and productive forces are placed 
under the direct control of man himself in a socialist system 
and fully serve the happiness and progress of mankind. In 
other words, the role of machinery and technology under the 
capitalists — to control, destroy and exploit man — comes to an 
end when capitalism is abolished. 

This is particularly important to a country like Korea, which 
lias taken the path of socialism without going through the 
normal development of capitalism and industrial revolution. 
Regarding the living conditions of the people, the social 
sources of exploitation and poverty have been eliminated 


98 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


and the most basic problems in the material and cultural life 
of the people have been solved. But the task of continuously 
and decisively raising the living standard of the people still 
remains. Therefore, what is the task facing a state of the dicta- 
torship of the proletariat and how can this task be realized? 

In order to achieve the complete victory of socialism and accom- 
plish the historical cause of the working class [Kim II Sung says], the 
state must further strengthen its role as a weapon of class struggle, 
a weapon for the building of socialism and communism. In other 
words, the socialist state should strengthen the dictatorship ol the 
proletariat, carrying on the class struggle on the one hand and vigor- 
ously pushing ahead with the building of the socialist economy on 
the other. 17 

Only by continuously and decisively strengthening the 
dictatorship of the proletariat can a socialist state occupy the 
ideological and material fortresses that have to be occupied 
for the complete victory of socialism and the advance to 
communism. 

It is important to carry out the task of occupying the ideolog- 
ical and material fortresses in a unified way, simultaneously. 
Overestimation or understatement will lead to deviations of 
left or right opportunism and there will be an irretrievable 
loss to the general course of socialist construction. Actually, 
these two tasks are inseparably interrelated and it is thus 
necessary to carry them out in an integrated way. 

In other words, if the dictatorship of the proletariat and the 
ideological revolution are underestimated and the class stiug- 
gle is weakened, it will be impossible for the working masses 
to give full scope to their creative capacity and conscious 
enthusiasm and to carry out the tasks of economic construc- 
tion and technical revolution successfully. 

On the contrary, if the class struggle and ideological revolu- 
tion are overemphasized, and economic construction and the 
technological revolution are underestimated, it is difficult to 
ease the onerous working conditions of the people, to raise 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


99 


their living standards and to carry out the ideological revolu- 
tion itself successfully. Ideology and consciousness are deter- 
mined by material conditions and, even in a socialist country, 
these depend to a great extent on technological development 
and improvement of living standards. We must man the ideo- 
logical and material fortresses in a closely related and inte- 
grated way, through the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the 
complete victory of socialism. 

It is important to combine the class struggle against a hand- 
ful of enemy elements with the struggle to educate, remold 
and unite the masses who constitute the overwhelming ma- 
jority of the people. 

If one loses sight of the fact that under socialism unity and 
cooperation among the working class, peasantry and intellec- 
tuals are the basis of social relations, and if the class struggle is 
overemphasized and exaggerated, the error of leftism is com- 
mitted. Conversely, if one ignores the fact that hostile ele- 
ments and old ideology survive and that the class struggle 
continues under socialism, and if all the people are permitted 
to enjoy “pure democracy” or what is called “freedom” the 
serious rightist error is committed. 

Democracy as a political concept assumes class character 
under any circumstances. All dictatorships of the exploiting 
classes are dictatorships against the exploited classes, and 
their democracy is democracy for the handful of people of the 
exploiting classes. In contrast to this, a dictatorship of the pro- 
letariat is a dictatorship of the exploited against the exploiters 
and democracy for the benefit of the masses of the people. Just 
as there has never been a state without a ruling class, so there 
lias never been a democracy devoid of class character and 
I here will never be such a democracy. In any state, democracy 
is democracy for the class in power, and goes along with dic- 
tatorship against the enemy classes. 

In conditions where remnants of the deposed exploiters are 
active and where class struggles continue, there can be no 


100 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


“pure” democracy or “complete freedom” for all people. 
Bourgeois democracy is the freedom for millionaires to exploit 
and plunder the working people and to earn profits, allowing 
the working people only the freedom of poverty. If one should 
fail to recognize the class nature of democracy in socialist 
society and assert that all people should enjoy pure democra- 
cy” and “complete freedom” under the dictatorship of the pro- 
letariat, this will be tantamount to imposing bourgeois democ- 
racy and slavish freedom on the people. We are opposed to an 
abstract and supra-class interpretation of demociacy. 

Next, it is necessary to solve the rural and agrarian questions 
in order to realize the complete victory of socialism. As Kim 11 
Sung says: 

To solve the rural question finally and to raise cooperative proper- 
ty to the level of public property is one ol the most important tasks 
confronting the dictatorship of the proletariat after the triumph oi the 
socialist system and one of the basic conditions for the complete 
victory of socialism. Only when the rural question is solved and the 
backwardness of the countryside is eliminated completely can the 
socialist state make a clean sweep of the reactionary bourgeois hang- 
overs and footholds fostered from outside and of the remnants of the 
overthrown exploiting classes that plant themselves and engage in 
insidious maneuverings. And only when cooperative property is 
raised to the level of public property can the agricultural productive 
forces be developed to a high degree, can selfish ideas remaining in 
the minds of the peasants be rooted out, and can all the woiking 
people be led unswervingly along the path of collectivism, which 
will result in their working for the whole society and the entire 
people with a high degree of conscious zeal . 18 

It is clear that the rural and agrarian questions finally will be 
solved, in the complete sense defined by Kim 11 Sung, in the 
stage of social development when the ideology and conscious- 
ness of the peasantry are remolded into the ideas of the work- 
ing class or the ideas of communism, when agriculture will be 
equipped with modern machinery and cooperative ownership 
has been turned into ownership by the whole people. To 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


101 


realize this, it is necessary, above all, to carry out energetically 
three revolutions — technical, cultural and ideological — in the 
countryside, on the basis of the rapid development of socialist 
industry and towns. At the same time, it is necessary for the 
working class to strengthen greatly its assistance to the peas- 
antry, to raise agriculture to the advanced levels of industrial 
management and control and to strengthen relations of produc- 
tion between ownership by the entire people and cooperative 
ownership, and to bring them together. 

Only when this task has been accomplished successfully 
can the working class complete one of the main tasks to be 
carried out in the transitional period, that is, winning the in- 
termediate classes, especially the farming masses, a basic 
principle presented by Kim II Sung for solving the rural and 
agrarian questions under socialism. 

For a complete victory of socialism, it is essential to advance 
socialist economic construction, to raise productive forces to a 
level high enough to satisfy the requirements of socialism and 
communism, and to attain a high level of material and cultural 
life for the working people. 

The communists not only fight for the freedom and liberation of 
people, but also strive for their happiness [says Kim II Sung]. An im- 
portant task confronting communists after they have overthrown the 
old system and liberated the people from exploitation and oppression 
is to build a satisfactory socialist economy. Concern for the enhance- 
ment of the welfare of the people is the supreme law governing the 
activities of the Party and state of the working class . 19 

This concern is the prime principle consistently upheld by 
(be Workers Party of Korea and the government of the Repub- 
lic in their activities. To implement it, it is necessary to pro- 
mote socialist economic construction. The task here is to lay a 
I inn material and technical foundation of socialism by carrying 
out industrialization, technical and cultural innovations, and a 
program to train all the working people in the skills and tech- 
niques of operating modern machinery. In other words, it is 


102 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


necessary to develop a rapidly expanding modern industry 
and advanced agriculture by equipping all sectors of the econ- 
omy, including agriculture, with advanced techniques and to 
remold all people into capable all-round builders of commu- 
nism. It is necessary in this way, to liberate the working class 
from exploitation and from onerous and exhausting labor, to 
eradicate distinctions between industrial and agricultural 
labor, heavy and light labor, manual and mental labor, and 
to produce more material wealth with easier work. Further, it 
is necessary to raise decisively the material and cultural levels 
of all working people, based on the rapidly developing indus- 
trial and agricultural production. This is the meaning of lais- 
ing productive forces to a level of development commensurate 
with socialism and communism. This is the realistic basis for 
fully realizing the highest principle governing the activities 
of the Party and state of the working class. This is also the 
basis for realizing the communist principle of distribution; 
where people voluntarily work for society and commodity 
circulation is transformed into distribution in kind. 

The complete victory of socialism, as defined by Kim II 
Sung, is not only wide in scope but also very high in quality— 
a complete transformation of the socio-economic formation. 

Thus, socialism triumphs completely when the remnants of 
the exploiting classes have been demolished and liquidated 
completely; when distinctions between town and countryside 
and between the working class and the peasantry have been 
eradicated; when all the members of society have been trans- 
formed into conscious communists by having been converted 
into the working class; when the rural question has been 
solved so that there are no longer distinctions between co- 
operative property and property of the entire people so that 
ownership by the entire people, the highest level of social- 
ization, holds undivided sway; when the technological 1 evo- 
lution and socialist industrialization have been realized fully; 
when the material and technical foundations of socialism firm- 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


103 


ly have been laid by equipping all sectors of the people's 
economy with modern technique; and when material and 
technical foundations have been completed for the full de- 
velopment of individuals and for the gradual elimination of 
distinctions between industrial and agricultural labor, heavy 
and light labor, manual and mental labor. 

Only when these conditions are fulfilled can socialism have 
the requisite material and technical foundation, and commu- 
nism will begin to develop. It is at this stage that a full reali- 
zation of communism will be posed as a concrete and realistic 
task. 


3. TOWARD WORLD SOCIALISM 

The revolutionary struggles of the proletariat in countries 
where they have conquered power should be part of the revo- 
lutionary struggles of the international proletariat to overthrow 
capitalism and imperialism on a worldwide scale and to 
guarantee the ultimate victory of socialism and they should 
ho developed in connection with the revolutionary struggles 
ol the international proletariat in an integrated way. Only in 
lliis way can the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat 
in individual countries win ultimate victory. This necessity 
is related to the fact that the revolutionary struggles in coun- 
li ies where the proletariat has seized power are being waged 
under encirclement of international capitalism and in direct 

• onlrontation with imperialism. Kim 11 Sung says: 

Where the proletariat has seized power in an individual country 

• ueircled by international capitalism, there cannot he freedom from 
I lie danger of imperialist aggression and capitalist restoration till 

• •mnnunism is realized on a worldwide scale. Therefore, to win the 

• ill i mate victory in revolution, the proletariat of each country that 
Ini', assumed power should consolidate its own internal revolutionary 
Inires in every way and, at the same time, should be given the posi- 


104 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 

tive support of other contingents of the world socialist revolution 
and should cement true international solidarity with the working 
classes in all countries and with oppressed peoples all over the 
world. 20 

Consequently, the proletariat that has assumed power in 
individual countries is faced with the revolutionary task of 
decisively strengthening and vigorously advancing the world 
revolution. The strengthening of the internal revolutionary 
forces and the victory of the revolution should be considered 
in their relation to the ultimate victory of the world revolu- 
tion. In other words, the victory of the revolution and socialist 
construction in each country decisively strengthen the forces 
of the world socialist revolution, which, in turn, creates a 
condition decisively favorable for carrying out the revolution 
and construction in each country. This is the unitary rela- 
tionship between the victory of the revolution in one country 
and the final victory of the world revolution. 

The ultimate victory of the world revolution will be real- 
ized, says Kim 11 Sung, <l in the course of the outbreak of the 
socialist revolution and its complete victory in many coun- 
tries, and the gradual expansion, consolidation and develop- 
ment of the socialist camp.” 

The ultimate victory of the revolution will be achieved as 
a result of the process by which revolutions will continue to 
occur in a large number of countries in the world, and espe- 
cially in countries in proximity to those where the proletariat 
has conquered power; where imperialist encirclement is 
converted into socialist encirclement, breaking down the 
walls of imperialist encirclement of socialist countries and 
opening up a prospect for the transformation of the dictator- 
ship of the proletariat into a world system; where the isolation 
of the bastions of individual socialist countries encircled by 
imperialism is prevented; and where strong ties of militant 
solidarity between the working class and the oppressed peo- 
ples of the world have been formed precisely through this 
historical process. 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


105 


Only when these conditions are realized can it be said that 
socialism is completely free from armed intervention by the 
imperialists and attempts to revive capitalism, and only then 
will the ultimate victory of socialism be secured. This is the 
concrete process of realizing the ultimate victory of the world 
lev olution as made clear by Kim II Sung — the great historical 
and actual process of revolutionary transition from capital- 
ism to socialism on a worldwide scale, the concrete process 
of realizing the ultimate victory of socialism. 

The socialist camp is the invincible revolutionary base of the 
intei national working class for the ultimate victory of socialism and 
communism, the reliable bulwark of victory for the oppressed peo- 
ples and all progressive peoples throughout the world, and the 
powerful fortress of world peace. 21 

The existence of the socialist camp and its united strength 
are important factors determining the destiny not only of the 
socialist countries and peoples, but also the destiny of all 
mankind. The solution of all questions of world revolution 
today depends to a large extent on the united strength of the 
socialist countries. It is because of this that world reaction, 
led by U.S. imperialism, fears the existence of the socialist 
camp more than anything else, and continues plots and activi- 
ties to undermine it. 

Specifically, U.S. imperialism is following a two-pronged 
slrategy of armed aggression and internal subversion through 
ideological and cultural infiltration to destroy the socialist 

■ amp. It is a policy of directly attacking, one by one, the coun- 
tries that are taking a revolutionary road, holding high the 
banner of anti-imperialism. At the same time, the United 
Males is intensifying ideological and cultural infiltration into 
countries that are not carrying out the revolution actively, 
.pleading illusions about capitalism among the people and 

■ tiling for unprincipled compromises with imperialism in 
older to undermine these countries from within. Under the 

■ Ireumstances, it is necessary for all the socialist countries 


106 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


to unite to defend the socialist camp from the allied forces 
of imperialism. Thus, if it happens that a country of the social- 
ist camp is exposed to serious danger because of the subver- 
sive activities of imperialism and domestic reactionary forces 
allied with it, the proletariat of the country concerned should 
receive active support from other contingents of the world 
socialist revolution. All the revolutionary forces of the world, 
including the socialist countries, should give all-out, active 
assistance to it. This problem affects not only the revolution 
of one particular country but also the destiny of the world 
revolution generally and the existence of the entire socialist 
camp. Since the socialist camp is the bastion of world revolu- 
tion, it is clear that the failure of the revolution in any country 
will result in a major setback for the power and strength of the 
entire socialist camp. 

Further, the existence of the socialist camp is a great com- 
mon revolutionary gain for the working class of the entire 
world. Accordingly, its defense should be shared not only by 
the proletariat that has gained power but also by the prole- 
tariat that has not. It is a historic fact that the very existence 
of the socialist camp has opened a decisive phase for the revo- 
lutionary struggles of the proletariat in different countries 
for the conquest of power. It is only imperialism that is afraid 
of the expansion of the socialist camp — and consequently of 
the victory of the revolution in individual socialist countries — 
and it is because of this that imperialist reaction is making 
desperate efforts to frustrate the revolution and construction. 
In order to strengthen the power of the socialist camp, it is 
necessary for the socialist countries to uphold the class posi- 
tion in solving questions, starting from the basic interests of 
the revolution and the essential requirements of the socialist 
camp as a class alliance. 

The socialist countries are opposed to imperialism and 
colonialism and are fighting together for the construction of 
socialist and communist society where people can live freely 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


107 


and happily. Herein lies the common political, economic and 
social basis and class content of all the socialist countries. 
This is the reason the socialist camp is not artificial, a creation 
of some international treaty. It is not a temporary alliance. It 
is a permanent alliance created by the need for class soli- 
darity of the working class of the world, which has been vic- 
torious in shaip revolutionary struggle against international 
capital. 

Consequently, it is impossible to exclude a country that has 
the prerequisites of a socialist state from the socialist camp 
because of differences of opinion, nor is it possible to include 
a country that is no longer a socialist state as part of the social- 
ist camp. 

Differences between fraternal parties and countries arise 
Irom different historical and geographical conditions, and 
ho m their different national tasks. Differences also arise from 
the failure to understand correctly the principles of Marxism- 
I ieninism and to uphold a completely revolutionary stand. But 
these differences do not reflect contradictions between state 
and social system nor do they reflect basic differences between 
hostile classes. However sharp they may be, such differences 
are the internal affairs of the socialist camp and the inter- 
national communist movement. It is not permissible to pre- 
sent these differences as contradictions between hostile 
classes. Therefore, the way to overcome such differences 
should be essentially different from the method of solving 
contradictions between hostile classes. They should be 
solved by means of ideological struggle based on the desire 
lor unity among class brothers. A basic principle of commu- 
nists that should be observed in all circumstances is to dis- 
tinguish clearly between class brothers and class enemies. 
As long as this class position strictly is adhered to, difference 
nl opinion surely will be overcome. 

In order to achieve real unity among fraternal parties and 
•lutes, it is necessary to observe strictly the norms of inter- 


108 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


relationship among fraternal parties and fraternal states — 
complete equality, mutual respect for independence, non- 
interference in internal affairs, and comradely cooperation. 

It is especially important for all socialist countries and com- 
munist and workers’ parties to adhere strictly to a position of 
independence under all circumstances. Needless to say, 
socialist countries and communist and workers parties are 
completely equal and independent. They are all inseparably 
linked by the class solidarity of the working class and they 
are responsible not only for the revolution in their countries 
and for their people as completely equal and independent 
contingents in the militant ranks of the world revolution, 
but they are responsible for the world revolution and for the 
people of the entire world. 

In this sense, distinctions between the parties of large and 
small countries, between the parties of long established 
and newly formed revolutionary countries are entirely 
meaningless. No country is permitted to claim special privi- 
leges in the ranks of the world communist movement because 
of such distinctions. None can claim a privileged position 
in the ranks of the communist movement and there can be 
no question of a higher or lower country in the socialist camp. 
The question is whether a party adheres strictly to the revolu- 
tionary principles of Marxism-Leninism, whether it is respon- 
sible for successfully promoting the revolution and construc- 
tion, and whether, in so doing, it performs its international 
duties in the world revolution. 

However, it is impossible to maintain independence apart 
from economic independence. Only after it has constructed 
a firm national economy can a socialist country not only main- 
tain political independence but also contribute to the strength- 
ening of the socialist camp as a whole. In other words, the 
economy of each socialist country as a unit of the world social- 
ist economic system develops in close relation and coopera- 
tion with other units. Consequently, the socialist economic 


THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 


109 


system is strengthened as each unit comprising it is strength- 
ened. Further, the strength and effectiveness of the socialist 
economic system as a whole necessarily deepens the general 
crisis of imperialism and, consequently, of the capitalist 
woild economic system and accelerates the ultimate down- 
lall of world imperialist reaction. This, in turn, creates con- 
ditions more favorable for revolution and construction in 
each socialist country. In this way, it is necessary to under- 
stand correctly the interrelations between the construction 
of an independent national economy in each country and the 
general strengthening of the socialist economic system. 

Today, the formation of the socialist market has dealt a 
severe blow to the imperialist monopolies and billionaires 
that dominated markets and controlled the world economy 
in the past. It has damaged gravely the expansionist policy 
ol U. S. imperialism, which leads modern imperialism, and 
tries to monopolize overseas markets, plunder the raw ma- 
terial resources of the world at will, and establish a world 
market of its own. This has deepened decisively the general 
crisis of imperialism in economic matters. 

In this situation, it is of decisive significance to expand 
and strengthen the socialist market in order to weaken im- 
perialism and accelerate the world revolution. Consequently, 
i! is of primary importance for the socialist countries to 
strengthen and develop their foreign economic relations. 

I .< onomic lelations with capitalist countries can have onlv 
secondary significance in the foreign trade of the socialist 
eountries. In other words, the socialist countries are required 
,<) s h c k to their class position even in their foreign economic 
relations. 

Construction of an independent national economy is the 
icalistic basis for eliminating national inequality — the actual 
Uisis for national inequality is economic backwardness. The 
• obstruction of socialism and communism is aimed at elimi- 
naling not only class distinctions but also national inequality. 


110 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


National inequality cannot be eliminated immediately after 
the socialist revolution is carried out in a specific country, 
nor can such inequality be eradicated by integrating nation- 
alities in one way or another. 

In order to eliminate national inequality, all nations must 
become socialist, but all nations must develop with full free- 
dom. This is the realistic way to do away with national 
inequality. 

Maintenance of independence should be based firmly 
on the principle of proletarian internationalism and should 
be carried out so as to strengthen internationalism decisively. 
Just as there can be no internationalism apart from inde- 
pendence, so there can be no independence apart from 
internationalism. If this interrelationship is ignored, inde- 
pendence apart from internationalism will have nothing in 
common with Marxism-Leninism but will be merely narrow 
bourgeois isolationism or bourgeois nationalism. 

If someone ignores Marxism-Leninism and proletarian inter- 
nationalism and takes to national egoism under the pretext of main- 
taining independence, he is gravely mistaken. What is more, it does 
not befit a Communist to renounce the principle of class solidarity 
and reject joint action and joint struggle of class brothers under the 
slogan of independence. Such an act will do enormous harm to the 
development of the world revolution, and more, result in ruining 
the revolution in his own country, too . 22 


CHAPTER III 


Socialist Economic Management 


Organization and perfection of economic management 
under a socialist system is a pressing theoretical and practical 
question in the construction of socialism and communism. 
Kim II Sung wrote: 

Following the completion of the socialist reorganization of pro- 
duction relations and the establishment of the socialist system, the 
successful building of socialism and communism depends largely 
on how socialist production relations are adapted to the ever- 
developing productive forces and how they arc implemented; on 
how the superstructure is perfected to suit the foundations that are 
established; and finally on how the reverse influence of the super- 
structure on the foundations is to be stimulated . 1 

This quotation refers to the most fundamental area of Marx- 
ism-Leninism: the interrelation between productive forces 
and production relations, and between the base and the 
superstructure. It is a problem that can be solved only by 
bold, creative development. 

The general proposition is: In any society the form of pro- 
duction relations and economic structure must correspond 
to the level of development of productive forces and the na- 
lure of the economic base of society. How to apply this princi- 
ple in a socialist society? How to insure correspondence be- 
tween the constantly developing productive forces to the 
relations of production? How to perfect the superstructure, 
in particular the planning and management of state and eco- 
nomic organs, how to best adapt it to the socialist base, how 
lo strengthen its positive influence on the base? 


112 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


Solution of these questions is necessary to give full play to 
the essential superiority of the socialist system, whic ias 
completely liberated productive forces from the shackles ot 
capitalism, and has opened a broad vista for free development, 
as well as for expansion and strengthening of the socialist 
base through state planning and management. 

This means, primarily, that socialism enables millions of 
working people, liberated from all forms of exploitation and 
suppression forever -and thus absolute masters of social 
production -to display their revolutionary zeal and creative 
initiative and powerfully to promote socialist and communist 
construction. 

In the final analysis, the problems boil down to the inter- 
relationship between productive forces and production rela- 
tions, and between the base and the superstructure. Under 
capitalism, these interrelationships are formed spontaneous y. 
When they have reached a certain stage, contradictions and 
conflicts become their basic content. These contradictions 
finally are resolved only by the abolition of the capitalist 
production relations and superstructure thiough ie\o ution. 

Under the socialist system, these interrelations should ie 
planned and purposeful. The slightest error may cause grave 
damage to the revolution and to construction. To form such 
interrelationships correctly, it is necessary scientifica y to 
analyze the changing and developing situation and to apply 
the Juche principle. Several socialist countries suffered con- 
fusion and grave losses from failure to solve this question 

correctly. 

In the DPRK this most difficult and complex question was 
solved by application of the Chongsanri spirit and the Chong- 
sanri method created by Premier Kim 11 Sung, and the Daean 
work system, to industry and agriculture, and by the new sys- 
em of guiding agriculture. The correctness of the Daean work 
system and the guiding system of agriculture, which are new 
socialist systems of economic management established in 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


113 


North Korea, has been demonstrated clearly and their vitality 
is being displayed fully in the form of a great upsurge of 
socialist construction. 

L ESSENCE OF THE CHONGSANRI SPIRIT 
AND METHOD 

In the northern half of the Republic, the socialist transfor- 
mation of the relations of production in industry and agricul- 
ture was completed in August 1958. This was a decisive factor 
in vigorously advancing socialist construction. The productive 
forces, freed from old relations of production, began to develop 
rapidly, and the workers' revolutionary enthusiasm and will to 
produce rose to new heights, while a technological revolution 
began in all branches of industry and agriculture. Along with 
the rapid economic development, the scale of production was 
expanded greatly and relations among different branches of 
production became more complex. 

This development required reorganization of the state and 
economic planning organs in adaptation to a changed situa- 
tion — that is, the creation and completion of a new socialist 
system of economic management related to the socialist sys- 
tem. In other words, it became impossible to accelerate the 
development of productive forces more positively and power- 
fully under the existing system of economic management 
which, though essentially a socialist system of economic man- 
agement, was plagued by not a few survivals of capitalism. 

For instance, the existing state agricultural bodies were 
organized mainly for the purpose of directing private farms. 
Needless to say, this direction reflected the realistic require- 
ments in the stage where private farms played an overwhelm- 
ing role in agriculture. However, this system proved inade- 
quate when private farms were transferred into socialist coop- 
erative farms and when the scale of cooperative farms was 
greatly expanded through merger of agricultural cooperative 


114 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


association into ri-unit farms, and also when the technological 
revolution was beginning in agriculture in real earnest. 

The gap between the completely new situation in the 
countryside and the existing operation of the state organs for 
directing agriculture resulted in the political and practical 
inability of the government bodies to cope with the rapid 
development of the economy. As Kim 11 Sung pointed out: 

The rate of progress of our national economy is unusually high. 
The successes we have scored in economic construction in the six 
years following the war are such as could hardly be achieved, even 
in scores of years, under the capitalist system. We have advanced in a 
spirit of taking ten steps while others take one. 

Our economy has developed at a very high rate, but we can hardly 
expect people’s knowledge and capacity to progress as rapidly . 2 

On-the-spot guidance given by Premier Kim II Sung in 
February 1960 at Chongsanri, Kangso county, South Pyongan 
province, was of decisive significance for establishing a social- 
ist system of economic management adapted to the entirely 
new situation, inasmuch as it solved this urgent revolutionary 
task and radically improved the system of direction and 
method of work of the Party, state and economic organs in 
the economy. 

Through this historic guidance, Kim II Sung analyzed the 
economic situation created after the socialist transformation 
of the relations of production and originated the Chongsanri 
spirit and the Chongsanri method as a new socialist system of 
economic management in North Korea, boldly applying the 
revolutionary mass line. This is explained by him as follows: 

The essentials of the Chongsanri method are that the higher organ 
helps the lower; the superior assists his inferiors and always goes 
down to work areas in order to get a good grasp of actual conditions 
and to find correct solutions to problems. This method gives priority 
to political work or work with people in all activities, giving full 
play to the conscious enthusiasm and creative initiative of the masses 
so as to ensure the fulfillment of revolutionary tasks. This is not only 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


115 


a powerful method of work, enabling us to carry out immediate 
revolutionary tasks successfully and substantially, but also a power- 
ful method of education that enhances the ideological and political 
level and the practical ability of functionaries and revolutionaries . 3 

To mobilize to a maximum the inexhaustible creative capac- 
ity of the masses, to rely on their strength, and to lead them to 
give full play to their revolutionary enthusiasm, creative 
capacity and talent or, in other words, to follow a consistent 
mass line, are of decisive importance for promoting the 
revolution and construction. 

The mass line, reliance on mass participation and initiative, 
is particularly urgent in a newly established socialist system, 
in which the levels of work of cadres were inadequate to cope 
with the rapidly changing reality. Cadres of the Party, of the 
state and economic organs, were relatively backward political- 
ly and practically in relation to the complicated problems 
posed. In addition, there were various strains which developed 
in economic control and management. These problems could 
be solved only by carrying through the revolutionary mass line. 

It is true that vigorous promotion of a cultural revolution 
was a basic solution, but it would not overcome immediately 
the obstacles that were the source of the defects and short- 
comings. The only immediate solution was to change the 
system of work and method of direction in economic affairs. In 
other words, it was necessary to establish a method of work 
whereby the center could help the provinces, counties and 
the ri. It was particularly important to radically change the 
method of guidance by counties to the ri. This required a 
changed orientation in the work of the county people’s com- 
mittees. 

As a result of the merger of agricultural cooperatives into 
ri-unit associations, the ri became a production unit rather 
than an administrative one. Under these circumstances, a 
county people’s committee was required to change its func- 
tions radically from directing lower administrative organs to 


116 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


organizing and guiding the work of agriculture cooperatives 
established in each ri as a production unit. 

Thus it became necessary for the county people's committee 
to be wholly responsible for the agricultural production of 
cooperative associations organized on a ri basis, as direct 
participants in them, and to bring its guidance decisively 
closer to the agricultural production of each cooperative. At a 
time when private farms dominated, the county people s com- 
mittee used to guide private farms by administrative means 
through ri people's committees. However, now that a ri as a 
whole had become a production unit in the form of a coopera- 
tive, that system of guidance became extremely unrealistic. 

In connection with the new system of guidance, by county 
people's committees to the ri directly, the structure of county 
people's committees was also improved substantially by 
adapting them to agricultural production by cooperatives. 
Thus, a county cooperative farm management committee was 
established independent of the county people's committee, 
as a special organ for the guidance of cooperatives' agricultural 
production. This new body later became the core of the new 
agricultural guidance system in North Korea. 

The next task was to improve the method of guidance and 
operation of county Party committees — to get rid of formalistic 
administrative and bureaucratic work methods and to stick 
firmly to the basic line of Party work in order to increase its 
leading role. Kim 11 Sung put it this way: 

The basic method in Party work is not to give orders but to per- 
suade and educate 

You should have frequent talks with the Party members, lecture to 
them, induce them to read books, and direct their meetings so that 
all Party members will have a clear understanding of the intentions 
of the Party Central Committee, wholeheartedly uphold the Party s 
policies, and go through thick and thin to carry them out. Such is 
Party work, political work. By giving precedence to politics, which 
we have been calling for, we mean doing the political work well first, 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


117 


then other work. When political work is done well, administrative 
work will naturally go well, too 1 

In the final analysis, this means political and ideological 
work should be given priority in all areas so that the Party's 
policy will be brought to broad sections of the working masses, 
rousing them to implement the proposed revolutionary tasks. 

In connection with this, a series of questions were also pre- 
sented. Included was the question of county Party committees 
directly leading all the lowest level Party organizations in the 
counties as the Party's terminal leading organs; the further 
strengthening of the system of collective consultation; es- 
tablishment of correct business-like relations between the 
county Party committee and the county people's committee; 
raising the political level and business-like conduct of county 
committees and practical leaders. 

Posed as important tasks in strengthening the collective 
leadership of county Party committees were, first, the prob- 
lem of organizing the sections of collective leadership firmly 
and, second, the job of mobilizing the wisdom of broad sec- 
tions of the masses. Creative, alive wisdom always comes from 
among the masses. 

For all party activists to go to the masses to draw from their 
inexhaustible initiative and capacity, to formulate ideas 
through collective consultation, and to return these concepts 
to the masses, thereby organizing and enlisting all workers in 
the execution of revolutionary tasks — herein lies the most 
fundamental content of the Chongsanri spirit and the Chong- 
sanri method. 

Finally, in the field of economic activities, priority was 
given to the task of elevating decisively the level of economic 
management and planning. Where agricultural cooperatives 
were merged into ri-unit farms and were transformed into 
large-scale socialist collective farms, planned management 
and control of the cooperative associations became a pressing 
requirement. 


118 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


In the control and management of the economy it was also 
necessary for the work method to locate a central link in the 
chain of activities and to concentrate all energy on it. For 
instance, in the northern half of the Republic, grains are the 
basis of agricultural production. Consequently, in the activi- 
ties of the agricultural cooperatives, all energy had to be con- 
centrated on production particularly of grains, without dis- 
persing labor power, materials, funds, etc., to other second- 
ary sections. 

It was further proposed as an important task correctly to 
carry through the socialist principle of distribution and 
effectively to stimulate the material interest of farmers. As 
Kim 11 Sung explained: 

Although the means of production have been socialized, differ- 
ences in skill and intensity of labor still remain, and the people s 
consciousness is not yet up to the communist standard. Under such 
conditions, the enthusiasm of the working people for production can 
be raised and the productive forces developed rapidly only by dis- 
tribution according to the work performed. This is an objective law 
of the socialist economy and an important principle that must be 
adhered to in running it . 5 

This does not mean a one-sided emphasis on material in- 
centives. The basic policy remains to educate the working 
people in the ideas of communism, raise their voluntary en- 
thusiasm, and to link this with material incentives. Evaluation 
of working days in agricultural labor was proposed as the best 
means of measurement for applying material incentives. 

A major change was effected in the work of the Party, state 
and economic organs during the application of the Chongsanri 
spirit and method in all areas of the country. Guidance was 
brought closer to the people, higher bodies helped lowei, and 
leaders made direct contact with the masses and established a 
revolutionary course for educating, remolding and uniting 
them and for solving all problems by encouraging everyone to 
give full play to his revolutionary zeal and creative initiative. 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


119 


2. THE DAE AN WORK SYSTEM -MANAGEMENT 
FOR INDUSTRY 

The Daean work system, evolved by Premier Kim II Sung 
through his on-the-spot guidance (in December 1961) at 
Daean Electric Machine Factory, was an embodiment of the 
Chongsanri spirit and method in the area of industrial man- 
agement. 

The Chongsanri spirit and method applied to the field of 
industrial management means to implement the mass line — 
i.e., to give prime importance to ideological, political and 
moral stimuli and to combine these stimuli with material 
incentives in order rapidly to develop production. 

To strengthen political and ideological understanding of the 
working masses, priority should be given to raising the leading 
role of the vanguard party as well as of political and other 
work with the people. At the same time, it is essential to estab- 
lish a closer relationship between higher and lower organs 
and for all leaders to make direct contact with the masses, to 
learn from them and to teach them, and to improve their 
revolutionary consciousness and enthusiasm. 

In this way, the essence of the Daean system of economic 
management is that it relates most successfully to the nature of 
socialist society. It is a system of mobilizing the masses con- 
sciously for economic construction by strengthening political 
education as well as political and ideological stimuli and by 
adhering thoroughly to the principle of collective life. It is 
also a system of collectively managing and controlling the 
economy on the basis of the principle of democratic central- 
ism under the leadership of the vanguard party, with the par- 
ticipation of the masses, learning from them and teaching 
I hem, higher organs directly helping lower organs. 

The construction of socialism and communism is the great 


120 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


revolutionary cause of the masses themselves. It can be 
realized only through their creative labor. Consequently, 
ideological stimulus to arouse this revolutionary conscious- 
ness and enthusiasm is of decisive significance. And only 
when there are socialist relations of production, free from all 
forms of exploitation and oppression, is it possible for millions 
of working people to display this zeal. Consequently, ideo- 
logical stimuli fully reflect the objective requirements of 
socialist development. 

Along with this, the essential superiority of socialist pro- 
duction relations must be brought out fully through economic 
control and management. The socialist economy, by its nature, 
is a highly organized, planned economy, which constantly 
develops at a rapid pace, according to schedule. This is the 
necessary law of the development of the socialist economy. 
At the same time, the more the economy is developed and 
the more its scale is expanded, the more complex will be the 
internal structure of the economy, with the result that a higher 
level of organization is required. 

Planned management and control of a highly developed 
and organized socialist economy cannot be carried out 
successfully by a handful of specialists without the advice 
and cooperation of the people. Thus, to strengthen their 
ideological understanding and attain their participation in 
economic control and management is in accord with the ob- 
jective development of the socialist economy. 


(1) Essence of the Daean System 

The Daean work system means, in a word, to embody the 
mass line in economic control; to get rid of survivals of 
capitalism in economic management such as bureaucracy, 
over-centralization and individualism, and to implement the 
Chongsanri spirit and method, enabling workers to contribute 
to the maximum in accelerating socialist construction. 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


121 


In any kind of social system, economic management cor- 
responds to that system and reflects its essential requirements. 
Under the capitalist system industrial management is adapted 
to that system and reflects its essential requirements. All the 
means of production are in the hands of capitalists and the 
organization, control and management of production are con- 
trolled by them. Needless to say, workers are completely 
alienated from the control and management of production. In 
the final analysis, the motivation, management and control 
of capitalist production are devoted to the search for surplus 
value and profit. It is obvious that labor and material controls, 
as well as distribution of funds, are subordinated entirely to 
the quest for profit. If a factory or enterprise is unable to 
realize these objectives, it will be shut down. The sole aim of 
lationalization and scientific methods of management and 
control is to intensify the exploitation of workers and achieve 
a maximum return with a minimum of materials and funds - 
that is, to squeeze out maximum surplus value and profit. 

In this sense, the capitalist system of industrial management 
fully reflects the fundamental law of capitalist production - 
the law of surplus value; and completely serves the essential 
demand of the capitalist system -surplus value and profit. 
Thus, it is quite natural that workers have no direct material 
interest in the results of, nor do they care about, capitalist 
production. Their interest is confined to the fact that the 
management and control of capitalist production results in an 
intensification of their exploitation. 

Thus, the capitalist system of industrial management inten- 
sifies class antagonisms between the worker and the capitalist. 
The more rational and scientific the system is, the more inten- 
sified will be the class antagonisms between workers and 
capitalists, until the capitalist system will be overthrown. This 
is the inevitable contradiction inherent in the capitalist sys- 
tem of industrial management, which is, after all, a reflection 
of the essential contradiction in the capitalist system itself. 


122 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


The capitalist system of industrial management is fated for 
ultimate destruction following the collapse of the capitalist 
system itself. But this takes time, because the socialist society, 
newly born following the collapse of capitalism, unavoidably 
is plagued to a considerable extent by the survivals of capital- 
ism. Before the establishment of the Daean work system, this 
was the case with the system of industrial management in the 
northern half of the Republic. Kim 11 Sung put it this way: 

It must be admitted that the old system of factory management, 
though socialist, still retained many capitalist elements. Bureaucracy, 
departmentalism, and individualism were found in large measure. 
Superiors shouted commands at their subordinates in a bureaucratic 
manner instead of going to help them; a spirit of cooperation between 
workshops was lacking; and among some people there was a ten- 
dency toward individualism of the “You attend to your business, I’ll 
stick to mine!” variety. Therefore, under the old system of work, 
it was not possible to give full play to the activity and initiative of 
workers, people busied themselves for nothing, and no sizable 
achievements were made in production. 0 

Capitalist survivals found their concentrated expression in 
factories administered exclusively by managers. They were 
vested with sole decision-making powers and responsibility 
for production. Under such conditions, arbitrary control, sub- 
jective discretion, and other bureaucratic methods flourished. 
And where managers were not controlled by the Party, the 
damage was greater. 

Workers participated insufficiently in factory control and 
management. It was impossible to stimulate their political, 
moral and material interest. They were little concerned with 
whether production was going well or not. Their job was to 
work for eight hours, as assigned, and then go home. Needless 
to say, this system did not reflect the essential superiority of 
the socialist system. 

It could not be said that this was a socialist system of factory 
management, in the fullest meaning of the word, operating in 


ll 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


123 


accordance with the essential requirements of the socialist 
system. In conditions of expanding production and more com- 
plex and varied organic relationships among different branches 
of production, where more scientific and rational economic 
control and management were required, it became all the 
more evident that a system of control and administration of a 
factory at the discretion of a manager or a group of several 
specialists did not fit in with the new circumstances. 

After the completion of the socialist transformation of pro- 
duction relations in town and countryside, and after the estab- 
lishment of the socialist system, it was quite natural that a 
system of industrial management fully reflecting the essential 
requirements of this system, characteristic of this system and 
socialist in the fullest meaning of the word, had to be estab- 
lished. 

The content of socialist system of industrial management is 
defined primarily by the essential requirements of the social- 
ist system itself. It has to faithfully reflect the superiority of 
the socialist system and satisfy completely the requirements 
of the fundamental law of socialist production. 

The socialist system, in which the masses of people have 
power, own all the means of production and are complete- 
ly liberated from all forms of exploitation and oppression, 
makes it possible for everyone to give rein to his creativity 
and talent and to develop production constantly and rapidly. 
It also enables the economy to develop in a planned and bal- 
anced way, mobilizing and utilizing effectively and to a maxi- 
mum all human and material resources, and the full production 
potential. Kim 11 Sung explained: 

The working masses create history, and socialism and communism 
can be built only by the creative labor of millions of working peo- 
ple. Labor power is the most active and decisive element of produc- 
tion. Technology is developed by man, and machinery, too, is made 
by man and is operated by man. All precious and beautiful material 
and all cultural wealth are made by the labor of the working people. 


124 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


After all, it may be said that whether we can construct socialism 
and communism faster and better depends on how the working peo- 
ple can give full play to their creative capacity and talent, on how 
we organize social labor and utilize it, and on how rapidly we can 
increase labor productivity. 7 

To achieve this, the vanguard party decisively should 
heighten its leading role and priority should be given to politi- 
cal work. At the same time, this must be linked with economic 
and technical work and with the material interest of the work- 
ing people. This approach helps raise the level of conscious- 
ness of the working people, imbues them with collectivist and 
communist ideas, and ultimately converts them into commu- 
nist men and women who devote themselves voluntarily, with- 
out any social compulsion, to the cause of society and the 
revolution. This will help guarantee democratic centralism, 
scientific quality and rationality in economic control and 
management. 

The Daean work system evolved by Kim 11 Sung is a creative 
Marxist-Leninist system of industrial management, completely 
equipped with the essential conditions for a socialist system 
of industrial management. Its essential content is, first, to give 
priority to political and ideological work with people, to 
strengthen ideological stimuli and thereby thoroughly to 
eradicate individualism and egotism and to enable people 
to give maximum play to their revolutionary enthusiasm and 
creative talent — all this for the purpose of economic manage- 
ment and control. 

Above all it is vital in this connection to evaluate the peo- 
ple's ideology and understanding of economic control and, on 
this basis, to inform them about the economic policy of the 
Party. It is necessary for the people to participate in working 
out production plans and measures and to display their 
political enthusiasm and creative capacity. They should 
participate in production, control and management so that 
their enthusiasm for work and their creative talents will 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 125 

continue. Achievements should be evaluated politically, 
before being evaluated materially, to strengthen ideological 
stimuli. 

Second, the essential purpose of the Daean work system is 
to increase production and to control and to manage the econ- 
omy by applying the principle of collectivist and communist 
life through promoting comradely accommodation and close 
cooperation among producers and also among producing units. 
Thus, the Daean work system not only fully reflects the super- 
iority of the socialist system and the fundamental law T of 
socialist production but also amply contains in it elements of 
communist economic management. These elements are ex- 
pressed in the fact that the producers consciously and positive- 
ly participate in economic management and that their econom- 
ic control and management is carried out on the basis of a high 
level of consciousness and revolutionary enthusiasm. It is 
clear that economic management in a communist society will 
take the form of collective management by millions of con- 
scious, communist working people. 

Consequently, the Daean work system is the prototype of 
communist economic management. 

Furthermore, the people cooperate with each other and all 
work units help one another in economic management, and in 
this way the principle of collective and communist life is 
being implemented. 

Finally, this system also helps train people as excellent and 
cultured producers and as able managers: 

The Daean work system is radically different from the old; it is an 
advanced system with many factors of communist industrial manage- 
ment. This new system of work is an excellent embodiment of the 
principle of collective, communist life: “One for all and all for one.” 
In this system, superiors help their subordinates, the well-informed 
leach the less-informed, all the people help each other as comrades, 
and all workshops cooperate closely. 8 

Third, the essential meaning of the Daean work system is 


126 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


that economic management and control are carried out through 
aid by higher to lower organs and by superiors to their sub- 
ordinates. 


(2) Superiority of the Daean System 

The Daean work system will prove superior in all respects 
in the actual management and control of the socialist econo- 
my, in the first place, because it completely guarantees col- 
lective leadership of the Party committee, the highest organ of 
the economic unit concerned. 

It also ensures the principle of democratic centralism in 
socialist economic management, makes it possible to link 
centralized and unified leadership with democracy in the 
economy and, on this basis, to realize an effective economy. 
The unification and detailing of plans is precisely the focal 
point of the superiority of the Daian work system. Better plan- 
ning of integrated production is based on the principle of 
superiors helping subordinates. 

The most important point of the Daean economic manage- 
ment system is that it strengthens the Party’s leading role in 
the economy and fully ensures collectivism in the control 
and management of factories. Under the previous system, the 
director was responsible for the factory and workers had 
hardly any interest in its control and management. No real 
material conditions were guaranteed for workers and thus 
they had no interest in whether production and management 
at their factories were successful. 

In these circumstances, workers were not masters of produc- 
tion but only inactive employees obeying bureaucratic orders 
and directions. This situation was not in accord with the nature 
of socialism, nor could the workers display their initiative and 
play a positive role. 

The new Daean work system removed these fundamental 
defects. In the new system, the factory Party committee 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


127 


directly and collectively controls and manages the factory as 
the highest leading body enabling all Party members, workers 
and engineers to participate actively in factory management. 
Consequently, one particular person is not responsible for 
production, as in the old factory management system, but all 
Party members, workers and engineers are responsible, and, 
above all, the factory Party committee is responsible as the 
collective leading body. According to Kim 11 Sung: 

All the successes scored at the Daean Electrical Machine Factory 
have once again clearly demonstrated that the first and foremost 
task in the leadership of production is to strengthen the work of the 
Party committee and to enhance the vanguard role of the entire Party 
membership in the factory. 9 

If the Party committee does a good job in carrying out col- 
lective leadership, it encourages all Party members to be more 
active, and if all Party members become active, all people 
can be influenced to work with enthusiasm. All Party mem- 
bers and workers will work consciously to increase pro- 
duction and to manage and control the factory better; no 
collective leadership is more complete than this, nor is there 
greater proof of a factory’s collective capacity. In addition, 
the Party’s leading role guarantees that all work is political 
work and the production battle is a battle of the masses 
themselves. 

The essential of Party leadership is not to give administra- 
live orders or instructions or to exercise control, but to per- 
suade and educate. The more complex and difficult the job, 

I lie more it is necessary to educate and transform the people 
so that they become conscious, learn the correct way, and 
forge ahead with conviction. Party and political work entails 
leading all Party members to grasp the intentions of the Party 
r(‘nter correctly, to support Party policy wholeheartedly, and 
lo concentrate on its realization. 

The policy of giving priority to political work, which the 
I ’arty has consistently upheld, attaches prime importance to 


128 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


this work and subordinates all other activities to it. If the 
political work is done correctly, there will be no spread ot 
administrative or bureaucratic methods. At the same time, the 
smooth execution of administrative control will be ensured. 

The new Daean work system is superior, secondly, because 
it is most effective in managing industry in a planned way. 
Planning is the most important part of, and one of the keys to, 
the success of socialist economic construction. 

Under socialism, all equipment, supplies and raw materia s 
are used according to plan and all economic life, including 
production and consumption, is planned. In such conditions, 
if planning is not carried out smoothly, large quantities ot 
equipment, material and labor power are wasted and grave 

loss is caused to the socialist economy. 

And the most important part of planning is to ensure a 
balance among different sectors of the economy. In other 
words balance must be maintained between accumulation 
and consumption, between industry and agriculture, between 
the industrial sector and other sectors, i.e., between heavy- 
industry and light industry, between ore extraction industries 
and processing industries, etc. Balanced development of the 
economy is in itself the law of development of socialism. 

However, smooth planning is not a simple task, but veiy 
difficult and complex. For planning work to be carried out 
successfully according to the scientific laws of economic 
development, it is necessary, above all, to make accurate 
judgments and calculations about the conditions of equipment 
and supply of materials, and especially with regard to labor 
power, the most decisive element of productive forces, i.e., 
the health, ideological level, awareness and skill of workers. 

Without correct information on all these factors, it would be 
impossible to draw up a realistic scientific mobilization plan. 
However, a handful of specialists or members of planning 
committees cannot possibly grasp all these complex factors ot 
production. Herein lies the decisive significance of mobiliz- 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


129 


ing broad masses for participation in planning work, relying 
upon their creative capacity and talent. 

Needless to say, it is the workers directly engaged in pro- 
duction who are most familiar with all the special problems of 
their factory, whether sufficient materials are supplied, and 
whether machinery operates properly. Therefore, to work out 
an objective and realistic plan, planners must consider pro- 
duction factors constantly and draw on workers’ knowledge 
and creativity. It is impossible to evolve a practical plan if 
one juggles figures on one’s desk without holding discussions 
with others who are directly engaged in production. Kim 11 
Sung says: 

The present textbooks on political economy set forth many condi- 
tions for ensuring good planning. But they do not give importance to 
the problem of the mass line in planning. I think it is necessary to 
complete a new textbook on political economy in conformity with 
the mass line. 10 

To avoid bureaucracy and subjectivism in planning, col- 
lective efforts are required. A plan drawn up without participa- 
tion of production workers is necessarily subjectivist, and 
bureaucracy results when such plans are imposed upon the 
masses. All plans — from the state, control bureau, factory, 
down to the workshop — should be drawn up after discussion 
with those who are directly engaged in production, taking 
into consideration the revolutionary initiative and experience 
of workers. 

The basic content of the Daean work system is to strengthen 
the leading role of the Party in the economy, to draw broad 
working masses into active management and control of fac- 
lories, and to encourage them to display their creative capaci- 
ly and talent to the fullest extent. This system has opened 
I lie way for broad working masses to participate actively in 
planning and to contribute their creative capacity and talent. 
Kim II Sung said: “Presented as the most important problem 
m the direction of the Daean Electrical Machine Factory was 


130 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


the question of getting rid of bureaucracy and subjectivity in 
planning work and of thoroughly carrying through the mass 

line.” 11 , 

Third, the superiority of the Daean work system lies m the 
fact that it has established a system by which technological 
direction can be strengthened in production and by which 
production can be guided in an integiated way. 

Complex technological production processes naturally 
require integrated direction by specialists who have mastered 
the required techniques, from the formulation of production 
plans down to technical preparations and control of produc- 
tion processes. 

In the old work system, many production processes were 
separated from each other and there was no general staff that 
could direct production in an integrated way. In the new 
Daean work system, there is a unified general staff, with the 
chief engineer at the center, to guide the whole production 
process, including the planning of production and piepaia- 
tions, in a unified way. This makes it possible to suboidinate 
all problems in the factory to the struggle to guarantee pro- 
duction. 

Fourth, the new Daean work system is decisively superior 
to the old in that it has improved radically the role of each sec- 
tion responsible for guaranteeing production. By overcoming 
the old bureaucratic and subjectivist method of work it guar- 
anteed the supply of materials. This made it possible for those 
directly engaged in directing production, including foremen, 
to concentrate on their proper work -preparing equipment 
and production, raising the level of consciousness of the work- 
ers, and guiding production. 

Further, in order to increase production, a community sup- 
ply system was established to guarantee the living conditions 
of workers. For instance, at the Daean Electric Machine Fac- 
tory a management committee was organized, consisting of 
the assistant director in charge of community supply work 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 131 

and representatives of the administration of the factory work- 
ers’ living quarters, general stores, state farms and livestock- 
breeding farms, cooperative farms and of the organizations 
engaged in public supply work. 

The decisive superiority of the Daean work system in 
arousing enthusiasm and initiative among the working masses, 
in strengthening leadership in production and in guarantee- 
ing production and supplies for the workers is being demon- 
strated clearly in actual life through a great upsurge of socialist 
construction in the northern half of the Republic. 

(3) Significance of the Daean System 

The Daean work system was a clear-cut answer to the most 
difficult and pressing question confronting socialist and com- 
munist construction — how should socialist economic manage- 
ment be organized after the establishment of the socialist sys- 
tem ? In this sense, it w 7 as an entirely new and original frontier 
reached in the Marxist-Leninist theory of economic manage- 
ment. The most essential requirement of the Daean work sys- 
tem is decisively to increase the leading role of the vanguard 
party in economic management, to strengthen collective 
leadership, to draw broad masses into production and eco- 
nomic management, to rely on their capability and to lead 
I hem to give full play to their inexhaustible creative capacity 
mid revolutionary enthusiasm, i.e., to implement collective 
notion — the mass line. 

In a socialist system, all forms of exploitation and oppres- 
sion are eliminated, all the means of production are socialized 
ni< I all production is managed only for the improvement of 
i he material and cultural life of all the people. But the ques- 
tion remains, how can the superiority of the socialist system 
Inlly be displayed, how should the economic management 
\ '.tom be organized collectively? 

I he continued development of planned and balanced pro- 


132 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


duction, based on socialized means of production, is a law. 
The question is, how can subjectivism be overcome in eco- 
nomic management and how can planning be organized cor- 
rectly? 

The Daean work system answers these questions. It fully 
reflects the essential superiority of the socialist system. 

If workers are to be encouraged to give full play tQ their 
inexhaustible vitality and initiative, priority in all activities 
should be concentrated on Party and political work. Material 
incentive plays its proper role only on condition that priority 
be given to political and ideological education and that the 
material incentive be organically linked to this education. 

The Daean work system gave a decisive blow to the theory 
which maintains that as the economy develops and as its scale 
expands under socialism, its growth rate declines. Such a 
theory is reactionary and is absolutely incompatible with the 
law of development of the socialist economy. The socialist 
economic system has the potential for economic development 
at a rate undreamt of in capitalist society, and as the economy 
develops and expands, this potential becomes greater. 

For example, in capital construction, the principle means of 
realizing socialist expanded reproduction and one of the fac- 
tors determining the rate of economic development, socialism 
is decidedly superior to capitalism. The socialist state, which 
is in a position to control production and distribution, accumu- 
lation and consumption according to a central plan, has the 
possibility of investing tremendous funds in capital construc- 
tion. 

Further, as the foundation of the socialist economy is ex- 
panded and strengthened, the scale of accumulation is in- 
creased, with the result that expenditures for capital construc- 
tion can be increased systematically and at a rapid rate. This 
provides a realistic possibility of speeding up the tempo of 
socialist expanded reproduction. 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


133 


With regard to increasing labor productivity, which is 
anothei decisive factor for determining economic develop- 
ment under socialism, it may be said that reserves in this field 
are still greater. The working people have unlimited capabil- 
ities and talents, and if their political and ideological aware- 
ness is raised constantly, and if their experience and enthu- 
siasm are encouraged, labor productivity will continue to 
lise. And if this is combined with a technological revolu- 
tion, if machinery and automated equipment are introduced, 
there is no doubt that labor productivity will be all the more 
enhanced. 

Tims, the greater the scale of the economy and the more de- 
\ eloped the production, the faster will be the rate of economic 
development. This is the law of the development of the so- 
cialist economy. The question is how to interpret this law, 
how to manage and control the economy, and how the system 
of economic management should be organized rationally. 

The decisive significance of the Daean work system lies in 
the fact that it is based on this objective law of development 
and that it is adapted to socialist production relations — the 
economic management system best suited to the expanding 
productive forces — and that it perfects the superstructure, 
the administrative system oi the Party, state and economic 
organizations in such a way that these may be adapted fully 
to the established base. 

further, as mentioned earlier, the Daean work system in 
many respects has ample factors of communist enterprise 
management. This system is permeated by the principle of 
collective and communist life. Its most essential content 
is that people work for society and for the community con- 
sciously and in a communist way, voluntarily and without any 
compulsion, helping each other in a comradely way. Conse- 
quently, this system is of decisive significance in educating 
•md remolding people in a communist way. Kim 11 Sung wrote: 


134 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


When the communist principle is strictly observed in work, bu- 
reaucracy and egoism naturally disappear. Innovations in production 
have been made by many comrades, and they have worked devotedly 
solely in the interests of the state and the people, not merely to get 
more wages. If we allow people to become mercenary, it will be im- 
possible to realize the transition to communism. Transition to com- 
munism requires not only economic development, but also the re- 
molding of the old ideologies in mens minds. It is important above 
anything else for people to work voluntarily and consciously. 

Our system of work is one where people work and live in a com- 
munist way. It unites all the people without exception, and brings 
their devotion and creative ability into full play, enabling them to 
bring about greater results in production. 

The great power of the new system of work is the great power of 
unity and cooperation, the great power of the vitality and creativity 
of the awakened masses; it is the great power which is born when 
Party leadership penetrates deeply into the lower units . 12 

The Daean work system, which basically and decisively 
strengthens the leading role of the vanguard party and the 
socialist state in the economy and realizes the piinciple of 
democratic centralism in economic management, is of great 
importance in strengthening the function of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. 

The socialist economy develops according to a planned and 
balanced law and it requires centralized and unified direction 
by the vanguard party and the state. 1 he basic concept of a 
socialist economy precludes individual factories and enter- 
prises from being managed and controlled spontaneously. The 
unified and detailed system of planning which is an important 
part of the Daean work system, reflects this basic concept of a 
socialist economy and ensures that the unified socialist state 
can provide direction and control even to the smallest section 
of each sector of the economy. 

The Daean work system relies completely on the principles 
of Marxism-Leninism, and is an economic management sys- 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


135 


tern creatively adapted to the concrete conditions of the 
revolution and construction in the country. It is a great victory 
for the Juche idea and for the mass line of the Workers Party. 


3. A NEW SYSTEM OF AGRICULTURAL GUIDANCE 

After the completion of agricultural collectivization in 
August 1958, a decision was made (in October of the same 
year) to merge agricultural cooperatives into ri-unit farms. 
This was a very complex task. However, it was completed 
smoothly in a short period of one to two months in a great up- 
surge of political enthusiasm among the peasants as a result 
of their active struggles. The merger of cooperatives wrought 
a major change in the countryside. The number of cooperative 
farms was reduced from 13,309 to 3,843. The average size was 
increased from 80 to about 300 households and the average 
acreage from 130 to 500 hectares, or about four-fold. 

The mergers created objective conditions for promoting 
land adjustment in earnest, for introducing modern farm 
machinery and advanced agricultural techniques, for utilizing 
natural and economic conditions more rationally, for develop- 
ing diversified cooperative farms, for eliminating inefficient 
use of labor and materials and for promoting prompt and 
planned rural construction. 

As a result of the merger of cooperatives, the chairman of the 
ri people’s committee also assumed the post of chief manager 
of the cooperative. This meant that the local administrative 
body was brought closer to production and its leading role 
and functions in the economic and cultural construction of 
the countryside were strengthened. 

Simultaneously with the merger of the cooperatives, meas- 
ures were taken to transfer the stores of consumer coopera- 
I ives and of mutual-aid credit associations to the agricultural 


136 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


cooperatives. As a result, the agricultural cooperatives had 
control not only of agricultural production but also of circula- 
tion and credit so that their economic activities could be 
managed according to plan. 

Technological agricultural innovation thus arose as a serious 
task in the early part of 1959. Kim II Sung saw it this way: 

Today our basic task in the domain of agriculture is to realize a 
technical revolution and a cultural revolution in the countryside 
in several years and thereby to strengthen further socialist coopera- 
tive farms politically and economically and to develop our rural com- 
munities into prosperous and cultured socialist communities 
equipped with modern techniques. 1 '* 

In only several years after this task was proposed, irrigation, 
mechanization and electrification projects, which are the mam 
aspects of the technological revolution in the countryside, 
were carried out on a large scale and, as a result, the material 
and technical foundations of agriculture were strengthened 
further. 

As a result of the rapidly increased material and technical 
assistance by' the state to the countryside, at the end of 1962 
Sukchon county, for example, completed a large-scale iriiga- 
tion system. Its channels had a total length of 400 kilometers 
and it was equipped with 262 water-lifting pumps. The county 
also acquired 200-odd tractors, trucks, different kinds of farm 
machinery, transformers, electric motors, pumps and various 
other technical equipment. The county now had machinery 
and equipment comparable to that at a first-rate state-run in- 
dustrial enterprise in those days. 

Together with the completion of agricultural collectiviza- 
tion, the technical, cultural and ideological levels as well as 
the level of consciousness of the peasants were also raised. 
Farmers who had had only small farm implements, such as 
sickles and hoes, were now engaged collectively in agricul- 
tural production using tractors and other large-scale farm 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


137 


machines. These conditions necessarily brought about a major 
change in their ideology and consciousness. 

Thus, objective conditions were created for educating and 
remolding peasants with ideas of collectivism and commu- 
nism. Moreover, as a result of the merger of agricultural co- 
operatives into ri-unit farms, a radical change was effected in 
the functions and role of the ri people’s committee as an ele- 
mentary unit of state administration. After the merger, the ri 
became a large agricultural production unit rather than an ad- 
ministrative unit. Formerly, individual farms had one or two 
hectares of arable land. After the merger, when the basic farm 
unit comprised more than 300 households and had an average 
of 500 hectares of arable land, the business of the ri people’s 
committee became more complex and diversified. Before, 
each individual farmer was responsible for his farm, and the ri 
people’s committee was the administrative director. However, 
after the merger it became necessary for the people’s com- 
mittee to control its farm directly and to manage it according 
to plan. 

With the new and complicated situation created after the 
completion of collectivization and merger, a tremendous task 
laced agriculture, since the old system of management was no 
longer adequate. Consequently, establishment of a socialist 
system of agricultural management completely adapted to this 
new situation, a system and method of controlling and man- 
aging the new agricultural cooperatives, fully in accord with 
socialized agriculture, was presented as an urgent revolu- 
tionary need. Together with this was the need to overcome as 
soon as possible the backwardness of agriculture as compared 
with advanced industry, regarding relations of ownership and 
levels of economic management, as well as production. 

I h rough his on-the-spot guidance of agricultural work in 
Sukchon county. South Pyongan province, in December 1961, 
kirn II Sung scientifically analyzed the new situation created 
hi the countryside. Creatively applying the general principles 


138 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


of Marxism-Leninism, he founded an entirely new socialist 
system of agricultural management, with the county coopera- 
tive farm management committee as its main pivot. This agii- 
eultural guidance system is an embodiment of the Chongsann 
spirit and method in the domain of agriculture and of the 
Marxist-Leninist system of guidance, reflecting the basic su- 
periority of socialized agriculture and the fundamental law of 
socialist agricultural production. 

Essentially, improved methods of control and management 
of socialist agriculture in North Korea were in the direction of 
raising their level closer to the advanced methods of industrial 
management. Counties were defined as strategic strongholds 
for the guidance and management of socialist agricultuie and 
county cooperative farm management committees weie es- 
tablished. At the same time, provincial rural economy com- 
mittees were created as leading organs for county coopeia- 
tive farm management committees; simultaneously, the Min- 
istry of Agriculture was reorganized into the Central Agri- 
cultural Commission. 

The creation of county cooperative farm management com- 
mittees and provincial rural economy committees was an im- 
portant measure to improve radically the direction of agricul- 
ture in accordance with the realities of the changed countiy- 
side. And it was, at the same time, the most appropriate meas- 
ure to solve various problems that had to be solved for the 
development of socialist agriculture. 

The most important role in the new agricultural guidance 
system belonged to the county cooperative farm management 
committee. It controlled in a unified way the state-iun 
enterprises and the personnel serving agriculture, including 
technicians, as well as machine shops, farm-implement fac- 
tories and irrigation control offices; it also organized and 
guided the work of cooperative farms directly. It was a special- 
ized body which had the dual functions of directly guiding co- 
operatives and of providing them with material and technical 

aid. 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 139 

The county cooperative farm management committee has 
the following tasks. First, it must strengthen its leadership 
with agricultural specialists and expand the ranks of agricul- 
tural engineers, to assign them to each work team on the co- 
operative farms and to institute a system of chief engineers 
on the farms. Especially important for all active workers is to 
follow the Chongsanri spirit and method in the management 
committee, and to introduce the Daean work method into the 
guidance of farm production and management. Following 
these methods, the task of the committee is to control produc- 
tion, to raise the level of planning and to secure more materi- 
als, fertilizer and agricutural chemicals. 

Second, there is the matter of increasing decisively the utili- 
zation rate of machinery and equipment, especially tractors. 
The realization of mechanization in agriculture depends to a 
large extent on the rational utilization of tractors, and the man- 
agement committee is required to assure the greater utiliza- 
tion of tractors in a variety of ways. 

Third, an effort has to be made to improve seed constantly 
and to select superior seed best suited for the soil so as de- 
cisively to increase agricultural production. This is an es- 
pecially important question in intensive farming, which is the 
basis of socialist agriculture. 

Fourth, in addition to these technical matters, the manage- 
ment committee is required to raise the planning levels in 
agriculture. It is basic to the management committee’s plan- 
ning activities to have direct control over all planning, to 
draw up plans after direct and thorough consultation with the 
masses, and to explain to the masses fully the plans thus 
worked out. 

Fifth, it is urgent to improve the administration of labor, 
which is a question of rationally organizing the labor force, of 
preventing its outflow and of persuading workers to settle in 
• he countryside. It is also a task of labor administrators to set 
rational work norms in the countryside, and to evaluate ac- 
curately the quality and quantity of work, thereby enforcing 


140 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


the principle of socialist distribution and increasing material 
incentives. 

Sixth, there is the job of correctly directing and supervising 
the financial affairs of cooperative farms and of establishing a 
complete system of control over their property. Here the im- 
portant question is to set a correct balance between the con- 
sumption and accumulation of the cooperative farm, to con- 
sider the living conditions of farmers, and to guarantee a 
proper level of joint accumulation. 

Seventh, is the task of raising the technical education of 
farmers and concentrating on training technical cadres. This 
task is more and more urgent, along with the problem of the 
technical revolution in the countryside. The county Party 
committee has the responsibility for the political education of 
farmers in order decisively to raise their ideology and con- 
sciousness. 

The advantage of the county cooperative farm management 
committee lies primarily in the fact that it can use industiial 
management techniques. Formerly, the county and ri people s 
committees directed agriculture by administrative means. As 
collectivization was completed and the scale of cooperative 
farms expanded, and as agriculture gradually was mechanized, 
administrative methods of guidance became ineffective. New 
socialist farms equipped with machinery and technological 
equipment need direction through industrial management 
methods. 

The industrial method of management consists in directly 
controlling, organizing, and giving concrete leadership in all 
the activities of an enterprise -from planning to the organiza- 
tion of production, technical progress, supply ol materials, allo- 
cation and organization of the labor force, financial activities 
and so forth. According to Kim 11 Sung: 

The fundamental element in leadership by the industrial method 
of management is the technical guidance of production. 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


141 


Agricultural production, like industrial production, is a technical 
process. When farming was done by manual labor without the use of 
machinery, technology did not seem to count for much in agriculture. 
But as the technical reconstruction of agriculture forges ahead, it has 
become more and more obvious that agricultural production must 
also go through technical processes. 

Not only have advanced irrigation systems been established today, 
but numerous tractors and other farm machines are being introduced, 
step by step, in our countryside. Without industrial management and 
without technical guidance, it is utterly impossible to administer this 
agricultural production. 14 

Administration of agriculture through industrial manage- 
ment thus means the rational and scientific organization and 
control of all sections of agriculture and providing modern, 
scientific techniques and advanced technical methods, in- 
cluding rational utilization of all sorts of agricultural equip- 
ment as well as irrigation, electrification, chemicalization and 
other improvements. 

An important question is the proper size of enterprises. The 
county was set as the basic unit because within it there are 
available technical and management cadres, farm workshops 
and agricultural machinery repair shops, irrigation control 
oil ices and other state-run enterprises serving agriculture. The 
area of land under cultivation in a county is around 10,000 
hectares, considered a proper size in all respects. In this sense, 
cooperative farms did not meet these conditions and the prov- 
ince was too large a unit. 

Another advantage of the county cooperative farm manage- 
ment committee is that it is suitable for organically linking 
ownership by the whole people with cooperative ownership 
■md for strengthening the aid of the state to cooperative farms. 

Formerly, in many socialist countries, the strategic meeting 
point between joint ownership by all the people and coopera- 
tive ownership was the tractor station, through which techni- 


142 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 

cal aid was given to cooperative farms to promote the techni- 
cal revolution in the countryside. However, although this 
could extend technical assistance to farmers, it could not regu- 
late the production of cooperative farms directly and in an 
integrated way. This limited the role of the tractor station. Fur- 
ther, in some countries, tractor stations have been reorga- 
nized as tractor repair shops, with cooperative farms purchas- 
ing agricultural machinery on their own. Under these condi- 
tions, differentials are created between collective farms well- 
to-do enough to purchase agricultural machinery and others 
that are not. Further, when a farm purchases a tractor, it has 
to have a fairly high economic and technical level to utilize it 
fully. 

In contrast to this, the county cooperative farm manage- 
ment committee has unified control of state-owned enter- 
prises, technical equipment and capacity in agriculture, in- 
cluding farm machinery workshops, farm machinery factories, 
irrigation control offices, and livestock inoculation centers. 
It uses industrial management techniques to direct coopera- 
tive farms and, in this way, links state and cooperative owner- 
ship in an organic way in production so that the technical and 
economic assistance of the state to cooperative farms may be 
increased decisively. 

A technical revolution in agriculture, which requires tre- 
mendous sums and advanced techniques, cannot be carried 
out successfully by individual cooperative farms; the active 
financial and technical aid of the state is necessary. 

Rice is the main crop in the northern half of the Republic. 
It is extremely difficult to mechanize its culture. However, a 
clear-cut policy for the solution of this problem was presented 
after the creation of the county cooperative farm management 
committee, which strengthened cooperative farms not only 
materially and technically but also organizationally. Thus, 
shortcomings in agriculture were largely overcome. 

The provincial rural economy committee, which controls 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


143 


farm machinery factories and repair shops and helps county 
coopeiative farm management committees in their work, 
directly guides all work in its province related to agricultural 
production technically. It draws up production plans and 
supervises their implementation, it supplies agricultural ma- 
chinery, parts, fertilizer, agricultural chemicals and other ma- 
terials to counties, selects proper crops and seeds, establishes 
fertilizer application systems, selects seed-sowing seasons, 
adjusts labor forces, etc. 

Further, the provincial rural economy committee is obliged 
to report to the Cabinet and the Central Agricultural Com- 
mission regarding questions raised in the course of the 
fulfillment of production and production plans. In other 
words, the provincial rural economy committee completely 
lakes over the job formerly done by the Ministry of Agricul- 
ture. 

The most important task of the Central Agricultural Com- 
mission is to work out measures to develop agricultural tech- 
niques. It gives concrete guidance to all programs related to 
the development of agriculture, including studies on agricul- 
tural machinery, on the improvement of seed, on measures 
and efforts for land improvement, on long-term perspectives 
for land reclamation, on fertilizers and soil, on improvement of 
animal stock and stock-breeding, and on measures for the de- 
velopment of other activities in the countryside, as well as 
providing the wherewithal to guarantee this research and 
study. 

In addition, the work of the Central Agricultural Commis- 
sion includes the following: preparation of measures to guar- 
antee the supply of materials and agricultural machinery, sub- 
mission of final plans, supervision of the enforcement of cur- 
■'‘•iil plans, submission to the Party Central Committee and the 
< .abinet of opinions about long-range agricultural plans, 
guidance of large-scale land reclamation projects, and training 
ol cadres, including engineers and scientists. 


144 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


Thus the provincial rural economy committees are entrusted 
with all administrative work related to the guidance of pro- 
duction and the Central Agricultural Commission is required 
to guide agriculture throughout the country from a general and 
long-range standpoint. It is now possible under the new sys- 
tem of agricultural guidance to set up a strong and direct sys- 
tem of guidance at the level of production, with counties as 
the main points, and to direct agriculture in the northern half 
of the Republic in a unified way according to a long-range plan 
for the future of agriculture. The new system is excellent not 
only for raising the management and control of agriculture to 
the level of advanced industrial management, but also for or- 
ganically linking ownership by all the people to cooperative 
ownership, and for solving immediate and future problems of 
agricultural development by correctly linking them together. 

As is well known, even under the socialist system the coun- 
tryside is more backward than the urban areas not only in 
culture and ideology but also in ownership relations and in the 
level of economic management. These distinctions between 
industry and agriculture, arising from different relations of 
ownership, are the real basis that determines class distinc- 
tions between the working class and the peasantry. Distinc- 
tions on the level of economic management are also impor- 
tant. 

Consequently, to eliminate distinctions between the town 
and the countryside and between the working class and the 
peasantry, it is necessary to overcome the backwardness of 
the countryside not only in technology, culture and ideology, 
but also in the relations of ownership and, particulaily, the 
level of economic management. 

Using industrial management techniques to direct agricul- 
ture is of decisive significance in overcoming backwardness 
in the level of economic management. Further, the new sys- 
tem plays an important role in determining the direction of the 
future development of socialist cooperative farms, particularly 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 145 

with regard to the transformation of cooperative ownership 
into ownership by the entire people. When the technical trans- 
formation of agriculture is carried out, when machinery re- 
places human labor in agriculture as in industry, and when all 
people can live in abundance and enjoy their work, coopera- 
tive farms will be transformed into all-people’s ownership. 

This transformation is one of the most fundamental ques- 
tions in the construction of communism. It is the basis for 
erasing distinctions between town and countryside and be- 
tween the working class and the peasantry. The new system of 
agricultural control indicates clearly a realistic approach 
toward solving this question. Wrote Kim II Sung: 

Some people hold that the transition to communist society is possi- 
ble even if the cooperative economy is retained, and go so far as to 
say that the tiansition to communism is feasible even if private econ- 
omy is left intact. This is all wrong. 

Of course, it is not my intention to dwell here on what stages the 
socialist economy has to go through to achieve the transition to com- 
munism. But, at any rate, there is no doubt that in order to attain 
communism the country's economy should be merged into one under 
a single form of ownership, namely, ownership by the whole people, 
and that, accordingly, cooperative ownership must be converted into 
ownership by the whole people. 

The organization of the county cooperative farm management 
committees is the most rational way of bringing cooperative owner- 
ship constantly closer to ownership by the whole people by further 
strengthening the leading role of state ownership over cooperative 
ownership, and by establishing a closer relationship between these 
two forms . 15 

To transform cooperative ownership into all-people’s owner- 
ship, it is necessary not only to increase further the role of the 
county cooperative farm management committee and to 
mechanize agriculture on a large scale, but also to remold the 
ideas and consciousness of peasants by decisively strengthen- 
ing communist education among them. This is the shortest 
and most correct way to attain communism. 


146 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


In this way, the new system of agricultural control estab- 
lished in the northern half of the Republic, together with the 
Daean work system in industry, is of great significance for 
the future construction of socialism and communism. In 1966, 
Kim II Sung created the group management system, which is 
significant for further strengthening and developing the new 
direction of agriculture. This is a system whereby cooperative 
farm members are formed into groups of 15 to 20 members, 
and a certain area of land, a labor force, draft animals and other 
means of productions are assigned to each group. Under this 
system, a quota of harvest per chongbo is set for each group 
according to the state plan, and the number of work days for 
each group member is measured in accordance with his tempo 
of work. 

Before the introduction of this system, the elementary unit 
of agricultural production was the cooperative farm work team. 
Consequently, work team members, participating in work or- 
ganized on a work team basis, were unable to settle down to 
specific fields. 

However, under the group management system, it is pos- 
sible to organize production and labor according to the char- 
acteristics of each plot of arable land on the cooperative farm 
so as to make it most productive, and each farm member is 
able to work a specific field during the whole cycle of produc- 
tion. A member’s work is evaluated and he is remunerated 
not only according to the number of days worked, but also ac- 
cording to the size of the harvest. Thus the quality and effec- 
tiveness of work are considered as well as quantity. 

The first advantage of this system is that all peasants not 
only participate in production with the collective group, as a 
unit, but that political work can be conducted in the form best 
suited to their actual conditions. In this way political and 
ideological education, arming peasants with ideas of collec- 
tivism and communism, is developed more vigorously in 
close and direct connection with production activities. Also, 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


147 


under this system, the Chongsanri spirit and the method -the 
revolutionary mass line -can be more thoroughly carried 
tin ough in the socialist management of the countryside and, 
particularly, in the management and control of cooperative 
farms. 

In other words, the introduction of this system has made it 
possible for the broad masses of peasants to participate posi- 
tively in all the management activities of cooperative farms 
and to reflect fully their revolutionary enthusiasm, creative 
capacity and constructive opinions in the general work of then- 
cooperative farms. At the same time, this has resulted in 
raising the level of political and practical work of leading ac- 
tivists of cooperative farms and county cooperative farm 
management committees. 

Moreover, this system breaks down the state plan into work 
learn and group levels of cooperative farms and enables each 
larm member to link his work directly to the concrete tasks 
ol the state plan. This means that the principle of centralizing 
and detailing plans was carried through in the domain of agri- 
culture. 

Another advantage is that this system makes it possible to 
utilize land, the basic means of production in agriculture, and 
I lie other means of production more effectively. It greatly 
improves work in labor administration, which is of central 
importance in the management and control of cooperative 
liinns. The system enables farm members to work a specific 
»uca in groups, putting a stop to the labor turnover in the 
countryside. Further, with the labor force mobilized in a 
planned and organized way, efforts can be concentrated on 
llie basic area of production, e.g., on the production of grains. 

1 he gioup system also makes it possible to define work 
norms and evaluate work days on the farm more correctly and 
malistically; it provides a base for the correct realization of 
i In* piinciple of socialist distribution. The group management 
s slum already has demonstrated its advantages by strength- 


148 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


ening and developing the new agrieultural controls and, es 
pecially, by sharply developing agricultural production and 
raising the standard of living of the cooperative farm members 
in the northern half of the Republic. 

For instance, on the Pochon cooperative farm, Hyang 
county, Kangwon province, where the group managemenl 
system was first introduced, grain production rose in 1967 In 
166 per cent over 1965, before this system was introduced 
On a county basis, grain production rose 133 per cent in the 
same period and, on 523 cooperative farms in 17 counties, 
where statistical returns arc already available, average grain 
production rose more than 20 per cent on each farm in 1967 
as compared with 1965, and the amount distributed to each 
farm household rose from 2,364 kilograms in 1965 to 2,99b 
kilograms in 1967, while cash income climbed from 642 iron 
to 733 icon. 

At the same time a new upsurge was seen in the political 
and ideological life of peasants after the introduction ol llns 
system. The elementary production units of agriculture and 
of the collectives, as well as the activities of peasant masses, 
were organized more rationally. This meant that the guidann 
system, extending from the Central Agricultural Commission 
to county cooperative farm management committees, was 
firmly rooted in the places of production and among tin 
peasant masses. 

Further, the group management system ensured that I In 
strategic points of political and ideological education ol I In 
peasant masses with ideas of collectivism and communism 
were established directly at the places of production. And 
this, in turn, meant that a powerful stronghold for ideological 
as well as material victory —a stronghold that must be caplin e< I 

in the course of transition to socialism and communist 

agriculture — was secured. 

It may be said that the group management system is tin 
prototype of an agricultural guidance system in commune, l 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


149 


nciety. It is run on the principle of collective and communist 
lilc and of such production units a communist society will be 
< miiposed. 

In this way, the new agricultural guidance system estab- 
lished in the northern half of the Republic, on the basis of 

>ly cooperative farm management committees and the 

management system, not only strengthens the socialist 

of agriculture and greatly develops agricultural pro- 

• luclion, but also is a powerful weapon to guarantee the eom- 
I'l. le victory of socialism and its transition to communism in 

• In I ield of agriculture. 


4. UNIFIED AND DETAILED PLANNING 

In a system in which all means of production are socialized, 
economy can be developed only in a planned and bal- 
way. The planned and bal ance d development of the 
• uiiomy is a fundamental law of socialism. Without a plan, 
economy cannot move a step. All production equipment, 

'• (, es and raw materials are set into motion according to a 

I 1 " 'lie Plan, and economic life, starting with production and 

sumption, is conducted according to the plan. If the plan- 

mug is incorrect, large amounts of equipment and material 

■ II hr wasted and precious labor will be lost. The basic 
"l" uority of a socialist economy can be displayed fully only 
>» In n planning is done correctly. 

I herefore, planning is one of the keys to success in socialist 
. "mimic construction. It is most important for a plan to 
" H" * correctly the objective and balanced development of 
■i" economy and fully to mobilize the workers to fulfill it. 
i In |ilan should rely on the economic policy of the Party and 
»i". nl. I reflect it, because the economic line and policy of the 
1 iil\ are rooted in the scientific laws governing the develop- 
"" nl nl the socialist economy. 


150 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


On the basis of planning, Kim II Sung wrote: “A planned 
development of the economy means, before anything else, a 
correct balance among different sectors of the people’s 
economy. To secure such a balance is the basis of planning 
and the most important task of planning organizations. ” ,fi 

To maintain a correct balance between accumulation and 
consumption, it is necessary to combine expanded reproduc- 
tion (for a planned development of the people’s economy) and 
consumption (the people’s requirements). This is the most 
difficult and complex question in socialist economic con- 
struction. 

In addition, various other complex problems are posed, 
including the question of maintaining a balance between 
industry and agriculture, and among various branches of 
industry, e.g., between heavy industry and light industry 
and between ore extraction industries and processing in- 
dustries. Under conditions of an expanding economy and 
larger economic units, the job of balancing these different 
sectors is even more difficult. 

However, that does not mean that it is impossible to guaran- 
tee a correct balance. Kim II Sung wrote: 

It is not only possible but also necessary to develop a balanced 
economy under socialism. Whether it is possible to draw up a scien- 
tific, realistic and mobilizing plan, to secure a correct balance and to 
develop the economy at a rapid rate depends to a large extent on how 
the functions and role of the economic and, particularly, planning 
organizations are expanded and the work methods of personnel 
engaged in planning work are improved . 17 

The role of Juche in planning work is extremely important 
in implementing the mass line. 

The first contradiction in the old system of planning was 
between the instructions of the state planners and the de- 
mands of the direct producers. The planners assigned maxi- 
mum production tasks while guaranteeing minimum supplies; 
the producers tried to get by with minimum output tasks, 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


151 


while obtaining maximum guarantees of supplies. This con- 
tradiction reflected bureaucratism and subjectivism of state 
planners, and local patriotism and undue dependence on 
central organs by the producers. 

The second contradiction derived from the fact that although 
state planners had a fairly good knowledge of the general 
economic conditions and the prospect for economic develop- 
ment, they had no concrete knowledge of actual conditions 
and production reserves. On the other hand, producers were 
well informed of the concrete conditions and production re- 
serves at their enterprises, but had insufficient understanding 
of the general economic conditions or of the general perspec- 
tive of economic development. Consequently, it was neces- 
sary to take these two factors into consideration in planning. 
If this had been done, it would have been possible to draw up 
a scientific and coordinated plan based on a nationwide pro- 
gram. However, this was not done correctly in the old planning. 

To overcome this contradiction and draw up a scientific, 
realistic and coordinated plan, it was necessary for planning 
personnel to acquire a good grasp of the objective conditions 
and the realities of production reserves — the labor force, ma- 
terials and other factors of production. However, these pro- 
duction factors are complex and diversified, and it is impos- 
sible for planning personnel to grasp them fully with their 
limited data. So we have the problem of involving the broad 
working masses in planning and of mobilizing their creativity 
and talent fully, achieving mass participation in planning. 

It was on this point that the question was posed of com- 
pletely overcoming bureaucracy and subjectivity in planning, 
of gaining mass participation -the question presented as the 
most important in Premier Kim 11 Sung’s on-the-spot guidance 
at Daean Electrical Machine Factory. 

The problem is to get rid of the subjectivity and bureaucracy 
ol the state planning organizations while also strengthening 
slate control and guidance of planning, and overcoming undue 


152 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


dependence on higher bodies and the local patriotism of 
producers so that economic planning may be developed cor- 
rectly. The only way is on the basis of centralized plan- 
ning. Kim 11 Sung says: “By centralized planning is meant the 
inclusion of state planning organizations and planning units 
scattered throughout the country into a single system of plan- 
ning and a guarantee of a unified plan under the guidance of 
the State Planning Committee.” 18 

With the establishment of a newly unified system of plan- 
ning, several regional planning committees were set up in 
each province under the direct control of the State Planning 
Committee. The tasks of the state planning organizations at 
different levels are to supervise planning in the districts and 
sectors, to investigate production reserves, to provide guid- 
ance and aid in the formulation of objective and scientific 
plans. Further, the state planning bodies at all levels are re- 
quired to report from time to time to their superior organiza- 
tions and the Cabinet on defects, such as failure to organize 
production rationally, wasteful use of labor and materials, and 
the like. 

At the same time, the planning departments and sections 
of the ministries, central organs, provincial people's commit- 
tees, provincial rural economy committees and other economic 
organizations, as well as of factories and other enterprises, 
were defined as “hands and feet” or “cells” of the State Plan- 
ning Committee. In this way, it is intended to strengthen the 
links between the state planning organizations and the plan- 
ning departments of the ministries and enterprises, as well as 
the guidance of the state planning organizations to the “hands 
and feet.” These are the essentials of the new unified system 
of planning. 

Along with the unification of planning, a system of detailing 
plans was also established. This means the drawing up of con- 
crete and precise plans covering all facets of the branches and 
enterprises of the economy on the basis of strict scientific 
calculations and a good grasp of the objective conditions. 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


153 


Under the old system of planning, scientific calculations 
were not sufficient since concrete substantiation was lacking, 
so that the plans did not cover all aspects of all branches of the 
economy. For instance, plan figures for the production of 
ores, iron and steel, cement, automobiles, tractors and other 
key products were available, but plans for the production of 
small items, such as bolts, were not spelled out. Similarly, 
in the production plan of tractors, the number of tractors to be 
turned out was specified, and the “fund” materials such as 
steel plate and other steel products required for production 
were reflected in the plan, but hardly any non-“fund” ma- 
terials, such as screws, valves and bearings were included. 
Plans for non-“fund” materials were arbitrarily drawn up by 
ministries, and since there was no system of detailing plans, 
the responsibility of planning personnel could not be clearly 
set. Further, such plans were not plans in the strict meaning 
of the word. 

In the socialist system, it is necessary for a plan to coordi- 
nate the details of economic activities. For instance, the provi- 
sion of non-“fund” materials must be sufficiently reflected. 
Needless to say, this is a tremendous job, requiring an increase 
in the number of plan indices. However, under the new sys- 
tem, detailed plans must be drawn up even if the number of 
plan indices reaches several scores of thousands of items. 
The scope of the plans is defined for the State Planning Com- 
mittee, local planning committees and ministries. However, 
whatever the scope, and by whatever planning unit it is 
worked out, once a detailed plan is drawn up it assumes a 
legal character without exception, and is not permitted to be 
altered arbitrarily. 

The new system reflects the Juche system of planning in 
which the general principle of Marxism-Leninism is applied 
creatively to the concrete realities of the country. It is the 
embodiment of the great Chongsanri spirit and method in 
economic planning, the system which combines centralized 
guidance and local initiative. 


154 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


5. THE CHOLLIMA MOVEMENT 

“The Chollima* movement is the general line of our Party 
in socialist construction. The essence of this line is to educate 
all working people in communist ideas, to remold them and 
rally them more firmly around the Party, and to give full scope 
to their revolutionary zeal and creative talents so as to build 
socialism better and faster.” 19 

The great upsurge in socialist construction, based on the 
revolutionary consciousness and creative labor of millions of 
workers who are making history, the rapid development of the 
socialist economy, is a law of socialism. This is the true mean- 
ing of the essential superiority of the socialist system. 

However, the advantages of the socialist system and the 
people’s keen interest and creative ability do not occur spon- 
taneously, but are developed through stubborn and purpose- 
ful struggles based on full scientific calculations of the sub- 
jective and objective conditions. These aims can be realized 
only through outstanding political leadership in the revolu- 
tion and construction and through the constant struggle of the 
vanguard party. 

The Chongsanri spirit and method, the Daean work system, 
the new system of agricultural guidance, the group manage- 
ment system, and the system of centralizing and detailing 
plans encompass the traditional mass line and the basic 
method of the Party in organizing and mobilizing the masses 
for revolution and construction. 


* According to Korean legends, Chollima was a winged horse capable of bear- 
ing those fortunate enough to mount it at great speed toward the land of 
happiness. 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


155 


The basic method our Party employs in mobilizing the masses for 
socialist construction [Kim II Sung emphasizes] is to raise the Party's 
leading role and always to give priority to political work, combining 
this properly with economic and technical work, steadily to enhance 
the political awareness and the level of consciousness of the working 
people and properly to combine this with material interest . 20 

North Korea’s historic Chollima movement combines the 
traditional mass line of the Party and the outstanding leader- 
ship of Kim II Sung. It is also an entirely logical development 
of the socio-economic transformation realized in the northern 
half of the Republic in the postwar period and of all the ma- 
terial and spiritful factors accumulated in the course of the 
long, bitter struggles. But since socialist construction does not 
advance automatically, even under the best conditions, for a 
real upsurge to take place in socialist construction there must 
be a subjective factor, a subjective force: apolitical leader and 
a vanguard party capable of organizing and enlisting millions 
of working people for the great upsurge in the revolution and 
construction. At the same time, the masses must firmly resolve 
to realize completely the aims and policies of the Party. 

Of decisive importance for the start of the Chollima move- 
ment were the plenum of the Central Committee of the 
Workers Party of Korea in December 1956, and Kim 11 Sung’s 
on-the-spot guidance at the Kangson Steel Works. At that time, 
as indicated previously, North Korea was faced with serious 
difficulties. Immediately after the plenum, Kim 11 Sung ap- 
pealed directly to the workers of the Kangson Steel Works, 
telling them about the grave internal and external situation 
and the intentions of the Party, and he called on all workers to 
forge ahead at the speed of the Chollima horse. He also ap- 
pealed directly to the workers of the Hwanghae Steel Works 
on January 4, 1957, to the workers of Haeju in February and 
to the workers of Hungnam and Shinpo in March. Later, the 
Premier appealed to the workers of Hwangchoryong, the 


156 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


Nampo districts, the construction workers of Pyongyang, as 
well as to the workers in the coal-mining areas in the west. 

The workers responded to the appeal, effecting a great in- 
novation in socialist construction. They discovered items in 
short supply, created goods that were non-available, destroyed 
old standards and designs, and established new standards. 
They built a blast furnace with an annual capacity of 300,000 
to 400,000 tons in less than a year, laid over 80 kilometers of 
wide-gauge railway in 75 days, and built a large-scale vinylon 
factory in a little more than one year on a broad expanse of 
wasteland. They developed a “machine-tool-to-beget-ma- 
chines” movement and produced some 13,000 machine tools 
in excess of the state plan; they constructed over 1,000 local 
enterprises, utilizing idle local materials and labor, and they 
carried out a large-scale reclamation project to irrigate 370,000 
hectares of farmland in only six months. Countless other ex- 
amples could be cited. In this way, the flames of the Chollima 
movement, kindled among the workers of the Kangson Steel 
Works by Kim II Sung, spread like wildfire over all areas, 
factories and enterprises in the northern part of the Republic. 

While this was going on, Kim II Sung again visited the Kang- 
son Steel Works in February 1959, and suggested that the 
workers initiate a Chollima work team movement to strength- 
en the Chollima movement in a more organized way. 

So the Chollima movement was raised to a new stage of de- 
velopment in the form of the Chollima work team move- 
ment. Its central task was to do political and ideological work 
among the people, to arm them with the ideas of collectivism 
and communism, to eliminate the old ideas still found among 
the masses, in order to revolutionize them and convert them 
into a fully conscious proletariat. In other words, the main 
task of the movement was to carry out an ideological revolu- 
tion among the masses. The second task was to forge a cultural 
revolution. The Chollima work team movement is a school of 
communist education, created by the workers themselves for 
their own education in the ideas of collectivism. 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


157 


Thus, the important characteristic of the Chollima work 
team is its effective development of a collective innovation 
movement in production by emphasizing and strengthening 
the education and remolding of working people, and by 
directly linking these educational activities with the fulfill- 
ment of production assignments: 

1 he main feature of the Chollima work team movement, which is 
being extensively unfolded among our working people [wrote Kim II 
Sung] lies in the close combination of the mass innovation drive in 
pioduction with the education and remolding of the working people. 

1 his woik team movement, as an intensified and developed form 
of the Chollima movement, has become not only a powerful impetus 
to the development of the national economy and an ideal form of 
mass economic management by the working people, but also consti- 
tutes an excellent medium of mass education for remolding every- 
body into a person of a new communist type. Our Chollima riders 
are not only innovators in production, but also able management 
personnel, expert organizers and real communist educators. 21 

The Chollima work teams rapidly spread and developed, 
embracing industry, agriculture, construction, science, educa- 
tion, health preservation and other areas, and in August 1960, 
the first national conference of Chollima Work Team Riders 
was held. 

As of August 1961, or just before the historic Fourth Con- 
gress of the Workers Party of Korea, more than two million 
working people were participating in this movement, and 
4,958 work teams, comprising 125,028 persons, had the title 
Chollima Work Team.” Fifty-five work teams, comprising 
1,459 workers, had the title “Double Chollima Work Team.” 

By May 1968, when the second national conference of 
Chollima Work Team Riders was held, the number of Chol- 
lima work teams had risen 21-fold and the number of double 
Chollima riders 23-fold since the first national conference. 
The Chollima work team movement developed into a na- 
tional, large-scale innovation movement, embracing millions 
of working people in the northern half of the Republic. That 


158 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


is why the Chollima movement is the general line of the 
Workers Party of Korea in socialist construction. 

The most important political and economic significance of 
the Chollima movement is that it guarantees the rapid tempo 
of socialist economic construction. After the start of this move- 
ment, industrial production in North Korea developed rapidly, 
recording an annual growth rate of 40 to 50 per cent, and the 
overall Five-Year Plan was successfully fulfilled in only two 
and a half years. A rapid growth rate of industrial production 
is being maintained in fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan. 
For instance, with economic construction and defense build- 
up developing simultaneously, the northern part of the Repub- 
lic retained its remarkable growth rate in industrial production 
in 1967 and 1968. 

Rapid expansion of the economy is a requirement of socialist 
society, a requirement rooted in the essential superiority of 
the socialist system. It is a direct reflection of the desire of 
the masses of people to construct socialism and communism 
better and more quickly. This desire is particularly keen 
among the working masses. The revolutionary tasks imposed 
on them — eliminating the remnants of the colonial economy, 
rehabilitating and constructing the war-destroyed economy, 
unifying the fatherland, etc. — demand that North Koreans take 
ten steps forward for every step others take. It is because of 
this that the masses accepted the Chollima work team move- 
ment wholeheartedly and developed it effectively as their 
own, all-people innovation movement. 

What is especially important in this connection is that, al- 
though this movement was created by the masses from among 
themselves according to the necessary law of development of 
socialist society, it would have been impossible to develop it 
into a dynamic national movement if it were not for the out- 
standing leadership of the vanguard party and the leader who 
took hold of it, reflected it correctly in policy, and mobilized 
the masses positively to carry it out. The historical experience 


SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 


159 


of the Chollima work team movement clearly demonstrates 
this. Kim 11 Sung says: 

The wise leadership of the Party, its firm unity with the people, 
their firm resolve to advance rapidly and their revolutionary zeal — 
these are the foundations for the great upsurge in socialist construc- 
tion and the Chollima movement and constitute the decisive guaran- 
tee for all our victories. 22 


CHAPTER IV 


Some Theoretical Problems 
of Socialist Economy 


Premier Kim II Sung made public a new work entitled "On 
Some Theoretical Problems of Socialist Economy” on March 
1, 1969 in answer to questions submitted to him by scientific 
and educational workers through the Science and Educational 
Department of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of 
Korea. 

In this work, the Premier gave clear-cut theoretical ex- 
planations on the question of the correlation between the scale 
of the economy and the rate of development of production, the 
question of the means of production in the form of commodi- 
ties and the application of the law of value, and on the prob- 
lem of the peasant market and the way of abolishing it in a 
socialist society. These are the most fundamental questions 
in the area of the economic theories of Marxism-Leninism, 
particularly as they pertain to a socialist economy. The theo- 
retical elucidation of these issues is urgently required because 
of their practical importance. 

The problem of the correlation between the scale of the 
economy and the rate of development of production in a so- 
cialist society is fundamental to the law of the whole process 
of development of a socialist economy. The attitude toward 
this question clearly determines whether the position is a 
revolutionary and principled one based on Marxism-Leninism 
or reflects left or right opportunism. It is already known how 
right and left opportunist views have caused serious confusion 
and loss in the practical struggle for socialist and communist 
construction. 


160 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


161 


The problem of the means of production in the form of com- 
modities and the application of the law of value, as well as the 
problem of the peasant market, reflect the basic characteristics 
of a socialist economy as a transitional economy. 

A very practical problem in a socialist economy is that of 
commodity-money relations. 1 his should be solved effectively 
in relation to the problem of securing a constant and rapid 
development of the socialist economy in the transitional pe- 
riod from capitalism to socialism. However, this problem has 
been regarded as very complex and difficult and repeatedly 
has been discussed internationally over scores of years. No 
clear-cut conclusion was reached. The recent theoretical work 
of Kim II Sung has presented a solution. 

While fully explaining the characteristics of the transitional 
economy and economic laws that operate in the transitional 
period, Kim 11 Sung has given lucid explanations on the cor- 
relation between the base and the superstructure, on the posi- 
tive role of the Marxist-Leninist party and the state of the prole- 
tarian dictatorship in the development of socialist economy, 
and on the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat as 
the organizer of the economy. By doing so, he has made clear, 
iheoretically and practically, the unified relations between the 
working masses as the vanguard in the historical development 
of socialist society, on the one hand, and the Party and its 
political leadership on the other. 

In this way, Kim 11 Sung’s recent theoretical work on the 
central problems of the economic theories of socialism is of 
great significance for the creative development of the econom- 
ic theories of Marxism-Leninism and for the completion of 
llio entire system of the political economy of socialism. Fur- 
Ihermore, it is also a powerful theoretical weapon in the rev- 
olutionary struggle of the proletariat for the complete victory 
ol socialism and the realization of communism. 


162 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


1. PROBLEMS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN 
THE SCALE OF THE ECONOMY AND THE RATE 
OF DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION 

In the first part of his work, Kim 11 Sung presents a new and 
original theory on the correlation between the scale of the 
economy and the rate of development of production in a so- 
cialist society. He writes: 

In a socialist society, the great revolutionary zeal of the people 
is the decisive factor which impels the productive forces to germi- 
nate. The intrinsic superiority of the socialist system lies in the fact 
that the working people, freed from exploitation and oppression, 
work with conscious enthusiasm and creative initiative for the 
country and the people, for society and the collective, as well as for 
their own welfare. 1 

It is due to this basic factor that the development of the so- 
cialist economy according to scientific laws results in the 
possibility of greater expansion of production as socialist 
construction proceeds and as the scale of the economy is in- 
creased, and that production expands at a rate of development 
undreamt of in capitalist society. 

It has been generally conceded for a long time that the rate 
of development of socialist production is higher than that of 
capitalist production. This is a natural corollary of the general 
proposition that socialist production is based on the abolition 
of capitalist relations which have become fetters preventing 
the further development of production. 

Today, however, the questions are: What should be the 
proper level for the rate of development of production in a 
socialist society? Should we regard the proper rate of develop- 
ment as much higher than that of capitalist production, or only 
slightly higher? Even when we admit the proposition that the 
rate of development of socialist production naturally should 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


163 


be far higher than that of capitalist production, should we 
regard this revolutionary proposition as generally valid for 
all stages of development of a socialist economy? In other 
words, should we regard this proposition as applicable only 
to a certain stage in the development of a socialist economy, 
i.e., to the initial stage or recovery period, and as not applica- 
ble to a more developed stage or a period of technological in- 
novation in the development of socialist economy? 

Today, right opportunists admit that the economy grows 
constantly under socialism but at the same time they argue 
that when the economy has reached a certain stage, it is im- 
possible to raise the rate of development of production above 
four to seven per cent, since the scope for the growth of pro- 
duction narrows, the possibility of further expanding produc- 
tion decreases, as the economy increases. According to this 
view, then, the rate of development of socialist production 
not only differs little from the growth rate of capitalist pro- 
duction when a socialist economy has reached a certain level, 
but also it may lag behind the rate of development in some 
capitalist countries. 

If this were true, the intrinsic superiority of the socialist 
system over the capitalist system (the higher rate of develop- 
ment of socialist production over capitalist production is pre- 
cisely a concentrated expression of this superiority) would 
display its vitality in the initial stage or in a recovery period 
but would become untenable when the socialist economy 
reached a certain level of development. 

Furthermore, if it were true that as a socialist economy ex- 
pands and its scope for further development gradually dimin- 
ishes as the rate of development of production decreases, 
•ben we have to admit that it would be impossible to complete 
die material foundation of socialism or, if not impossible, it 
would be possible to do so only gradually. This means that 
it would take several centuries to realize communism. 

Tims, continuously maintaining a high rate of development 


164 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 

throughout the entire period of socialist and communist con- 
struction by analyzing correctly the correlation between the 
scale of the economy and the rate of development of produc- 
tion would confirm the scientific basis of the economic de- 
velopment of socialism. This concerns the intrinsic superior- 
ity of the socialist system and is a key question that determines 
the future of socialist and communist construction. 

Kim II Sung’s original theory on the correlation of the scale 
of the economy and the rate of development of production in 
a socialist economy is a Marxist-Leninist answer to this press- 
ing problem and a refutation of left and right opportunist 
views. He holds the principled position that this question 
should be tackled in its relation to the decisive and intrinsic 
superiority of socialism over capitalism. 

The crux of the problem is to determine the scope of ex- 
pansion of the scale of the economy, or the possibility of fur- 
ther increasing production. In other words, should we con- 
sider that the scope diminishes or increases with the expan- 
sion of the scale of socialist economy? And, if we consider that 
it increases, where should we look for the greater scope? 

In a socialist society there is unlimited scope for developing 
production, unlimited possibility for increasing it. Certainly 
it increases along with the strengthening of the economic 
foundations and the consolidation of the economy-organizing 
functions of the proletarian dictatorship. These potentials lie 
in socialism, in the objective intrinsic superiority of the so- 
cialist system. The problem is to analyze correctly the various 
factors determining these potentials in relation to the essential 
superiority of the socialist system and how to relate them to 
the rapid development of production expansion. 

These factors are, first, the planned and balanced develop- 
ment of a socialist economy; second, the planned and rapid 
development of technology in a socialist society; and third, 
the unlimited revolutionary enthusiasm and creative initia- 
tive of the working masses which can be given full play only 
in socialist society. 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


165 


Planned and balanced development of the economy is a law 
applicable only to a socialist economy and is the most funda- 
mental characteristic of the process of socialist reproduction. 
Further, it operates as an important factor for rapidly de- 
veloping socialist production. As Kim 11 Sung says: 

In capitalist society production cannot grow steadily, the process 
of repioduction being periodically interrupted and much social 
labor wasted owing to crises of overproduction. In a socialist society, 
however, all the labor resources and natural wealth of the country 
can be used efficiently, and production can be raised incessantly ac- 
cording to plan. 2 

Capitalist society, where private or capitalist ownership of 
the means of production prevails, is characterized by the 
anarchy of production. The crises of overproduction caused 
by the contradictions between the social nature of production 
and the private or capitalist form of ownership interrupt and 
destroy the process of capitalist reproduction periodically, 
with the result that tremendous amounts of production ma- 
terials and products are wasted. 

This cyclical interruption and destruction of production and 
its chronic stagnation are a law characteristic of capitalist 
production. However, in a socialist society, where capitalist 
ownership has been abolished completely and socialist owner- 
ship of the means of production established, this law disap- 
pears. The anarchistic and abnormal development of produc- 
lion is replaced by planned and balanced development, and 
I ho cyclical interruption, destruction, and chronic stagnation 
o! production, by its constant and rapid development. The 
development of socialist production is based primarily on 
(he social ownership of the means of production, on the seiz- 
ure of power by the proletariat. 

Under these conditions, the proletarian dictatorship can 
achieve a planned and balanced economy by utilizing to a 
maximum all the economic levers, which it controls, and by 
dislributing the social means of production and labor power to 
\.uious economic branches according to the law of develop- 


166 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


ment of a socialist system. As the organization functions of the 
state are strengthened and as economic control and manage- 
ment are extended to maintain and coordinate a rational 
balance among different branches of the people's economy, 
scope for the growth and potential of production is greatly 
increased. 

This is not affected by the factor of the expanded scale of the 
economy. In other words, however much the scale of the 
economy is expanded, scope for further growth will increase 
if the economic planning bodies of the state are strengthened 
and the planning levels raised. 

The fact that the state controls distribution, accumulation 
and consumption in a unified way and according to a plan 
makes it possible to develop socialist expanded reproduction 
on a larger scale by channeling more funds to accumulation. 

Planned, rapid development of technology is possible only 
in a socialist economy, and this, in turn, raises labor produc- 
tivity which becomes a factor also for developing socialist 
production rapidly. Kim II Sung observes: 

. . . The production relations of socialism give a broad scope for 
the unrestricted development of productive forces, and the socialist 
state, by making use of this potential, rapidly can develop technology 
according to plan. It is an economic law of socialist and communist 
construction that outmoded technique is replaced by new technique, 
and the new one by an even newer one; that manual labor is mech- 
anized, mechanization becomes semi-automation, and semi-automa- 
tion becomes full automation. It is a demonstrable truth that in so- 
cialist society, with the rapid development of technology, labor pro- 
ductivity increases constantly and production develops at a high 
rate . 3 

In capitalist society, machinery and technology made and 
developed by man are turned into instruments to dominate 
and oppress man; the capitalist utilizes machinery and tech- 
nology to exploit and oppress workers. Under such conditions, 
the development of machinery and technology intensifies 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


167 


the exploitation of workers and alienates them from the pro- 
cess of direct production. Machinery and technology are used 
in production only insofar as they increase profits. If the 
equipment fails to serve this purpose, it is discarded, however 
excellent it may be. The development of technology is hin- 
dered by capitalist production relations themselves. 

Machinery and technology are controlled by the people only 
under socialism and then they are used in the interest of the 
masses, for their happiness and improvement of living condi- 
tions. In a socialist society, all machinery and technology are 
utilized fully as a powerful means to liberate the worker from 
difficult manual labor and to improve productivity. Full and 
rapid development of modern equipment and technique is 
the direct concern of the state and the masses. Machinery and 
technology are developed not only by a handful of scientists 
or engineers but also by the unlimited creativity of the people. 

The decisive factor in expanding and developing socialist 
production should be sought in the revolutionary awareness 
and creativity of the liberated masses. As Kim II Sung puts it: 

In a socialist society, the great revolutionary enthusiasm of the 
people is the decisive factor which actively encourages the produc- 
tive forces to spread. The intrinsic superiority of the socialist system 
lies in the fact that the working people, freed from exploitation and 
oppression, work with conscious enthusiasm and creative initiative 
lor the country and the people, for society and the collective, as well 
us for their own welfare . 4 

I bus, labor power is the most active and determinant ele- 
ment of production. Technology is developed by man, ma- 
eliinery is made by man, and it is man that operates it. All 
precious and beautiful material and cultural products in the 
world are made by the labor of working people. Man himself 
i'. I he basic element of productive forces, the human power 
dial conquers nature, and man plays a decisive role in the 
development of productive forces. The issue is the ideology 
and consciousness of man. 


168 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


Under capitalism, workers are exploited and oppressed be- 
cause they do not possess the means of production and they 
are forced to work to live; therefore they take no interest in 
the development of machinery and technology since all the 
fruits of production belong to the capitalist and the develop- 
ment of technology results only in increasing a worker's ex- 
ploitation. Under socialism where the means of production 
belong to the society the worker, as direct producer, is com- 
plete master of the state, society and production. The results 
of production belong to him directly or indirectly and serve 
to improve his material and cultural life. Machinery and tech- 
nology are developed to lighten his labor and to improve his 
living standard. In these circumstances, the development of 
production and technology is of direct and great concern to 
the worker. This is the decisive condition that enables the 
masses in a socialist society to give full scope to their inex- 
haustible creativity and talent, and this, too, is the basic 
content of socialist relations of production, with the working 
masses freed from all exploitation and oppression. 

These factors make it possible for a socialist society to ex- 
pand production constantly, however much the scale of the 
economy may be increased. There is an unlimited scope and 
potential for expanding production that is derived from the 
intrinsic superiority of the socialist system itself. 

For production constantly and rapidly to develop so as to 
realize socialism and communism successfully, the socialist 
state first must strengthen decisively the functions of the pro- 
letarian dictatorship, continue the class struggle with this as a 
weapon, remold the consciousness of the people by carrying 
out an ideological and cultural revolution, and raise technical 
and cultural levels, thus implementing the task of revolution- 
izing the entire society. Kim 11 Sung says: 

The more the Party and state of the proletariat, in conformity 
with their proper functions, strengthen the ideological revolution 
among the working people and gradually eliminate the survivals of 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


169 


old ideologies from their minds, the more the working people will 
devote their talents and stamina to the development of socialist pro- 
duction . 5 

In a socialist system the working masses can be encouraged 
to show their awareness and creativity only when the state 
actively promotes an ideological struggle to uproot individual- 
ism and egotism — the ideological survivals of the old society — 
and arm all people with the advanced ideas of the working 
class, that is, the ideas of collectivism and communism. 

For a constant and rapid development of socialist produc- 
tion, the socialist state must strengthen the economic plan- 
ning functions of the proletarian dictatorship as a weapon of 
class struggle. The socialist system has created all the objec- 
tive conditions for developing a planned and balanced econ- 
omy. The socialist state is required to raise decisively the plan 
level on the basis of these conditions to prevent a waste of 
labor power and materials and to mobilize maximum produc- 
tive reserves. 

W hen the ideological revolution, carried out by the prole- 
tarian dictatorship, is joined with a powerful technical revolu- 
tion it can become a decisive propelling force for developing 
socialist production rapidly. There is no doubt that when all 
the branches of the people’s economy are equipped with the 
latest machinery and technology and when this equipment is 
operated by ideologically inspired workers, socialist produc- 
tion will develop rapidly. As Kim II Sung says: “All this shows 
that we can develop the economy as fast as we want, no matter 
how large its scale if we, by conducting political work success- 
hilly in accordance with our Party’s program, enhance the 
political consciousness of the masses, arouse their revolution- 
ary zeal and constantly improve techniques.” 6 

The famous proposition put forward by Lenin after the vic- 
torious October Revolution, “Communism is Soviet power 
plus the electrification of the whole country,” should be inter- 
| noted as demonstrating this requisite for proletarian dictator- 


170 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 

ship and technological revolution. Lenin’s proposition indi- 
cates that communism can be realized only when the proletar- 
ian dictatorship is strong enough to carry out ideological and 
cultural revolutions, to convert the entire society into the 
working class, and, at the same time, to carry out a technologi- 
cal revolution, laying solid material and technical foundations 
for realizing a high level of productivity. Only then can the 
socialist state occupy the two strongholds, ideological and ma- 
terial, which it must capture in the course of its advance to 
socialism and communism, and guarantee the complete vic- 
tory of socialism. If we neglect either of these, the dictatorship 
of the proletariat or the technical revolution, we can neither 
develop the socialist economy at a rapid rate nor build social- 
ism or communism. 

The correctness of the revolutionary proposition advanced 
by Kim 11 Sung on the correlation between the scale of the 
economy and the rate of development of production in a so- 
cialist society has been borne out amply by the historical 
experience of the Republic in socialist construction. The rate 
of development of production was higher, not lower, in the 
period of the Three-Year Postwar Rehabilitation Plan, and 
particularly during the period of the Seven-Year Plan, a time 
of full-scale technological innovation in which the scale of 
production was many times larger than previously. 

When the Republic tackled the Five-Year Plan, the people’s 
standard of living was not satisfactory, although in the main 
the ravaged economy had been restored and the living stand- 
ard had been stabilized as a result of the successful imple- 
mentation of the postwar Three-Year Plan. Further, the Re- 
public found itself in a very difficult position. Reactionaries 
at home and abroad were directing the thrust of their attack 
at the Republic and were engaged in undisguised maneuvers 
to frustrate its economic construction. It was in these circum- 
stances that the DPRK was faced with the urgent task of lay- 
ing the foundation for industrialization, and for this purpose, 
large quantities of steel products were needed. 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


171 


However, at that time there was but one blooming mill in 
the Republic, and its rated capacity was only 60,000 tons of 
rolled steel, far from enough. Under these difficult conditions, 
the Party and the government, under the leadership of Pre- 
mier Kim 11 Sung, solved the problem by putting complete 
trust in the working people and encouraged them to give full 
play to their inexhaustible revolutionary zeal and initiative. 
Kim 11 Sung personally visited the Kangson Steel Works and 
explained to the workers the difficult situation facing the rev- 
olution and construction, and proposed to increase the rated 
capacity from 60,000 tons to 90,000 tons: 

We have barely managed to rehabilitate the ravaged economy, and 
now the factionalists have reared their heads against the Party and 
the great-power chauvinists are putting pressure on us, and the U.S. 
imperialists and the Syngman Rhee puppet clique are frantically 
clamoring for a “March North.” But is that any excuse for us to get 
disheartened and to yield to the grave difficulties facing our revolu- 
tion and construction? No, that won't do. We trust only you workers, 

I he main power of our revolution, and we have only you to rely on. 
To overcome these grave difficulties facing our Party, you must he 
in high spirits and work hard, produce plenty and construct, so as to 
press economic construction more vigorously, isn't that so ? 7 

In response to Kim 11 Sung’s call, the workers of the Kang- 
son Steel Works resolved to produce 90,000 tons and immedi- 
ately set about to improve existing machines and equipment. 

( Welcoming a number of difficulties and ordeals, they suc- 
ceeded in turning out 120,000 tons of steel products, instead 
o! 90,000, by the end of that year, giving full scope to their 
i evolutionary zeal and creative initiative. Today, the produc- 
tion capacity of the Kangson Steel Works has been raised to a 
level of 450,000 tons, or eight times the rated capacity. This 
example evoked innovations in all parts of the country, and 
old rated capacities were scrapped. In this way, the Five-Year 
I'lan, which envisaged a 2.8-fold increase in total production 
\ dilne, was fulfilled successfully in two and a half years. 

I low about the situation in the seven or eight years after the 


172 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


Five-Year Plan? In economic construction, the Republic car- 
ried out the tasks of the full-scale technological revolution 
and many new industrial branches were created, with ma- 
chinery and equipment radically improved and the scale of 
production increased many times. 

Did the growth rate of production decrease when produc- 
tive capacity was increased in this way? Precisely under these 
conditions, production maintained a high rate of development 
during the Seven-Year Plan. The National Economic Plan for 
1967, the first year for implementing the decision of the Party 
Conference on building the economy and defense simultane- 
ously was a tight plan envisaging a 12.8 per cent increase in 
total industrial output value over the previous year. But in 
1967, the Republic actually overfulfilled the plan by far and 
raised industrial output by as much as 17 per cent in a year. 

Further, in 1968, great reserves were created in the course 
of the struggle to realize the economic plan. In view of the 
frantic war cries by the United States following the Pueblo in- 
cident, the Party addressed an appeal to the factories and en- 
terprises in all fields of the national economy to fulfill all their 
production and construction assignments ahead of schedule 
and produce more with the released labor power, materials 
and equipment. This call was answered by workers in all fac- 
tories and enterprises, and many not only carried out their 
assignments but also asked for more work which they did well. 

In this way, a socialist society has an unlimited potential for 
constantly developing the economy at a rate undreamt of in 
capitalist society, and this potential increases as socialist con- 
struction proceeds and its economic foundations are strength- 
ened. Consequently, if political work is successful in raising 
the political consciousness of the masses and in arousing their 
enthusiasm, and if techniques are constantly improved, the 
economy can be developed at a high rate, however large the 
scale of the economy. This is the basic proposition on the eco- 
nomic development of socialism. Its correctness has been 
borne out fully, theoretically and practically. 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


173 


This revolutionary proposition advanced by Kim 11 Sung is 
the most powerful theoretical and practical weapon for de- 
fending resolutely the purity of Marxism-Leninism and expos- 
ing thoroughly the counter-revolutionary nature of the theo- 
ries of left and right opportunism. Premier Kim 11 Sung says: 

The theory that when industry reaches a certain stage of develop- 
ment its reserves will diminish and a high growth rate will not be 
ensured in industrial production has nothing to do with the Marxist- 
Leninist theory of the economy. The “theory” that a large-scale econ- 
omy cannot develop rapidly is only a sophistry brought forward by 
some to justify the fact that their technical progress is slow and their 
economy stagnant because they, talking about “liberalization” and 
democratic development,” did not educate their proletariat and, as 
a result, the workers are ideologically so sluggish that they fiddle 
about and loaf on the job. 8 


2. PROBLEMS OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION 
IN THE FORM OF COMMODITIES AND THE 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF VALUE 


In the second part of his theoretical work, Kim 11 Sung gives 
a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the designation of the 
means of production as commodities and of the law of value in 
socialist society. 

Involved here are also questions related to the conditions 
lor and characteristics of commodity production, and its aboli- 
lion; definition of the form of the means of production pro- 
vided by state enterprises; the production and circulation of 
means of production as commodities, and the utilization of the 
law of value and its significance. Thus, included are all the 
important questions in the general area of the use of commod- 
lly-money relations, commodity production, and the law of 
value, presented in the context of the transitional nature of a 
socialist society. Kim II Sung says: “After all, the question of 
utilizing commodity-money relations is an important one 


174 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


which the proletarian state must settle properly in the period 
of transition from capitalism to socialism. Right or ‘left’ errors 
in this question can result in serious harm .” 9 

It is common knowledge that left and right opportunists, 
who have failed to solve this question correctly, cause great 
confusion and bring about serious losses to our cause. The 
question of commodity-money relations is crucial for clarify- 
ing the characteristic features of the transitional economy. 

Utilizing commodity-money relations, i.e., the means of 
production as commodities and the law of value, is of ex- 
tremely important theoretical and practical significance in the 
struggle of the working class for socialist and communist con- 
struction. This is a very difficult and complex theoretical prob- 
lem, which has been discussed actively for a long time among 
Marxist-Leninist theoreticians, without any clear conclusion 
having been reached. 

The general question of commodity production under so- 
cialism was stated by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. 
Engels, on the supposition that socialist revolutions would 
triumph almost simultaneously in highly advanced capitalist 
countries, presented the proposition that commodity produc- 
tion would be abolished when private ownership of the means 
of production was replaced with social ownership. Thus, in a 
developed capitalist society which Engels had in mind, class 
distinctions between the working class and the peasantry 
would be eradicated before the socialist revolution, and con- 
sequently there would be no ownership of the means of pro- 
duction by the peasantry. Under these conditions, abolition 
of capitalist or landlord ownership would mean not only aboli- 
tion of private ownership in general but also the establish- 
ment of social ownership as the only form of ownership. There 
would be no separation of social ownership into two main 
categories, ownership by all the people and cooperative 
ownership. It is clear that if ownership relations were not 
divided, commodity-money relations would disappear. 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


175 


After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, Lenin 
said, “When we have won on a worldwide scale, we will be 
able to build public lavatories with gold on the streets of some 
of the largest cities in the world.” He meant that when social- 
ism has triumphed on a worldwide scale, the significance and 
role of gold as money will disappear. 

Stalin, who was a pioneer in socialist construction, gave 
considerable thought to the utilization of commodity-money 
relations. For instance, on the question of the form of the 
means of production in socialist society, Stalin advanced in his 
later years the propostion that “the means of production lose 
their characteristics as commodities in domestic commercial 
transactions and are placed outside the law of value, main- 
taining only the accouterments of commodities (cost account- 
ing, etc.),” 

According to this proposition, the means of production in a 
socialist society cease to be commodities uniformly , at least 
within national boundaries. If we admit that the means of 
production have the accouterments of commodities, why is 
this so, and what significance does this have? Thus Stalin’s 
proposition has left some questions unanswered. 

At present, right opportunists, defining all the means of 
production in a socialist society indiscriminately as commodi- 
ties, are trying to carry out economic management in a capital- 
ist way, while overestimating the significance of commodity 
production and the law of value. On the other hand, left op- 
portunists, ignoring the transitional nature of a socialist so- 
ciety, are unable to rationalize the management of socialist 
enterprises and are wasting substantial quantities of means of 
production and labor power because they refuse completely 
to recognize the role of commodity production and the law of 
value under socialism. 

In clarifying this question, Kim II Sung first states the 
Marxist definition of a commodity: “A commodity is some- 
lliing produced not for one’s own consumption but for sale. 


176 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


In other words, not all products are commodities, but all things 
produced for the purpose of exchange are commodities .” 10 

Commodity production presupposes a social division of 
labor and a differentiation of ownership. Should either of 
these be lacking, there can be no commodity production. 

Commodity exchange among communities in the closing 
stage of primitive society is explained as the differentiation of 
communal ownership among different communities, and com- 
modity exchange in a capitalist society as the differentiation 
of private-capitalist ownership relations among individual 
capitalists as owners of commodities. Consequently, com- 
modity production in a socialist society should be explained 
on the basis of the differentiation of ownership. 

In past controversies, the general proposition of Marxism- 
Leninism on the nature of the commodity and its origins was 
not only misunderstood but also greatly distorted, causing 
serious confusion in the settlement of this question. Some 
people, relating the nature of commodities and the origins of 
commodity production mainly to the private ownership of the 
means of production, asserted that there can be no commodity 
production in socialist society, where private ownership has 
been abolished. Other people, asserting that commodity ex- 
change was carried on even in primitive communities where 
communal ownership prevailed exclusively, have distorted 
the general proposition of Marxism-Leninism. 

If we take private ownership and private labor as the basis, 
there would be no commodities in a socialist society, where 
there is no private ownership or private labor, and one nat- 
urally is led to the extreme leftist conclusion that no means of 
production are commodities in a socialist society under any 
circumstances. 

On the other hand, if we regard as commodities the prod- 
ucts of the communal labor of primitive man in primitive com- 
munities where communal ownership dominated exclusively, 
we will be led to regard all products in a socialist society, even 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


177 


the means of production among state enterprises, as commodi- 
ties in the true sense of the word. Then will follow the right- 
opportunist view that commodity production will continue 
even in a communist society where ownership by the entire 
society prevails. 

Kim II Sung formulated this definition of conditions for 
commodity production and commodity-money relations in a 
socialist society: 

I he reason commodity-money relations exist in a socialist society 
is that the social division of labor and different forms of ownership 
of products exist. As everybody knows, in a socialist society, the divi- 
sion of labor not only exists but develops every day. As for owner- 
ship, there exist state and cooperative ownership of the means of 
production as well as private ownership of consumer goods, although 
in the course of a socialist revolution, private ownership is abolished 
and different economic forms that existed early in the transition pe- 
liod are gradually fused into a single, socialist form of economy. In 
addition, socialist states must carry on foreign trade in a situation 
where communism has not yet triumphed on a worldwide scale and 
frontiers exist . 11 

Needless to say, in a socialist society, private ownership is 
abolished in the course of the socialist revolution, and vari- 
ous forms of capitalist economy and commodity economy 
which existed in the early stage of the transitional period are 
lused into a single, socialist economic form. However, in a 
socialist society, the socialist forms of ownership arc not yet 
unified in the single state form but are differentiated. This is 
an expression of the transitional nature of socialism as seen 
in the relations of ownership. 

The characteristic feature of commodity production in a 
socialist society is that there are no capitalists and the law of 
value applied to commodity production does not operate 
blindly, as in a capitalist society, but within a limited scope. 

It can be utilized in a planned way by the state as an economic 
lever for effective economic management. 


178 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 

Under capitalism, commodity production is the means by 
which the capitalist makes a profit. The capitalist employs 
workers for commodity production and obtains profits by sell- 
ing their products. Workers are thoroughly exploited in the 
process. Consequently, the law of value operates without 
limit and blindly in all areas of social production and com- 
modity circulation, and even in the sale and purchase of labor 
power. 

On the other hand, in socialist society commodity produc- 
tion is carried on to satisfy the material and cultural demands 
of the people, and its scope is limited. It is confined to the 
production and distribution of consumer goods and, partially, 
to the production and distribution of the means of production. 
Therefore, the operation of the law of value is restricted to 
these areas. 

Thus, since the conditions for commodity production are 
the social division of labor and the differentiation of owner- 
ship relations, commodity production also will be abolished 
when the transitional period is over and cooperative property 
is converted into the property of the entire people so that a 
unitary form of ownership is established, aside from foreign 
trade. As pointed out by Kim II Sung, then products of social 
production no longer will be commodities but will be called 
simply means of production and consumer goods or by some 
other names. Commodity circulation then will be transferred 
to a distribution system and the law of value will cease to 
operate. 

It is important to remember that even in that stage, the so- 
cial division of labor will continue to exist and to develop, for 
commodity production is not a prerequisite for the social divi- 
sion of labor, though the social division of labor is a condi- 
tion for commodity production.* In other words, the social 

* Revisionists try to explain the conditions for commodity production in a 
socialist society in terms of the “immaturity of the degree of socialization of 
ownership by all the people" and the consequent “heterogeneity" of social 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


179 


division of labor exists and develops irrespective of the exist- 
ence of commodity production. 

After clarifying the nature of commodities, the conditions 
for commodity production generally and under socialism, its 
characteristics and the prospect for its abolition, Kim II Sung 
posed the question, In a socialist society, when are the means 
of production a commodity and when not? And answered: 

The deteimination of when the means of production are a com- 
modity and when they are not in socialist society should also be 
based on the differentiation of ownership. In a socialist society, the 
means of production, even when shifted to other places, are not a 
commodity if they do not change hands, and a commodity when they 
do change hands. 12 

According to Kim II Sung, means of production are a com- 
modity (ownership of a means of production changes) in the 
following cases: (1) when a means of production is transferred 
from state ownership to cooperative ownership; (2) when a 
means of production is transferred within the cooperative 
ownership, or between cooperative farms, between producer 
cooperatives, or between a cooperative farm and a producer 
cooperative; (3) when a means of production is exported. In 
all these cases, a means of production becomes a commodity 
because it changes hands and, consequently, the law of value 
operates not in form but in substance. 

When the confederation of the South and North is effected, 
and businessmen in South Korea ask us for machines and 


labor. In other words, they try to explain it by distinctions in labor skills — 
between simple and complex labor, between manual and mental labor, etc. 
II this view were followed, commodity production would continue to exist 
even in a complete socialist society, before distinctions between manual and 
mental labor are eradicated. Further, when they refer to the “immaturity of 
(he degree of socialization of ownership by all the people," the question is, 
what is the yardstick? According to this view, commodity production will con- 
tinue to exist even when ownership by all the people prevails exclusively, if 
socialization is considered still “immature." This is nothing but sophistry. 


180 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


equipment, the northern part of the Republic will sell them. 
In that case the machines and equipment will be commodi- 
ties, and the law of value will operate. 

When are the means of production not a commodity? Means 
of production or equipment, raw and other materials do not 
become commodities when they are transferred between state 
enterprises or within the ownership of all the people. In that 
case, the socialist state maintains its ownership. Further, the 
means of production are not transferred through the transac- 
tions of sale and purchase but are distributed according to the 
state plan for distribution of machinery, equipment and ma- 
terials, in the same way that the state provides the army with 
weapons. Thus transfer of ownership does not occur, and the 
item cannot be a commodity, nor does the law of value 
operate. 

If a means of production transferred between state enter- 
prises is not a commodity, what is it? And how do we explain 
the prices and cost accounting that have to be taken into con- 
sideration when it is transferred between enterprises in the 
present stage of socialism? Furthermore, what should be used 
in such accounting if the law of value is not used? Concerning 
these questions, Kim 11 Sung holds: 

It would be correct to say that the means of production which are 
transferred between state enterprises according to the plans for 
equipment and material supply and for cooperative production are 
not commodities, but assume the form of commodities and, accoid- 
ingly, in this case the law of value does not operate in substance, as 
in the case of commodity production, but in form . 13 

Thus, as Kim 11 Sung points out, since the law of value does 
not operate in the proper sense but only in foim, in the case of 
exchange of the means of production among state enterprises, 
the form of value is utilized simply as a means of economic 
accounting, and does not represent the value itself. 

Then, how can it be explained in social and economic terms 
that the means of production transferred between state enter- 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


181 


prises are not commodities but merely assume the form of 
commodities? On this, Kim II Sung bases his explanation on 
the relative independence of state enterprises whose manage- 
ments operate an independent accounting system within the 
state sector and the consequent principle of equivalent com- 
pensation. 

In a socialist society, all state enterprises are owned by the 
state, but they are relatively independent in using and manag- 
ing means of production, as if they were under different own- 
erships. All the business-accounting enterprises in the state 
sector separately use the means of production received from 
other enterprises according to the unitary plan of the state and 
according to the system of independent accounting, and must 
net a certain profit for the state after they recover their costs. 

Under these conditions, enterprises have to be particular 
about what is theirs and what belongs to others, and transac- 
tions have to be conducted on a strict accounting basis accord- 
ing to the principle of equivalent compensation. This is why 
the means of production transferred between state enter- 
prises assume the form of commodities and the law of value 
operates not in substance but in form. 

Why, then, are enterprises within the state sector granted 
independence in management, and why are the delivery and 
receipt of the means of production strictly accounted for ac- 
cording to the principle of equivalent compensation, when 
they are not commodities? 

Kim II Sung explains this on the basis of the transitional 
character which is the specific feature of a socialist society. 
The specific features of a socialist society relevant to this 
question are: 

First, the productive forces have not yet developed to an 
extent where each works according to his ability and each 
receives according to his needs. 

Second, there still remain survivals of the old ideologies in 
the thinking and consciousness of members of society, who 


182 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 

are not yet sufficiently educated and remolded in the spirit 
of collectivism and with ideas of communism. Consequently, 
not all people possess sufficient collective spirit to take care 
of and protect state properties as their own. There are some 
who still harbor old ideas of taking advantage of the state or 
other organs and enterprises, placing their own local interests 
before everything. 

Third, under socialism labor has become honorable and 
worthwhile, but not yet life’s prime requirement or man’s 
physiological need as in communist society. 

All these factors require that under socialism equivalent 
values be strictly cost-accounted in transactions between en- 
terprises. When the tasks of the transitional period have been 
carried out successfully and the productive forces greatly 
developed; when our society has a great abundance of goods; 
when the working people of all enterprises have been edu- 
cated and remolded in the spirit of collectivism and ideas of 
communism and completely have overcome old ideas of in- 
dividualism and everything else; and when people are as con- 
cerned about state property as about their own and conduct 
all state affairs as devotedly and consciously as their own — 
there will be no need to keep accounts on an equivalent basis. 

It is of extreme practical importance to utilize correctly the 
commodity form and the commercial form in the production 
and distribution of the means of production. Regarding this, 
Premier Kim II Sung says: 

A proper use of commodities and commerce in the production and 
distribution of the means of production is of definite significance in 
methodically increasing the profits of enterprises and the accumula- 
tions of the state by eliminating the wastage of social labor and 
strengthening the save-and-spare regime. It is therefore necessary 
to make proper use of them in all branches of the national economy 
and all enterprises. 14 

Under limiting conditions resulting from the transitional 
nature of a socialist society, or when people do not yet work 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


183 


consciously and devotedly both for the society and their own 
welfare without social compulsion, the use of the commodity 
and commercial forms is an inevitable social and economic 
regime for rational control and management of socialist state 
enterprises. If there were no such regime, the managing staff 
and working people of the enterprises would not be suffi- 
ciently interested in fulfilling plan assignments, controlling 
raw and other materials, utilizing labor power rationally, re- 
ducing production costs, improving the quality of products, 
etc., and enhancing their sense of responsibility. 

Only when efforts are made to use the form of value prop- 
erly in providing the means of production will it be possible 
to strengthen the strict accounting system and the control by 
won (the monetary unit of the Republic) over the use of ma- 
terials and labor power and to save on material per unit. 

In North Korea, the importance of the materials’ supply 
agencies for using correctly the commodity and commercial 
forms for the means of production is emphasized. And this 
assumes the existence of the Daean work system, which is the 
basis of socialist economic management. 

To increase decisively the leading role of the vanguard 
party, to enable broad sections of the working people to par- 
ticipate actively in economic management and give full scope 
to their creativity, and, for this purpose, to strengthen the po- 
litical and ideological education of the working people it is 
important to combine the use of the commodity form and the 
law of value with the implementation of the principle of so- 
cialist distribution. 

Kim II Sung pointed out that the most important factor in 
utilizing the law of value in a socialist society is that of fixing 
the prices of commodities properly: “Prices should be as- 
sessed on the basis of correctly calculating the requirements 
of the basic economic law of socialism and the law of value .” 15 

To fix the prices of commodities on the basis of the law of 
value means that prices should be based on the socially neces- 


184 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


sary labor contained in the product. This is the basic require- 
ment of the law of value; it applies to commodity production 
and circulation in socialist society. Therefore, if prices are not 
based on the outlay of socially necessary labor, price equilib- 
rium cannot be maintained, socialist distribution cannot be 
carried out properly, and the development of social production 
cannot be implemented correctly. 

In pricing, it is also necessary to consider the requirements 
of the basic economic law of socialism, in other words, to fix 
prices of mass-produced consumer goods at lower levels. In 
the final analysis, the purpose of economic activities in a 
socialist society is to satisfy the growing material and cultural 
needs of the people. It is for this reason that production facil- 
ities are equipped with the latest techniques and newest 
equipment. The highest law governing the activities of the 
Party and the proletarian state is precisely to improve the 
living standards of the masses constantly. 

Therefore, it is necessary for the Party and the workers' 
state to price mass consumption goods as low as possible: 
rice, textiles, footwear, mosquito-netting, sewing thread, 
matches, stationery and other essential goods so that all people 
can be clothed and fed adequately and live comfortably. In 
this case, the prices of commodities should be set lower than 
their values. 

This is not meant to ignore the law of value, but to apply it 
correctly in a socialist society. Thus, while it is necessary to 
fix the prices of commodities in the direction of making them 
coincide with their values on the basis of the law of value, it 
is also necessary for prices of commodities to differ from their 
values in accordance with the requirements of the basic eco- 
nomic law of socialism. This is the correct use of the law of 
value in a socialist society. 

Kim II Sung clarified the difficult and complex questions 
of utilizing commodity-money relations in a socialist society, 
and particularly the question of defining the form of the means 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


185 


of production on the basis of his concept of the differentiation 
of ownership, the nature of commodities and the conditions 
for commodity production. On this basis, he gave consistent, 
full and comprehensive explanations regarding conditions 
for and special features of commodity production in a socialist 
society, particularly on the definition of the form of means of 
production, the prospect for abolition of commodity produc- 
tion, and utilization of the law of value. The theoretical con- 
cepts clarified by Kim 11 Sung lead to the correct utilization 
of commodity-money relations in a socialist society. 


3. PROBLEMS OF THE PEASANT MARKET 
AND OF ITS ABOLITION 

In the third part of his theoretical work, Kim 11 Sung gave 
Marxist-Leninist explanations on problems of the peasant 
market in a socialist society, including the nature of the 
peasant market, objective conditions for its existence, scientif- 
ic prospects for its abolition, and the principled stand of the 
Marxist-Leninist Party and the proletarian dictatorship on the 
law that governs the transition of socialist commerce to a com- 
plete system of distribution. 

These questions are treated also in connection with the 
transitional nature of a socialist economy. Where there are 
class distinctions between the proletariat and the peasantry 
and where there are two forms of social ownership, that is, 
ownership by all the people and cooperative ownership, the 
existence of the peasant market is inevitable. Thus, the prole- 
tarian state must solve the question of the peasant market as 
one of the tasks in the transitional period to the complete vic- 
tory of socialism. 

It may be said that the peasant market is a component part 
of commodity-money relations in the sense that its socio- 
economic basis is the differentiation of ownership and that it 


186 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


is a special form of socialist commerce. After all, this problem 
is unavoidable in the course of doing away with class distinc- 
tions between worker and peasant and of solving finally the 
agrarian question by completely converting the peasantry into 
the working class. In this sense, the problem is part of the 
agrarian question in a socialist society and it is important in 
the economic theories of socialism. 

Nevertheless, the questions of the peasant market and its 
abolition hardly have been dealt with in the economic theo- 
ries of socialism and still remain entirely unsettled. As a con- 
sequence, tendencies of left and right opportunism on such 
questions are causing serious confusion and loss in the practi- 
cal struggle for socialist and communist construction. 

A rightist tendency is toward expanding the peasant market 
under socialism and encouraging its spontaneous develop- 
ment as a capitalist element. This only results in encouraging 
the selfishness of the peasantry and in greatly hampering the 
development of socialist agricultural production. On the other 
hand, a left opportunist deviation is toward ignoring the ob- 
jective necessity for the peasant market in a socialist society 
and overestimating the capitalist element in the peasant mar- 
ket, in demanding that it be abolished immediately. This 
reflects the complete failure to understand the transitional 
nature of socialist society. 

The character of the peasant market in a socialist society 
was analyzed by Kim 11 Sung as follows: 

The peasant market represents a form of commerce whereby peo- 
ple buy directly from peasants, at definite places, farm produce and 
animal products grown on cooperative farms and as a sideline of 
individual cooperative farmers. Although a form of trade in a social- 
ist society, the peasant market retains many features of capitalism . 16 

In a socialist society, a substantial part of the animal prod- 
ucts and industrial crops produced by cooperative farms are 
purchased directly by the state and are paid for in money. 
However, part is distributed among the peasants in kind for 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 


187 


their own consumption or for sale to the purchasing agents of 
the state. Also, they can take part to the peasant market. In 
addition, cooperative farmers may cultivate their own small 
plots of land and keep a few animals. Farmers may use their 
produce for their own consumption, sell it on the peasant mar- 
ket or barter it for other products. 

However, a peasant market under socialism differs radi- 
cally from the farmers’ market in a capitalist society. First, 
there is no exploitation in the socialist peasant market, which 
is a direct relationship between working people, or a direct 
producer-consumer relationship. Further, the socialist farm 
market is under the influence of state commerce regulations 
and cannot but be affected by them. However, the peasant 
market still retains characteristics of capitalism. One ex- 
ample is that peasant-market prices are determined spontane- 
ously according to demand and supply and, therefore, the law 
of value operates there somewhat blindly. 

The objective conditions permitting the continuation of 
peasant markets in a socialist society arise from the transi- 
tional nature of such a society. Kim 11 Sung believes it is not all 
had for the peasant market to exist under such circumstances. 
In a socialist society where the state is not yet able to supply 
all the goods necessary for the people’s life, particularly daily 
necessities and supplementary provisions in sufficient quan- 
tities, it will be beneficial for the people if these goods are 
produced by peasants and sold in the peasant farm market. 

I hat is the role that the private plots and the peasant market 
play in a socialist economy. Therefore the socialist state 
should not abolish the peasant market in haste but, on the 
contrary, should utilize it positively. 

If peasant markets were abolished forcibly, in spite of the 
present objective circumstances, it would lead to black mar- 
keteering and also great confusion and inconvenience in the 
people s living conditions and in economic construction. 

The state must take steps to eliminate the conditions which 


188 


THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 


give rise to the peasant market, while fulfilling the general 
tasks of the transitional period, but meanwhile the peasant 
market must be utilized. In doing so, it is necessary to limit 
the size of gardens and to strengthen the coordinating func- 
tions of the state over the peasant market. In this way, the 
growth of capitalist elements in the peasant market will be 
prevented and it will be used consciously and purposively. 
The next step is to develop socialist commerce and to increase 
its leading role. It is especially necessary for the state to coor- 
dinate peasant-market prices by purchasing agricultural pro- 
duce in a more planned way and by expanding and strengthen- 
ing such purchasing operations. 

Then, in what stage of the development of socialism will 
private plots and the peasant market disappear? And how will 
they be abolished? They will disappear when there is no 
longer any basis for their support. In other words, private 
production and the peasant market will be abolished only 
when socialist industrialization has been realized and tech- 
nology developed enough to supply sufficient quantities of 
all the consumer goods the people need. 

Even now, articles that are plentiful are not sold in the 
peasant market. Therefore, it is important to reduce the num- 
ber of articles bought and sold on the peasant market one by 
one and gradually to reduce the sales by developing produc- 
tion rapidly to meet the demands of the people. In this way, 
the peasant market will become unnecessary and will be abol- 
ished. 

Moreover, private production and the peasant market will 
be abolished when cooperative property is transferred to the 
whole people. Since peasant markets are associated mainly 
with cooperative farms and private production, they will 
vanish when all the people own all the property, as against 
cooperative property; when the two forms of ownership are 
organically welded together and cooperative property finally 
is transformed into the property of the entire people. Then 


SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 189 

commodity distribution in general will no longer be needed. 
Consumer goods will be distributed according to the diverse 
needs of the people. Kim II Sung concludes: 

The peasant market as well as underhand dealings will disappear 
and trade will go over finally to the supply system only when the 
productive forces have developed to such an extent that the state 
can sufficiently turn out and supply all kinds of goods required by 
the people and cooperative ownership has grown into ownership of 
the entire people . 17 

Today, the Korean people, led by Kim II Sung, are in the 
vanguard of mankind's march toward socialism and commu- 
nism. They have undergone revolutionary struggles in un- 
precedented situations. There were no ready-made formulas 
of Marxism-Leninism to follow. Marxist-Leninist propositions 
could be applied only to the concrete, historical conditions of 
these struggles. Kim II Sung's revolutionary idea of Juche is a 
typical example of the creative application and development 
of Marxism-Leninism. It is because of this that his idea has led 
the Korean revolution to victory. He wrote: 

I have read the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and the works of 
Stalin who directly led socialist economic construction. Further, 

I have studied the systems of economic planning in other countries. 
But no rational system of planning that suits the actual conditions of 
our country was found either in the classical works of Marxism- 
Leninism or in books written by others. There was no alternative for 
us but to complete our own system of planning for our country so 
that the general theories of Marxism-Lenism on planning might suit 
the realities of our country . 18 


PART TWO 


Revolution in South Korea 
and Unification of Korea 


The struggle of our people to drive the U.S. imperialist aggressors 
out of South Korea and unify the fatherland [wrote Kim II Sung] is 
developing in close connection with the anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. 
struggle which is being unfolded dynamically on a worldwide scale. 

South Korea is not only a complete colony of the U.S. imperialists 
but also their military base for invading the whole of Korea and Asia, 
and our country is one of the fiercest battlefronts in the anti-imperial- 
ist struggle where we stand face to face with the chieftain of world 
imperialism. We must force the U.S. imperialist aggressors out of 
South Korea and accomplish the unification of the fatherland, thereby 
fulfilling our national and international duties . 1 

Today, U.S. imperialism’s occupation of South Korea and its 
artificial division of the country is the fundamental obstacle 
to the development of the revolution in South Korea on a 
nationwide scale and in a unified way. As a result, the dif- 
ferences between North and South Korea are gradually in- 
creasing— in politics, the economy, ideology, culture and in 
all other respects. The identity of national characteristics, 
formed through a long history, gradually is being obliterated. 

The split keeps the Korean people from mobilizing and 
utilizing the country’s resources and the people’s abilities in 
a coordinated way for the development of their fatherland, 
and this causes great hardships to all the Korean people, but 


191 


192 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 

particularly to the South Koreans. The only way to end these 
misfortunes and save the South Korean people is to drive the 
United States out of South Korea and eliminate their agents, 
carry out the South Korean revolution successfully and unify 
the fatherland. 

The question of the South Korean revolution and the unifi- 
cation of the fatherland is a new one, and there is no ready- 
made formula for its solution. An original development of 
Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics is required. Kim 11 Sung 
has analyzed the situation in and around Korea and the bal- 
ance of forces between the revolution and the counter-revolu- 
tion, and he has presented the strategy and tactics for the 
South Korean revolution and for the unification of the father- 
land, so as to reflect the strivings of the South Korean people. 

The basis of the strategy and tactics is the Juche principle 
of assuming responsibility for the revolution in our own coun- 
try and of carrying out the revolution ourselves for the all- 
Korean victory against U.S. imperialism. 


CHAPTER i 


U.S. Imperialism in South Korea 
and the Pak Chung Hi Regime 


Kim II Sung concretely analyzed the colonial aggressive 
Policy of U.S. imperialism against South Korea and the reali- 
ties of its society, which still remains colonial and semi-feudal, 
lie also exposed the real nature of the South Korean “regime” 
as a mere tool of the United States for its aggressive policy. 

As a result of the long occupation, the United States controls 
all power in South Korea. The U.S. ambassador rules South 
Korea as its virtual “governor general”; its politics, military 
allairs, economy, culture and all other domains are under 
American colonial domination. The people are oppressed. 
And the Pak Chung Hi regime is a puppet serving U.S. impe- 
rialism — a traitorous, subordinate, anti-people and reactionary 
regime. 

I lie United States has turned South Korea into an aggres- 
sive, military base as a link in the chain of its general military 
strategic plan for world domination. It intends to perpetuate 
I Ik* division of the Korean nation. 

To carry out this policy, the United States has reorganized 
socio-economic relations in South Korea along the same lines 
as under Japanese imperialist rule, but with certain different 
leatures. The feudal landlord system still dominates the 
countryside, preserved, strengthened and protected by the 
I United States. The feudal exploitation of the peasants by land- 
lords is closely linked to colonial plunder by U.S. imperialism, 

• i rating a decisive obstacle to the development of South 
Korean agriculture. 


193 


194 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


Further, U.S. imperialism protects and fosters comprador 
capitalists in various ways and at the same time blocks inde- 
pendent development of the national economy, precipitating 
national capital down the road to bankruptcy and ruin. 

These colonial-capitalist and feudal production relations 
are a major obstacle to the social development of South Korea. 
Because of U.S. imperialism, the people, beginning with the 
workers and peasants, have been hurled into intolerable 
starvation and poverty, are completely deprived of political 
freedom and enjoy no rights. 


1. CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. IMPERIALIST 
DOMINATION OF SOUTH KOREA 

The U.S. imperialists have enforced the most reactionary, colonial- 
military, fascist rule in South Korea for over 20 years. They have con- 
verted it into an absolute colony and military base for aggression and 
have plunged the South Korean people into a living hell where 
poverty and hunger, terrorism and massacre prevail. All sorts of 
brutalities, committed by the U.S. imperialists in the southern hall 
of our country ever since its Liberation, have left a disgraceful page 
in the aggressive history of modern imperialism. 2 

After World War II, the U.S. imperialists supplanted the 
Japanese as the new colonial rulers of South Korea. The main 
purpose of U.S. domination is to turn South Korea into a 
military base for aggression not only against the northern hall 
of the Republic but also against the socialist camp in Asia. To 
this end, it developed a series of specific policies to reorga- 
nize the society, economy, ideology and culture of South 
Korea. This was done through its “military government," 
which continued for two years and nine months after the 
Liberation. 

Immediately after the Liberation, the South Korean people, 
like the North Koreans, overthrew the machinery of Japanese 
imperialism and established people’s committees as theii 


U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA 


195 


own organs of power. However, immediately upon landing in 
South Korea in September 1945, the U.S. imperialists declared 
that they were going to establish a “military government," 
and ordered people’s committees and other organs of sover- 
eignty disbanded. They hoisted a sign “U.S. Military Govern- 
ment" to replace “Government General of Korea," and took 
all power. 

Then the U.S. military suppressed the patriotic democratic 
forces of South Korea on the one hand, and gathered together 
reactionary forces to support the colonial domination, on the 
other. Many of the reactionaries were traitorous pro-Japanese 
who had been exploiting and plundering the Korean people 
in collusion with the Japanese imperialists, and others were 
pro-Americans whom the United States had been supporting 
lor a long time. The central figure of the latter was Syngman 
Rhee.* 

When, in May 1948, the United States finally held the 
separate elections," they cooked up the Syngman Rhee pup- 
pet regime, ignoring the will of the Korean people for the es- 
tablishment of an independent and sovereign state. They in- 
tended to carry out “indirect domination" through this regime 
while at the same time spreading the illusion among the peo- 
ple that they had been given “independence" instead of the 
Government General" of Japanese imperialism. Needless to 
say, the “government of the Republic of Korea," which they 
cooked up, was essentially a continuation of U.S. military 
government, its policies merely an unmodified continuation of 
I Ik* policies of the U.S. military occupation and domination. 

The United States has concluded over 60 treaties and agree- 
ments with the South Korean puppet regime from 1948 to the 
present in order to legalize its domination over South Korea, 
npported by domestic laws formulated by the puppet regime. 


I "°wn in Korea as Li Sung Man, Syngman Rhee had been kept in Hawaii 
‘••I many decades as a reserve puppet of U.S. imperialism. 


196 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 

The most important are the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, 
the ROK-U.S. Administrative Agreement and the ROK-U.S. 
Economic and Technical Agreement. 

On this legal basis the U.S. Embassy was established in the 
Republic of Korea, as well as the U.S. Military Command, U.S. 
International Development Agency, U.S. Information Center 
and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. These agencies 
are used to maintain domination over the South Korean pup- 
pet regime. And since the U.S. Embassy is actually the su- 
preme authority over all phases of life in South Korea, the 
legislative and administrative organs labeled “Republic of 
Korea,” such as the Government and the National Assembly, 
are only formal institutions under the direct control of the 
United States, their activities fully controlled Irom planning 
to execution. 

For instance, according to the ROK-U.S. Economic and 
Technical Agreement, the United States is in a position to 
“check and reexamine without reservation all projects and 
related documents” of the puppet regime and may also de- 
cide the nature and scope of each project.” Further, this agree- 
ment makes it obligatory for the puppet government to “pro- 
vide complete information required by the U.S. Government. 
Likewise, the U.S. Economic Development Agency has the 
right to “prior examination” of all the materials and reports 
from the puppet government concerning the compilation ol 
the national budget to the puppet National Assembly debate 
on the budget. Not only that, the imperialists have the right to 
“post-factum examination,” that is, to revise a bill that has 
already been approved by the puppet National Assembly. 
Thus even the national budget, which is the financial basis 
of the government’s activities, is under the complete eontrol 
of the United States and without its consent, the puppet gov- 
ernment can make no decision at all. 

Further, under the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the 
ROK-U.S. Administrative Agreement and other arrangements. 


U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA 


197 


the United States is vested with the power to use the terri- 
tory, territorial waters and air space of South Korea as an ex- 
tension of U.S. territory. For instance, the United States is 
free to deploy its army and its naval forces within the territory 
of the Republic of Korea at any time, in any number and in 
any place and, furthermore, the United States even enjoys 
“extraterritorial rights” in South Korea. 

U.S. imperialism subjugates South Korea not only politi- 
cally but also militarily. The United States installed military- 
bases in the name of “joint defense,” deploying over 60,000 
U.S. troops in various parts of the country, and it has some 
600,000 South Korean troops as local mercenaries under its 
command. According to the Taejon Agreement and also the 
ROK-U.S. Administrative Agreement, the U.S. Military Com- 
mand controls the puppet army, from the defense budget to 
llie internal life of the national army, so that they are not al- 
lowed to use even a drop of gasoline, let alone arms and am- 
munition, without the consent of the U.S. Military Command. 

The fact that over 50,000 South Korean troops have already 
been mobilized for the aggressive war in Vietnam will suf- 
fice to show the real nature of the puppet “national army.” 

Moreover, U.S. imperialism places South Korea under its 
eontiol economically. Aid is the main means used for ag- 
gression against South Korea and for plundering it. It is classi- 
lird roughly into “military aid” and “economic aid.” Between 
I'll,) and 1968, about $13 billion in “aid” was poured into 
South Korea, of which about $4.2 billion was for “economic 
■ml, ’ and the rest for “military aid,” used directly to equip 
'I"’ 800,000 puppet troops with aircraft, tanks, firearms and 
"llier weapons. “Economic aid” was used to mobilize the 
'"’"Hi Korean economy for U.S. military aggression and for 
- ulonial plunder through manipulation of the so-called “col- 
lilf’ial funds” and other funds — particularly to maintain the 
puppet armed forces and to obtain revenue for military spend- 
ing I hus military and economic aid are complementary-. 


198 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


The U.S. imperialists make the puppet government include 
“aid funds” in the budgetary system in the form of “collateral 
funds,” assuring complete controls over the budget and en- 
abling the puppet government to obtain revenue for military 
spending. 

With respect to defense spending, a large part of which is 
comprised ot the maintenance costs (salaries, etc.) of the pup- 
pet armed forces, the collateral funds included in the revenue 
of the budget reach about 40 to 50 per cent of the total revenue 
and military expenditures account for about 60 to 70 per cent 
of total budget expenditures. The difference is made up by 
tax revenues. In other words, U.S. imperialism is dumping 
its weapons and other surpluses on the South Korean people, 
paid for out of the funds of the puppet regime, while the 
deficit is covered by taxes levied on the South Korean people. 
Thus “aid” is a means of supplying and raising funds for 
maintaining cheap local mercenaries serving U.S. imperial- 
ism. 

Furthermore, since 1958 the U.S. imperialists, as a result ol 
the deepening of the dollar crisis, have been reducing aid. 

However, while cutting back, since 1959 they have been re- 
sorting to credit to supplement their domination. At the end of 
1968, the amount of credits had already reached $588,480,000 
in 159 cases, including both government and private. Credit, 
though different in form, is essentially the same as aid in 
that its aim is to control the South Korean economy and mobi- 
lize to a maximum its military potential at the expense of the 
interests of the people. Furthermore, since the effectuation 
of the ROK-Japan Treaty in 1965, the United States has been 
drawing Japanese monopoly capital into South Korea in an 
attempt to continue its own domination over South Korea 
even if it means turning it into a dual colony of the United 
States and Japan. 

The United States controls not only the budget of South 
Korea but also over 30 per cent of the funds financed, mono]) 


U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA 


199 


olizes 70 to 80 per cent of raw material supplies and 80 per 
cent of South Korean imports, thus establishing a system by 
which it can directly control and plunder individual enter- 
prises. 

The United States also attempts to control South Korea 
ideologically and culturally. The imperialists use the U.S. 
Information Center in the Republic of Korea as their base of 
operation to launch an offensive to benumb the national and 
class consciousness of the people, instill anti-communist and 
pro-American ideas and to spread the so-called American way 
of life to facilitate colonial domination. While suppressing pro- 
gressive ideas and organizations, efforts are made to spread 
reactionary ideas and set up cultural organizations. Films, 
newspapers, magazines, publications and broadcasts are 
utilized fully. Further, the educational system is organized 
in this direction. 

In connection with the U.S. imperialist domination we must 
not overlook the reinvasion of South Korea by Japanese mili- 
tarism. On this subject, Kim II Sung says: “The Japanese 
militarists, dreaming of regaining their old position, have 
started worming their way into South Korea again with the 
backing of U.S. imperialism, and they appeared on the stage 
as a dangerous force of aggression.” 3 

Following the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty, Japa- 
nese militarists seriously have been attempting to reinvade 
South Korea in the areas of politics, military affairs, the econ- 
omy, ideology and culture. They have an embassy to which 
l hey dispatch military attaches. They are investing “aid 
funds” in South Korea at an annual rate of $30 million, a total 
of $50 million in the name of “property claim funds,” and the 
amount of government and private credits totaled about 
$4 10,380,000 at the end of 1968. Japan ranks second only to 
die United States in the amount of government credits granted 
lo South Korea, and exceeds the United States in the amount 
of private credits. 


200 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


However, this does not change the fact that while remaining 
the real ruler of South Korea, it was the United States that 
brought about the ROK-Japan treaty, helping to revive Japa- 
nese militarism, and invited Japan into South Korea. Obvi- 
ously, the intent of U.S. imperialism was to save its Par East- 
ern strategy and its system of colonial domination in South 
Korea from a direct crisis — a crisis which found concrete ex- 
pression in the collapse of the Syngman Rhee regime as a re- 
sult of the popular uprising of April 1960, and other internal 
developments. The purpose was to reinforce the domination 
of South Korea by U.S. imperialism. Therefore, the steps to- 
ward joint colonialization of South Korea by the United States 
and Japan do not signify that the former means to give Japan 
an equal footing, but intends to keep it as a junior partner to 
bolster its own dominant position in South Korea. The result, 
however, is to raise an additional — and ominous threat for 
the Korean people. Although a component part of the U.S. 
system of command, the participation of Japanese armed 
forces in joint operations with the puppet ROK foices, as pio- 
vided for in the ROK-Japan treaty, brings the threat sharply 
home. 

In the realm of political domination the Japanese are also 
active. There are yen as well as dollar collateral funds, signil>- 
ing Japan's role in South Korean affairs, although the yen 
funds serve to make up for a decrease in the dollar collateral 
funds (used for military purposes, it should be noted) follow- 
ing the dollar crisis and the consequent reduction of U.S. 

“aid." . . , i . 

Similarly, Japanese credits are granted as a link in the chain 

of measures for the militarization of the South Korean econ- 
omy as required by U.S. policy, and are placed under the con- 
trol of the United States. Consequently, Japanese monopoly 
capital is permitted to have a share of the hunting ground in 
exchange for its positive service to the U.S. policy of coloniz- 
ing South Korea and turning it into a military base. In this way, 


U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA 


201 


the reinvasion by Japanese expansionists, thus far at any rate, 
is fused with and basically reinforces domination established 
by the United States, in politics, military affairs and the econ- 
omy. But as the revival of Japanese monopoly capital and 
militarism proceeds, Japanese imperialism may be expected 
to attempt a more direct role in East Asia. 

“After occupying South Korea,” wrote Kim 11 Sung, “the 
U.S. imperialists partially reorganized the social and economic 
relations of South Korea in order to create a basis more favora- 
ble for their colonial domination.” 4 

Colonial domination by the United States is based on the 
old reactionary social and economic system, reorganized to 
facilitate American requirements. Essentially, the socio- 
economic relations, even as modified by U.S. imperialism, 
retain the colonial and semi-feudal characteristics which 
existed under Japanese rule. There are three types of the 
economy: capitalist, feudal, and small-scale commodity pro- 
duction. Actually, changes in class relations effected in con- 
nection with the reorganization have resulted in a further 
intensification of socio-economic contradictions. 

The basic class composition remains essentially the same 
as under Japanese imperialism; capitalists and workers, land- 
lords and peasants, as well as petty-bourgeois in urban areas 
and reactionary bureaucrats serving the colonization policy of 
(ho United States. The capitalist class consists of comprador 
capitalists and national capitalists; the peasantry of rich farm- 
ers, medium and poor peasants, and hired peasants; and the 
urban petty-bourgeoisie includes handicraftsmen and small 
merchants. 

While retaining the class composition basically intact, the 
United States reorganized it to a certain extent to suit the new 
historical conditions. Class supporters were recruited as U.S. 
agents, while at the same time measures were taken to side- 
hack the revolutionary advance of the working masses. This 


202 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 

was accompanied by a series of changes that had not been ob- 
served under Japanese imperialist rule. 

The United States made serious efforts to foster comprador 
capitalists in order to dispose of the surplus commodities pro- 
duced at home, to help private monopoly capitalists export 
capital to South Korea and to procure a part of military sup- 
plies locally. A main lever was the “sale of enemy assets” to 
comprador capitalists; they were also accorded monopoly 
rights in the purchase and sale of “aid” goods as well as 
preferential treatment in financing “government” loans. Later, 
under conditions of reduced “aid,” introduction of foreign 
capital into South Korea served as a shot in the arm to the com- 
pradors. In this way, their ranks, insignificant in the days of 
Japanese imperialist rule, today have grown into ten major 
financial groups, comprised of about 500 entrepreneurs clus- 
tered around top comprador capitalists. They now occupy a 
leading position in the key industries. 

As soon as they occupied South Korea, the U.S. imperialists 
issued Military Ordinance No. 2, by which they took posses- 
sion of all the public and private assets held by Japanese 
imperialism — both movable and fixed— as “enemy assets. 
These “enemy assets” were made with the sweat and blood 
of the Korean people and should have been returned to 
them immediately after the Liberation. These assets, accord- 
ing to an official announcement made in those days, were 
tremendous, amounting to as much as 80 per cent of the total 
assets of South Korea. By taking over all these “enemy assets,” 
the United States was able to control the main arteries of the 
South Korean economy at one stroke. 

Renamed “returned assets” in May 1948 as soon as the pup- 
pet regime was cooked up, they came under the control ol 
that regime, at least in form. Now they were fully utilized by 
the U.S. occupation authorities as a lever to colonize the Soutli 
Korean economy. Those necessary for colonizing South Korea 
and converting it into a military base were renamed “state-run 


U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA 


203 


enterprises” or were “sold” to comprador capitalists; others, 
considered unnecessary, were destroyed. 

The “returned assets” were “sold” to compradors for next 
to nothing, at a price less than one-tenth of market value, and 
the payment was to be made in equal installments spaced 
over 10 to 15 years. Further, spiraling currency inflation made 
the sale of “returned assets” little different from distribution 
without compensation. The industrial enterprises sold to com- 
pradors were mostly light manufacturing, particularly flour 
milling and textile plants. This is closely related to the fact 
that farm surpluses given South Korea as aid were mostly 
wheat and raw cotton, and it was intended to have the com- 
pradors process them. Consequently, the comprador capital- 
ists were supported by trade and also by engagement in light 
industries, particularly the “three whites” -flour milling, 
sugar refining and cotton spinning. As the number of com- 
prador capitalists developed under Japanese rule was limited, 
some “returned assets” were also sold to landlords who were 
thus turned into compradors. 

In this way, by the end of 1958, about 92 per cent of 2,203 
enterprises, in the form of “returned assets,” had been sold to 
private enterpreneurs. Further, U.S. imperialists today are 
helping compradors to expand their business operations from 
light to heavy and chemical industries with the aid of foreign 
capital. This, too, is basically a link in the chain of measures 
lor militarizing the economy and for placing it firmly on a war- 
time footing. 

During the last ten years, U.S. monopoly corporations have 
directly invested their capital in enterprises in the textile, 
electronic, and other industries in South Korea. In these enter- 
prises the Korean people are compelled to work at starvation 
wages and under colonial conditions, while the U.S. monop- 
olies boast of reaping profits of 1,000 per cent and more. The 
goods produced in these factories are almost all for export to 
the United States and other countries. They claim the aim is 


204 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


to develop South Korea, but, in fact, they are only stealing the 
labor power of the people for their own profit. Also, in such 
enterprises, important war goods are produced for use in ag- 
gression against the Vietnamese and other peoples. 

On the countryside, the feudal system of exploitation, favor- 
able for colonial domination and plunder, has been basically 
preserved. The “land reform” was no more than a fraudulent 
measure to appease the demand of the South Korean peasants 
for land, which had been stimulated by the land reform car- 
ried out in the northern half of the Republic. Even after en- 
forcement of the “land reform” in South Korean, feudal rela- 
tions of exploitation continued to dominate the countryside, 
and the landholdings of peasants became smaller. About 
100,000 landlords account for 40 per cent of the total arable 
land, on which they exploit 1,400,000 peasant households. 
Land rentals in kind reach as much as 50 to 60 per cent of the 
harvest. 

In this way, the landlords and compradors are identified 
with colonial domination by U.S. imperialism and provide a 
class support for it. 

Having established a system of domination, the U.S. impe- 
rialists are foisting an unprecedented, barbarous military dic- 
tatorship on the South Korean people. There is a police force 
of about 160,000 men, augmented by 400,000 special political 
agents. Some 32,000 bureaucrats are directly or indirectly in 
collusion with the ruling circles of the United States and with 
the landlords and compradors, serving to maintain the colo- 
nial, semifeudal society by directing and enforcing traitorous 
policies. All these factors are major obstacles to the develop- 
ment of the South Korean economy and the democratization 
of its social life. 

In supporting comprador capitalists and protecting the 
feudal landlord system, the method used by the United States 
differed from that employed by the Japanese. The latter 
openly had supported the tenant system in Korea and main- 


U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA 


205 


tained big landlord exploitation. The United States maintains 
feudal exploitation but emphasizes medium and small land- 
lords. It continues the basic system, although with modifica- 
tion, as we shall see, because: 

First, it wants to utilize the landlord class and the comprador 
capitalists to strengthen colonial rule, particularly as a base 
for suppressing the revolutionary forces in the countryside. 
In South Korea, a backward agricultural area, the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the population is engaged on the land. 

Second, even from a backward agriculture the United States 
can obtain, on the spot, foodstuffs and other crops needed for 
aggression and war. Further, the system hastens the pauper- 
ization of the peasantry and increases the number of “under- 
employed, who can be enlisted more easily into the puppet 
army. Thus, the system forces the peasantry to carry a larger 
military burden. 

Third, the system maintains feudal production relations, 
thus restricting the development of agricultural productive 
forces and provides conditions favorable for the disposal of 
U.S. farm surpluses. 

To this end, the United States and its puppets carried out 
the fraudulent “land reform” in October 1950 to reorganize 
the feudal relations of landownership. By it, landlords were 
allowed to possess legally a restricted but considerable area 
of land for their own cultivation. Land was distributed to about 
1,550,000 farming households with compensation, but it 
amounted to only 490,000 chongbo (or about 32.5 per cent) 
of the total area of 1,447,359 chongbo that was cultivated by 
tenant peasants under the Japanese. 

Forests, wasteland, reclaimed land and river embankments 
were excepted from the land reform, and landlords were al- 
lowed to retain these areas without limit. In exchange for the 
land purchased from them, the United States issued to land- 
lords securities with which to purchase “returned assets”; 
thus some landlords became comprador capitalists. The end 


206 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 

result was to retain the landlord system, although in a some- 
what hidden form, with medium and small landlords as the 
core. 

Not only were high prices set on land distributed to cultiva- 
tors, but land taxes and an irrigation tax and other taxes were 
levied on the newly created landholders. These taxes proved 
an unbearable burden on the peasants, and they were compel- 
led to sell their land. Thus, more than 40 per cent of the dis- 
tributed land was reclaimed by the landlords and rich farm- 
ers. As a result, some 1.2 million peasant households, about 50 
per cent of the total number of peasant households in South 
Korea, work as tenants and have to turn over to the landlords 
50 to 60 per cent of their harvests as land rentals in kind. Fur- 
ther, peasants are being squeezed at a high annual interest 
rate of 70 to 100 per cent by moneylenders. In South Korea, 
poor peasants till only 0.2 to 0.5 of a chongbo of land, and are 
small-scale commodity producers. 

The poor peasants, along with hired rural proletarians, ac- 
count for 73.3 per cent of the total farming households of 
South Korea, but the land they cultivate is only 45 per cent of 
total arable land. The poor peasants, who also work as hired 
laborers, are semi-proletarians who suffer from increasing ex- 
ploitation and are going bankrupt. Thus the landlords, main- 
taining their dominant position in the countryside, are the 
basic exploiters as well as the main agents of U.S. imperialism. 

Nationally owned economy, outside the direct grip of U.S. 
imperialism and its compradors, is in a state of decline. The 
national capitalists, of whom there are some 50,000, are robbed 
by foreign monopolists and compradors, and suffer from lack 
of funds, materials and markets. Their factories and plants are 
operating at the average annual rate of about 40 to 50 per cent 
of capacity, and every year over 1,000 enterprises close down. 
In addition, the South, once called the granary of Korea, is in 
a state of chronic starvation, importing annually several mil- 
lion suk of rice. Several million people are jobless or partially 
employed. 


207 


U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA 

The national culture, mores and customs of the Korean peo- 
ple are being trampled underfoot, and the decadent American 
way of life is destroying the fiber of South Korean society. 


2. REAL NATURE OF THE PAK CHUNG HI REGIME 

In the light of the U.S. role in South Korea — its colonial, 
military-fascist control which it is trying to conceal by stress- 
ing the “independence” of the puppet regime — it is of special 
importance to understand the real nature of that regime. 

The Korean people are a single nation and have only one state and 
one government [says Kim II Sung]. The only stale of the Korean 
nation is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the govern- 
ment of the DPRK alone represents the real national interests and 
will of all the people of North and South Korea. The so-called 
“Republic of Korea” is a puppet regime which can never represent 
the South Korean people nor exercise any sovereignty . 5 

The DPRK differs from the puppet regime of South Korea 
in that, first, the government of the Republic is patriotic and 
anti-imperialist, whereas that of South Korea is traitorous. The 
Republic is led by patriotic revolutionary fighters who have 
fought against foreign aggressors for the liberation and inde- 
pendence of the fatherland. The successive rulers of South 
Korea have been, without exception, stooges fostered by the 
U.S. and Japanese imperialists who have sold the country and 
the nation to their masters. As for the present rulers who form 
the South Korean puppet regime today, they are also traitors 
who have betrayed the country and the people. 

While Korean communists, led by Kim 11 Sung, waged a 
bloody 15-year war against Japanese imperialism, the present 
South Korean rulers swore allegiance to the enemy. They are 
traitors who suppressed and murdered the revolutionaries 
and patriots who fought the Japanese. And, after the defeat 
of Japanese imperialism, they changed their master and be- 
came the faithful lackeys of the United States. 


208 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


While the DPRK is a sovereign and independent power, 
South Korea is an out-and-out colonial and dependent country. 
All domestic and foreign external policies of the Republic 
reflect the national interests and will of the Korean people and 
encompass the principles of political independence, econom- 
ic self-reliance and military self-defense. In contrast, U.S. 
domination is firmly established in the politics, military af- 
fairs, ideology and culture of South Korea, and the puppet 
regime is merely a compliant tool for their policy of war. 

The Republic has a genuine people’s government which 
represents and defends the interests of working people — 
workers and peasants — whereas puppet South Korea is anti- 
people and reactionary, representing the interests of land- 
lords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats. The 
power of the DPRK is made up of representatives of the 
people, and government bodies at all levels include legitimate 
representatives of the people, elected by secret ballot on the 
principle of democratic and direct election. 

In the puppet regime of South Korea reactionary bureau- 
crats, spokesmen for the landlords and comprador capitalists, 
occupy leading positions; they are allied closely with the U.S. 
imperialists, whose interests they serve. The South Korean 
regime does not include even one representative of workers 
or peasants but is made up only of reactionaries and exploiters. 
For example, the First National Assembly (May 1948) con- 
sisted of landlords (42.4 per cent), comprador capitalists 
(16.2 per cent), reactionary bureaucrats (21.7 per cent), rep- 
resentatives of cultural and religious organizations (7.6 per 
cent), and others (12.1 per cent). In the Fourth National As- 
sembly (May 1958), the proportion of landlords was reduced 
to 12.4 per cent and that of comprador capitalists was increased 
to 38.6 per cent, but the basic composition remained un- 
changed. The composition of the Seventh National Assembly 
(June 1967) of the Pak Chung Hi regime is 4.6 per cent land- 
lords, 28.0 per cent comprador capitalists, 32.0 per cent reac- 


U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA 


209 


tionary bureaucrats, 5.7 per cent 'political merchants” and 
29.7 per cent military and others. The great importance of the 
military in the present setup reflects the political direction 
of U.S. imperialism — a strengthened military-fascist system. 

The United States began preparing for a new war in Korea 
before the ink on the armistice agreement of 1953 was dry. 
War preparations were stepped up after President Johnson 
visited Korea and emphasized the "position of strength” 
policy in October 1966, and particularly after the Pueblo 
incident. At that time, the Pak Chung Hi regime, to keep 
pace with the maneuvers of the United States, increased the 
strength of the puppet army, improved its equipment, and 
took measures to make it combat-ready and put it on a wartime 
footing. The regime called up reserves, suspended the de- 
mobilization of army officers and men, lengthened the term 
of military service and took various other "emergency” 
measures. It increased the strength of the army by one division 
and formed a "motorized attack battalion” for each of the 10 
reserve divisions, placing them under army headquarters. At 
the same time 2,620,000 civilians were recruited into what is 
called the "native land reserve forces” to reinforce the puppet 
army. 

The United States and the Pak Chung Hi regime, while 
preparing South Korea for war, are carrying out vicious war 
provocations and armed attacks on the North more and more 
openly. The number of provocations is increasing. Between 
the armistice and April 20, 1968 there were over 54,800 inci- 
dents on land, some 990 on the sea, and over 730 in the air. The 
number rose sharply after the Pueblo affair, with 8,400 inci- 
dents and over 194,000 rounds of ammunition shot into the 
northern half of the Republic between capture of the Pueblo 
and October 20, 1968. 

In addition, the wartime general mobilization setup was 
lightened. Fascist laws were passed to implement the military 
dictatorship. The Pak Chung Hi gang, in 1967, cooked up an 


210 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


“election” for president and for the national assembly, result- 
ing in a so-called “legislative organ” dominated by the 
military and comprising comprador capitalists and reactionary 
bureaucrats. In 1968, the army succeeded in putting military- 
fascists in almost all the top official posts and in all important 
law enforcement and police posts. The puppet police have 
been placed on a sub-wartime footing, and terror and violence 
increase as they are being equipped with new weapons. 

Since the start of the Pak Chung Hi regime, the budget for 
military spending has risen more than four times, and govern- 
ment investments in military industries have been increasing. 
As a result of the militarization of the economy, which is being 
effected in the name of modernization, some industrial sectors 
directly related to military uses, such as telecommunication, 
road construction, railways, port and harbor facilities, are 
growing and the military potential is being increased further. 

To obtain funds for the militarization of the economy, the 
ROK government actively encourages foreign investment and 
as a result the South Korean economy is more and more de- 
pendent on foreign capital. Actual foreign investments in 
South Korea reached $1,508,120,000 by the end of 1968; if 
“approved” cases are included, the total was $1,850,000,000. 
A large part is invested in roads, railways, telecommunica- 
tions, power, ports and harbor construction and airports to 
increase the mobility of the armed forces, as well as in stra- 
tegic industries such as oil refining, cement, fertilizer, power 
and construction. The dependence of the economy became 
more marked particularly after the conclusion of the ROK- 
Japan Treaty, as militarization accentuated subordination of 
South Korea to both U.S. and Japanese monopoly capital. 

Because of the contradictions inherent in it, militarization 
deepens the crisis of the economy, which is reflected in the 
foreign currency shortage, the collapse of medium and small 
enterprises, and the devastation of agriculture. 

While according all kinds of preferential treatment to the 


U.S. IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH KOREA 


211 


compradors, the Pak Chung Hi regime prevents national 
capital from obtaining funds and taxes it heavily. Under these 
circumstances, medium and small enterprises, which com- 
prise 98.3 per cent of the total, are finding it very hard to 
survive. In 1968 alone, 157 enterprises closed down in South 
Chungchong province, over 140 in Kyonggi province, 150 in 
Seoul. In North Kyongsang province, 82 per cent of the total 
number of medium and small enterprises and in South Kyong- 
sang province two-thirds suspended or went out of business. 

Despite slogans of “agriculture first,” and “modernization” 
coined by Pak Chung Hi and his clique, agriculture is falling 
into a most serious kind of bankruptcy. On top of effects of 
policies already described, because of the great drought in two 
successive years, the 1968 crops were very meager, in some 
areas decreasing 80 to 90 per cent. In South Cholla province, 
80 per cent of all acreage under cultivation was affected. 
Crops in Kangjin, Hwasun and Haenam, in the same province, 
were totally destroyed. 

In view of all this, it is a wonder the South Korean people 
can stay alive. According to a survey by the Economic Plan- 
ning Board, the average monthly living cost for a family of 
five in the cities of South Korea is 23,530 won; the average 
monthly wage of workers in the manufacturing industries was 
only 7,730 won in November 1968.* 

Almost all workers barely manage to live, earning wages 
less than one-fourth or one-third of the cost of living. There is 
an 8-hour work day at only 43.3 per cent of all mining and 
manufacturing industries of South Korea; up to 12 hours at 
23.3 per cent and more than 12 hours at 33.4 per cent, accord- 
ing to a survey by the ROK Industrial Health Association, as 
reported by the March 9, 1968 issue of the Kyonghyang Shin- 
mun. Thus South Korean workers are exhausted, physically 

* About $25 at the official buying rate of 305 South Korean icon per dollar, 
considerably less at the black market rate. 


212 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


and mentally, many toiling as long as 12 or 15 hours a day in 
poor working conditions and subjected to speed-up. For in- 
stance, in the first five months of 1968 alone, 11,500 labor 
accidents were reported, involving 11,700 workers, of which 
158 were killed, a two-fold increase over the comparable 
period of the previous year. 

The conditions of the peasantry are also beyond description. 
Even according to conservative figures released by the puppet 
regime, more than four million peasants were hit by drought 
in South Korea in 1968, of whom 2.6 million were said to be 
so hard hit that they were unable to lead even a hand-to-mouth 
existence. In the Ryongnam and Ilonam districts, where the 
peasants were hit hard by the drought in 1968 — as they were 
in the previous year— 98 per cent of all peasant households 
had no grain stock. In September and October when they 
harvested grain, two million peasant households, accounting 
for 80 per cent of the total farming households in South 
Korea, were suffering from the shortage of food. It is estimated 
that the number of peasants who left their villages in a vain 
search for other means of livelihood reached 30 per cent of all 
the peasants. It is also reported that over 300,000 rural stu- 
dents are dropping out of school to go to work in larger cities. 

All this shows [Kim II Sung points out] that the actual rulers, hold- 
ing real power in South Korea, are no less than the U.S. imperialists 
themselves. The so-called “Republic of Korea” has been in exist- 
ence, to all intents and puiposes, as a camouflage to “legalize” the 
military occupation and cloak colonial rule and has served as a faith- 
ful instrument in the execution of the aggressive policy of U.S. 
imperialism . 6 


CHAPTER II 


Tasks and Methods 
of the South Korean Revolution 


The South Korean revolution is an important component 
part of the Korean revolution, a revolution to liberate the 
southern half of Korea and two-thirds of the population still 
under foreign domination. Kim II Sung made a scientific 
analysis of the concrete socio-economic and class relations in 
South Korea and the development of the revolution, and on 
this basis, he formulated a strategic and tactical line for the 
South Korean revolution. 

The South Korean revolution is an anti-imperialist, anti- 
feudal democratic revolution. The main target of struggle is 
U.S. imperialism, and the main link in the chain of struggle 
against it is to frustrate the invasion maneuvers of Japanese 
militarism. In addition, the struggle against domestic counter- 
revolutionaries allied with U.S. imperialism is important in 
undermining the influence of imperialism and leading to 
victory of the revolution. 

The motivating force of the South Korean revolution is the 
working class and its allies — peasants, youths, students, 
intellectuals, the urban petty-bourgeoisie and even national 
capitalists. The policy for carrying out the South Korean 
revolution is based on the principle that all struggles are part 
of the battle for the seizure of power and that victory in the 
decisive battle can be achieved only by revolutionary vio- 
lence. This principle is derived from the historical fact that 
no colonial rulers or reactionary governments have ever 
voluntarily surrendered power without being overthrown by 


213 


214 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


revolutionary violence, and also from the realities of U.S.- 
ruled South Korea. In addition, to win people's power, it is 
necessary to meet counter-revolutionary violence with 
revolutionary violence and to smash the domination of U.S. 
imperialism to achieve freedom and liberation. 


1. REVOLUTIONARY TASKS OF THE 
SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 

The occupation of South Korea by U.S. imperialism and its aggres- 
sive policy [writes Kim 11 Sung] is the source of all misery and suf- 
fering of the compatriots in the South. The South Korean people 
should fight more stubbornly to oppose the occupation of South 
Korea by U.S. imperialism, smash its colonial rule and overthrow its 
stooges — the landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary 
bureaucrats. 1 

The colonial social, political and economic systems in 
South Korea, established by the United States, hinder the 
development of society and national unification. They min 
the economy and force the people into the depths of misery, 
fomenting sharp social and class contradictions. The basic 
contradiction in South Korea at the present stage is between 
U.S. imperialism, landlords, comprador capitalists and reac- 
tionary bureaucrats, on the one hand, and the workers, 
peasants, urban petty-bourgeoisie and national capitalists, 
on the other. 

The basic task of the South Korean revolution is to liquidate 
U.S. domination, to guarantee the democratic development of 
South Korean society and to achieve national unification with 
the socialist forces of North Korea. The targets of the revolu- 
tion are the aggressive forces of the United States, and the 
landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats 
who are allied with it. 

Thus, the South Korean revolution at the present stage is an 


THE SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION 


215 


anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution to carry 
out the tasks of an anti-imperialist national liberation revo- 
lution and an anti-feudal democratic revolution. 

To solve the complex contradictions existing in South 
Korean society, there have to be two revolutionary stages — the 
anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution and the 
socialist revolution. However, these two stages are not clearly 
delineated nor are they independent of each other: they are 
two stages in the continuing development of the revolution. 

When all the factors of the South Korean revolution are thus 
defined, the next question posed is: What strategic line should 
be taken to effect the revolution? Kim 11 Sung, defining U.S. 
imperialism as the main target of struggle, said: “In order for 
the Korean people to win freedom and liberation, it is neces- 
sary for them to drive out the aggressive forces of U.S. im- 
perialism and smash the landlords, comprador capitalists and 
reactionary bureaucrats who are their allies." 2 

Directing the spearhead of struggle against U.S. imperial- 
ism is part of the strategic plan to accelerate the general 
collapse of the counter-revolutionary forces and hasten the 
victory of the revolution by isolating the main enemy and 
concentrating attacks on it. This strategic policy is related 
to the fact that the basic contradictions in South Korean society 
are complex and there is no single target. 

The basic contradictions consist of two component parts: 
(1) the contradiction between U.S. imperialism and the South 
Korean people and (2) the contradiction between the land- 
lords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats, on 
the one hand, and the people, on the other. 

However, the two component parts have different roles to 
play; but occupying the most important position and playing a 
decisive role is U.S. imperialism. The puppet “regime" is 
wholly dependent on the United States; in itself it is very 
weak politically, economically and militarily. Consequently 
the main strategic attack should be toward driving out this 


216 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


dominating force. Only if attacks are made on the U.S. aggres- 
sors and on the comprador capitalists at the same time will it 
be possible to overthrow the imperialist forces and destroy 
the counter-revolutionary forces. It is also necessary to strug- 
gle against the feudal forces if they are also to be eliminated. 

Following the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty, the 
Japanese militarists have made substantial inroads in South 
Korea. Under direction of the United States, they are in collu- 
sion with reactionary forces of South Korea to exploit and 
plunder the people. Thus we cannot relax our struggle against 
the Japanese militarists. 

Referring to the struggle against revived and armed Japa- 
nese imperialism as part of the struggle against U.S. imperial- 
ism, Kim II Sung said: 

It is important, in the struggle of the South Korean people for 
national independence and unification, to shatter the aggressive 
schemes of Japanese militarism. . . . 

All South Korean patriots must wage a decisive struggle to abro- 
gate the “ROK-Japan Treaty” and frustrate any aggressive designs 
by the Japanese militarist forces against South Korea. This struggle 
is, at the same time, part of the struggle against U.S. colonial dom- 
ination . 3 

Only after the U.S. forces and their agents are overthrown 
and reinvasion by Japanese militarism is prevented can the 
South Korean people win freedom and liberation. 

Another problem in connection with the South Korean 
revolution is to formulate a correct strategic policy to mobilize 
all the revolutionary forces in such a manner that they have 
maximum effect. Only in this way can the revolutionary forces 
achieve overwhelming superiority in the balance of forces 
between the revolution and the enemy, and can the counter 
revolutionary forces be routed. 

The South Korean people must carry out the revolution al 
the present stage on their own, with a perspective of an un 
interrupted revolution; the people of the northern half ol 


I HE SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION 


217 


I lie Republic are not in a position to fight for the South Korean 
people, in their place, although they can aid their southern 
brothers. This principle should be the basis for struggle, 
oner the balance of class forces in South Korea, their circum- 

• lances and political attitudes to the revolution, are analyzed 
scientifically. 

The workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, national 

• apitalists and others— -all may be part of the motive power 
■ >l the revolution, even though there are certain differences 
.nnong them affecting the relation of forces and in their 
political attitudes. In defining the main force of the revolution 
uni its auxiliary forces Kim II Sung said: 

by the main force of the revolution is meant the basic class that 

• .in he mobilized in the revolution, and the Marxist-Leninist party 
mils! he deeply rooted in it. Only when the main classes of the 
•neiety, workers and peasants, are mobilized under the leadership 

• * I Marxist-Leninist party can a revolution triumph . 4 

Thus the Marxist-Leninist party in South Korea should be 
I lengthened as amass party deeply rooted among the workers 
ind peasants. Today, the working class of South Korea is the 
most revolutionary class, fighting for the victory of the revolu- 
linn in South Korea. It is part of the revolutionary Korean 
working class that fought so bravely in the anti-Japanese 
national liberation struggle. 

Simultaneously, it is of decisive significance to organize the 
peasantry as a main contingent of the South Korean revolution. 
Hie peasantry comprises 65 per cent of the total population of 
South Korea: 95 per cent of the farming population are work- 
ing peasants and 77 per cent are poor or hired. They are 
doubly or triply exploited and oppressed. There has been a 
worker-peasant alliance since the 1930’s and peasants share 
with workers the most miserable social and class position. 

The core of the South Korean revolution is the Marxist- 
Leninist party, armed with the revolutionary ideas of Kim II 
Sung. The Party must be developed as the general staff of the 


278 


REVOLUTIONS IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


revolution and must lead the revolution if its growth and 
progress are to be expected. It is important, in building such a 
party, to form ranks of leading cadres and to expand and 
strengthen the ranks of the Party through practical struggles, 
to train and qualitatively improve the party with experienced 
revolutionary cadres. To improve the quality of Party mem- 
bers is an important factor in increasing the fighting capacity 
of the Party. The situation in South Korea demands it. 

What is important, next, is to rally workers and peasants 
around mass organizations as well as around the Party. In 
this way, while a strong Marxist-Leninist party is built, a very 
effective contingent will be formed for the Korean revolution. 
In this respect, Kim I] Sung says: 

The important task in organizing revolutionary forces in South 
Korea is to rally masses of people in all walks of life around a united 
front. South Korean intellectuals, youths, students, urban petty 
bourgeoisie, conscientious national bourgeoisie and all other people 
in all walks of life who cherish democracy, should be included in a 
united front . 5 

A united front is necessary to create conditions favorable for 
organizing the main contingent of the revolution. It can be the 
rallying point for broad masses, isolating the counter-revolu- 
tionary forces and weakening enemy attacks on the main 
forces of the revolution. Further, it can protect the revolution- 
ary forces and expand and strengthen them. Such a united 
front also can create forces in support of the main contingent 
of the revolution. People in various walks of life cannot be the 
main force of the revolution, but when they work together 
with workers and peasants they become an important supple- 
mentary force that can deal a blow at the counter-revolution- 
ary forces. 

Consequently, it is necessary to consolidate the main force 
of the revolution and, at the same time, to concentrate on 
developing a united front to win various strata of the people 
to the side of the revolution. 


THE SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION 


279 


At the present stage, the concepts that can be a basis for a 
coalition of different political forces are liquidation of U.S. 
imperialist colonial rule and establishment of people's power, 
democratization of South Korean society, and national unifica- 
tion. The basic policy of the Marxist-Leninist party is to in- 
crease the leading role of the Party and strengthen the worker- 
peasant alliance in forming the anti-American national salva- 
tion united front. As Kim II Sung writes: 

What is important next is to weaken the counter-revolutionary 
forces. To weaken the counter-revolutionary forces is synonymous 
with strengthening the revolutionary forces. It is necessary to con- 
centrate every effort not only on strengthening the revolutionary 
forces but also on weakening the counter-revolutionary forces in 
politics, the economy, culture, military affairs and in all other areas . 6 

The army is the last stronghold of the ruling classes. The 
history of revolutions shows that when the army is on the side 
of the people, no ruling class can survive. At present, the 
officers of the South Korean Army are men of reactionary class 
origin, but the overwhelming majority of the soldiers and low- 
ranking officers are of working class and peasant origin. When 
the soldiers of the “National Army" become class conscious, 
the “National Army" of South Korea will be on the side of the 
revolution. 


2. FORMS OF STRUGGLE IN THE 
SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION 


The South Korean people can wipe out the oppressors and attain 
genuine freedom and liberation only by their own determined 
struggle. The South Korean people should wage a struggle to drive 
the U.S. imperialists out of South Korea and demolish their colonial 
rule in close combination with the struggle to seize power, and 
should subordinate all forms of struggle to it. . . . 


220 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


But whatever their forms, these struggles should all be prepara- 
tory to the decisive struggle for winning power, and this decisive 
struggle can be victorious only by using force . 7 

Kim II Sung’s perspective for the revolution is based not 
only on a scientific analysis of the present relations of forces 
between the revolution and the counter-revolution and on the 
prospect of the development of these relations. It is based 
also on a correct analysis of the peculiarities of the South 
Korean revolution as an important component of the all-Korea 
revolution as well as of the international situation in relation 
to the South Korean revolution. 

The struggle to drive out the United States and overthrow 
its colonial rule is a sharp class battle between the revolution- 
ary and counter-revolutionary forces. The strategy and tactics 
of this battle cannot be decided arbitrarily but is related to 
subjective and objective factors, particularly the resistance of 
the reactionary ruling classes. In order to retain their domina- 
tion the reactionary classes take ruthless, suppressive meas- 
ures against the people fighting for their freedom and libera- 
tion. Counter-revolutionary violence is the method the 
exploiting classes use to stay in power. 

The United States, leader of world imperialism, is deter- 
mined to maintain its rule in South Korea and to resort to any 
means to achieve domination over the northern half of the 
Republic and Asia. Actually, when faced with serious crises 
because of the heroic struggles of the South Korean people, 
the U.S. imperialists mobilized armed forces and took bloody 
and suppressive measures against the people. When the Syng- 
man Rhee puppet regime was toppled by the April (1960) up- 
rising of the South Korean people, the answer of the U.S. 
imperialists was to establish a nefarious military-fascist 
regime instead of getting out of South Korea. The people have 
to faee counter-revolutionary violence even when they strug- 
gle for better living conditions and for the defense of their 
fundamental rights. 


221 


THE SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION 

Under these conditions, it is foolish to think that the South 
Korean people can win power peacefully. This is what the 
people themselves think after their bitter experiences in the 
past 20-odd years. But this does not negate various other 
forms of struggle in the development and strengthening of 
revolutionary forces. Nor does it mean that the South Korean 
people should engage in leftist, adventurist struggles, because 
of an incorrect assessment of the balance of forces between 
themselves and the enemy. As the history of revolutionary 
struggle shows, adventurism only results in causing serious 
damage to the combined revolutionary forces and a retreat for 
the revolution. However, if one should fail to develop positive 
struggles, waiting for a favorable situation to be created, it 
would be difficult to accumulate revolutionary forces or to 
surmount a difficult phase in the course of the revolution. 

Consequently, in order to develop revolutionary move- 
ments it is necessary to combine various forms of struggle, 
such as political and economic, legal and illegal, violent and 
non-violent, small-scale and large-scale, in keeping with the 
subjective and objective situation at different times, while 
maintaining strict vigilance against left and right deviations. 
And these struggles should be in preparation for a decisive 
battle or violent struggle for the conquest of power. This is 
all the more urgent in view of the complexity and difficulty 
of the South Korean revolution, as stressed by Kim II Sung: 

Many difficulties and obstacles are in store for the South Korean 
revolution. The complexity', difficulty and protracted nature of the 
South Korean revolution are a result of its occupation by the U.S. 
Army and its aggressive policy. . . . It is the concentration point and 
den of domestic reactionaries. . . . U.S. imperialism forms a counter- 
revolutionary force, joining hands with the domestic reactionary 
forces assembled there, and is opposed to the revolutionary forces. 

Anti-communist ideas are deeply rooted in South Korea. . . . Not a 
few people are still deceived by the enemy's anti-communist propa- 
ganda. And this is a great obstacle to the development of the South 
Korean revolution. 


222 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


Under these circumstances, the South Korean revolution has to be 
carried out under very difficult conditions and go through many 
twists and turns. 8 

The complexity and difficulty arise from the fact that the 
counter-revolutionary forces relatively are stronger in the 
balance of forces between the motive power of the revolution 
and the target of the revolution. This is due to the following 
three factors. 

First, the occupation of South Korea by the U.S. Army and 
the U.S. policy of turning South Korea into a colony. The 
United States plunders South Korea as a market for surplus 
goods, as a supply base of strategic raw materials and a source 
of cheap labor power. It regards South Korea as a supply 
base for the occupation of all Korea, as a bridgehead for 
aggression against socialist countries and all of Asia, and as a 
strategic bastion for world domination. The United States will 
continue to make desperate efforts to perpetuate the occupa- 
tion of South Korea and will never pull out on its own. Thus, 
South Korea is one of the sharpest anti-imperialist and anti- 
American fronts of struggle in the world. 

Second, South Korea is a concentration point of domestic 
reaction. U.S. imperialism assembled domestic and foreign 
reactionaries in South Korea and fostered and protected them. 
As a result, in contrast to what happened in North Korea, the 
remnants of Japanese imperialism were not liquidated but 
were transformed into pro-American forces and increased. 
Furthermore, as North Korea strengthened the revolutionary 
struggles and dealt blows at reactionary elements, some land- 
lords, comprador capitalists, pro-Japanese elements, traitors, 
vicious bureaucrats and fascists, fled to join the reactionary 
forces of South Korea. Then, too, not a few reactionaries 
returned from overseas. All these forces are being strength- 
ened under the protection of U.S. imperialism and Japanese 
militarism, as counter-revolutionary forces. 

Third, anti-communist and pro-American ideas have a 


THE SOUTHERN KOREAN REVOLUTION 


223 


certain effect on the South Korean people as a result of U.S. 
imperialism’s propaganda. Japanese imperialism inculcated 
anti-communist ideas in the minds of the people for 36 years. 
The county had an overwhelming majority of petty bour- 
geois and cultural levels were very low. In addition, after the 
Liberation, the United States and its stooges further strength- 
ened anti-communist propaganda. During the Fatherland Lib- 
eration War (1950-53) the people’s army in South Korea tried 
to transform the ideology of the people in the liberated areas, 
but the effect was not significant — the time was very short. As 
a result, a large proportion of the South Korean people are 
deceived by anti-communist propaganda and duped by the 
policies of U.S. imperialism and its stooges. This underlines 
the importance of enlightening and revolutionizing the people. 

However, historical experience shows that the revolution 
will triumph when the united people rise and fight. However 
difficult the revolutionary struggles of the South Korean 
people may be, they are not isolated; they are fighting under 
conditions far more favorable than when the Korean com- 
munists fought for 15 years against Japanese imperialism, 
which boastfully claimed invincibility. The communists had 
no state support and no regular army assistance, nor did they 
have as strong support as they have today from international 
revolutionary forces. 

Today, the South Korean people have the powerful revolu- 
tionary base and enjoy the positive support of North Korea 
which, under the leadership of Kim 11 Sung, considers it its 
duty to do all possible to render support to the southern 
brothers. 


CHAPTER III 


Unification of North and South 


Premier Kim 11 Sung set forth a firm principle of the Work- 
ers Party of Korea and the government of the Republic for the 
solution of the question of national unification and he also 
clarified the revolutionary strategic and tactical policy for its 
realization. 

The basic policy is for the peaceful unification of the North 
and South of Korea on independent and democratic principles, 
without any interference from foreign forces after the United 
States has been driven out of South Korea. It embodies the 
Juche idea and a tactical line that can solve the question of 
national unification best. 

Kim II Sung presented a threefold position — to strengthen 
the forces of socialism in North Korea, gather revolutionary 
forces in South Korea, and to develop the international revo- 
lutionary movement and strengthen ties with it in order to 
achieve success. This tactical line of strengthening the three 
revolutionary forces also defines the interrelations among 
these forces and advances the principle of building the in- 
ternal forces of North and South Korea, while strengthening 
solidarity with the international revolutionary force. 


1. BASIC POLICY ON UNIFICATION 

Since the first days of its formation, the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea has advanced reasonable and concrete proposals 
to unify the country, expressing the unanimous will and desire of the 
entire Korean people, and it has exerted every possible effort to 


224 


UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 


225 


implement these plans. The basic plan is for the North and South to 
unite independently without any interference from outside forces, 
following the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea. Our 
proposals for peaceful unification are fair and realistic, acceptable 
to all . 1 

h.im II Sung s policy as thus outlined is correct because, 
first, it is aimed at solving the question of unification on inde- 
pendent and democratic principles. Independence is the most 
important of the basic principles for unification. It is an em- 
bodiment of the Juche idea that the people of a country should 
assume full responsibility for their revolution and should 
carry out their revolution themselves. No one else must be 
allowed to interfere. 

To solve the question of national unification by relying on 
external foices would be an illusion and lead to national 
suicide. This has been borne out by the experience of our 
country as well as by the historical experience of the national 
liberation struggles of many colonial and dependent countries. 

The Korean people are certainly capable of solving the 
question of unification. Under the leadership of Kim II Sung, 
the Korean people defeated Japanese imperialism and U.S. 
imperialism, which boasted that it was the “mightiest” in the 
world. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a social- 
ist power independent in politics, self-reliant in its economy 
and self-protective in its national defense. Thus a decisive 
guarantee for national unification has already been provided. 

Further, the Jachc idea w r ould solve the question of unifica- 
tion democratically and fairly. In solving problems of a nation, 
the yardstick of fairness is the general will of the people and 
their national interests. Where there is interference by an 
external force, the free will of a nation and its interests would 
be violated. 

Neither the United Nations nor any external force can inter- 
im e in the question of unifying our country. In the past 20 
or more years, the UN has been utilized by the United States 


226 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


as a tool for aggression against Korea, and inasmuch as the flag 
of the UN was used by U.S. imperialism in its aggressive war 
against the Korean people, it has been degraded as a belliger- 
ent. Even today, in the name of the UN, the U.S. Army occu- 
pies South Korea, violating not only the national sovereignty 
of the Korean nation, interfering in the internal affairs of Korea 
and preventing unification, but also completely depriving the 
South Korean people of their political rights and freedoms. 

There are no foreign troops in the northern half of the 
Republic. Consequently, withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
South Korea is a precondition for unification of the fatherland. 
Once this is done, the Workers Party of Korea proposes the 
principle of democracy as a basis for national unification. 1 he 
question of unifying the fatherland is to be solved in a demo- 
cratic way, according to the free will of the people. Refening 
to the principle of democracy, Kim 11 Sung says: When all 

foreign troops have been withdrawn and wc are not subjected 
to any foreign interference, we shall be able to achieve nation- 
al unification by holding a general election in North and 
South Korea on democratic principles and by establishing a 
unified central government.” 2 

Today there are different social systems in the two parts of 
Korea. National unification thus presupposes the removal of 
political and economic barriers separating South from North 
Korea and establishment of a single social and economic sys- 
tem throughout the country. Roth the question of unification 
and of what social and political system should be chosen can 
be decided entirely according to the will of the Korean people. 
This is the only fair way. 

The Party and the government set forth two basic proposals 
to assure that the principle of democracy may be strictly ob- 
served in a North-South general election for national unifica- 
tion: first, the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South 
Korea; second, the free passage of people between North and 
South Korea, democratization of South Korea, and guarantee 


UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 


227 


of free social and political activities — freedom of the press, 
publication, assembly and association must be guaranteed for 
all political parties, mass organizations and individuals in 
North and South Korea. 

All inhabitants should have an equal right to vote and to 
eligibility in all parts of North and South Korea, irrespective 
of political affiliation, political persuasion, property and 
education, leligion and sex. A unified democratic government 
representing the interests of all strata of people can be estab- 
lished only through an election to be held by secret ballot on 
the principles of universal, equal and direct election in a 
completely democratic atmosphere, in which there are no 
factois obstructing or suppressing the free expression of the 
will of the Korean people. Referring to this question, Kim II 
Sung says: 

Our Party and the Government of the Republic have made consist- 
ent efforts to effect a peaceful solution of the Korean question. We 
have no intention of “marching South” nor do we intend to solve the 
question of Korean unification by use of arms. 

“Communist aggression from the North” is no more than a camou- 
llage used by the U.S. imperialists to continue their occupation of 
South Korea and to cloak their nefarious design to invade the whole 
of Korea and subsequently the rest of Asia . 3 

W T hy have the Workers Party of Korea and the government 
ol the Republic been making consistent efforts to realize the 
unification of the fatherland peacefully? This approach is 
derived from their class position. As historical facts show, an 
aggressive war is, by its nature, launched by imperialists and 
monopoly capitalists, and the working masses, beginning with 
I lie working class, never invade another country or start a war, 
although they may fall victims to imperialist wars. This is 
obvious from the class nature of aggressive wars. 

Because the government of the Republic is a genuine peo- 
ple’s power, representing and defending the interests of 
workers, peasants and other working people, it fosters peace- 


228 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


ful unification and is making efforts to effect it. Also, although 
the government of the Republic is not afraid of war, it does not 
want a fratricidal war. Instead, in accord with the national 
interests of the Korean people and the peace-loving peoples 
of Asia and the world, the government of the Republic calls 
for peaceful unification. Then, too, there is a fair prospect of 
unifying the fatherland by peaceful means and there is a 
realistic and rational method for achieving this aim. 

Since the Liberation, the Party and the government have 
made all possible efforts toward this goal according to the 
above stated basic policy. But, the U.S. imperialists and t ie 
successive puppet rulers of South Korea have refused on evei> 
occasion to accept this program and consistently have replied 
to our efforts with aggressive, provocative acts. 

Immediately after Liberation, the Party at its inaugural 
Congress on October 10, 1945 projected the policy of “estab- 
lishing a democratic people’s republic that will guarantee the 
complete sovereignty and independence of our nation by 
broadly rallying patriotic and democratic forces. Under the 
leadership of Kim 11 Sung, the Party concentrated its efforts on 
peaceful unification of the fatherland, based on the will ol 
all the Korean people. 

In contrast, the United States started various kinds of 
maneuvers designed to oppose the construction of a sovereign 
and independent state with the intention of perpetuating the 
occupation of South Korea and the split of the Korean nation 
The first maneuvers were to obstruct the implementation of 
the Three Power Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow. 

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United 
States and Britain met in Moscow in December 1945 to dis- 
cuss questions dealing with Germany and Japan. They de- 
cided on concrete measures for developing Korea as a com- 
pletely democratic, sovereign and independent state, fhe 
Soviet-U.S. joint Committee was set up and charged with t e 
task of implementing the decision. However, the United 


UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 


229 


States moved to trample underfoot this decision by whipping 
together the reactionary forces of South Korea. 

In this situation, the Party, while frustrating the aggressive 
maneuvers of the United States, isolating and weakening the 
reactionary forces, put forward the basic policy of rallying all 
the democratic forces to realize the decision of the xMoscow 
Foreign Ministers Conference, clearly indicating the way to 
Korea’s democratic development. To realize this policy, the 
Party organized and developed mass support for the decision 
of the Foreign Ministers Conference, while stepping up 
political activities on a large scale to expose the aggressive 
designs of the United States. 

This struggle paraleled that in North Korea to create a 
democratic base of the revolution. Under the revolutionary 
influence of the northern half, the South Korean people active- 
ly struggled against the U.S. policy. There were the general 
strike of workers in September 1946, the October People’s 
Resistance, and the general strike of workers on March 22, 
1947. (See Chapter 4, Part II.) These demonstrations tempo- 
rarily frustrated the plot of the United States to cook up a 
reactionary government consisting mainly of pro-American 
and pro-Japanese elements. Thereupon, the United States 
finally wrecked the activities of the Sovict-U.S. Joint Com- 
mittee in September 1947, developing new maneuvers to 
place the Korean question before the UN, which led to a 
separate election in South Korea in May 1948 under the 
aegis of the UN to set up a South Korean puppet government. 

In his 1948 New Year’s message and in his report to the 
Second Congress of the Workers Party of Korea in March 1948, 
Kim 11 Sung set forth the policy of frustrating a separate South 
Korean election under “UN supervision,” establishing a 
democratic people’s republic of Korea as a unified power 
through the efforts of the Korean people themselves, and 
Promoting national unification under its banner. This new 
policy was supported wholeheartedly by the South as well as 


230 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


North Korean people, as shown by the Joint Conference of 
North and South Korean Political Parties and Social Organi- 
zations, held in Pyongyang in April 1948, which was attended 
not only by middle-of-the-road but also by some right-wing 
political parties. The conference unanimously supported the 
unification policy proposed by the Workers Party of Korea. 
This is also graphically illustrated by the fact that the South 
Korean people developed sharp and sustained stiuggles 
against a separate election in South Korea. 

Workers in various parts of South Korea called a general 
strike against the separate election, and the people 1 aided 
police stations in all parts of South Korea and burned ballot 
boxes. The protests on the Cheju Island developed into an 
armed uprising on April 3, 1948. Further, the South Koiean 
people expressed opposition to the spurious separate election 
by boycotting it. In Kyongsang province alone, as many as 
80 to 90 per cent of the eligible voters abstained from voting. 
The separate election in South Korea w’as a farce but, in spite 
of this, the United States set up the Syngman Rhee puppet 
regime. 

In this situation, the Party, relying on the rising mass move- 
ment, intensified struggles for the establishment of a unified 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The election of depu- 
ties to the Supreme People’s Assembly held on August 25, 
1948 was participated in by voters in the South as well as the 
North. This was the legitimate election for the whole of Korea. 
In the North, 99.97 per cent and, in the South, 77.52 per cent 
of the eligible voters took part in the elections in defiance of 
barbarous suppression by the traitorous U.S.-Syngman Rhee 
clique. As a result, the Supreme People’s Assembly was con- 
stituted of the real representatives of the people, and the 
government of the Republic was established. 

The DPRK is the only government of Korea, representing 
the general will of the people of the entire country, established 
democratically. Its establishment was a new victory of the 


UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 


231 


Korean people and gave a powerful impetus to their struggle 
for peaceful unification of the fatherland. 

As soon as they concocted the Syngman Rhee puppet 
government,” the U.S. imperialists started to prepare openly 
for armed aggression against the North, while compelling the 
puppet regime to call for a “march to the North” as its “nation- 
al policy.” 

The Party repeatedly tried to avoid the fratricidal struggle 
and to establish a unified governing body. It even proposed 
to federate the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK with 
the National Assembly of South Korea as a single legislative 
body for the whole of Korea. This proposal w’as welcomed 
enthusiastically by the people in the South as well as the 
North, and mass movements arose in South Korea in support 
of this policy. 

However, the U.S.-Syngman Rhee puppet clique not only 
oppressed and murdered supporters of the proposal but 
finally replied to it by launching an aggressive war on June 25, 
1950. ft was an aggressive war launched by the United States 
and the Syngman Rhee clique to sabotage peaceful unification 
of Korea, to perpetuate U.S. occupation of South Korea and, 
finally, to transform North Korea into a U.S. colony. After 
tlnee years of heroic struggle, the Korean people won a 
decisive victory and frustrated the designs of the United 
States, creating the possibility of solving the question of 
national unification by peaceful means. 

After the Korean War, at the Geneva Conference in 1954 to 
find a peaceful solution of the Korean question, and repeated- 
ly in the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, the Party 
and the government made various proposals to turn the armis- 
tice into a lasting peace and to open up a new phase for 
national unification. However, the United States and its pup- 
pets have refused adamantly to accept proposals for unifica- 
tion. 

Under the circumstances, the government of the Republic 


232 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


proposed to create conditions for national unification tin ough 
a series of transitional stages, since the basic program for uni- 
fication cannot be realized immediately. In August 1960, it 
proposed a plan for a North-South Korean Confederation as a 
transitional measure to reestablish severed national ties, a step 
which may be feasible even before unification and a Noith- 
South general elections are possible. The proposed confedera- 
tion would be a supreme national committee consisting of an 
equal number of representatives appointed by the Noith and 
South Korean authorities, while existing political systems in 
the North and South remain unchanged for the time being. 
The supreme national committee would adjust economic and 
cultural developments and promote mutual cooperation and 
exchange between South and North Korea in the common 
interests of the nation. The confederation, if realized, would 
not mean complete unification, but would deepen mutual 
understanding and open a new phase favorable for the 
promotion of national unification. 

Further, should the South Korean rulers be unable to accept 
the plan for confederation, the DPRK proposed that economic, 
cultural and personnel exchanges be effected immediately to 
alleviate as much as possible the hardships endured by the 
Korean people as a result of the split. It was also pioposed that 
if even this plan is not acceptable to South Korea, at least the 
exchange of mail should be permitted between parents, wives 
and children, relatives and friends who are separated. 

The Eighth Session, Second Supreme People’s Assembly of 
the DPRK, November 1960, discussed peaceful unification of 
the fatherland, and made recommendations for economic and 
cultural cooperation between North and South and for inde- 
pendent development of the national economy. To change the 
armistice into a lasting peace, to ease tension between North 
and South, is considered of prime importance. On several 
occasions the DPRK proposed reduction of the strength of the 
armed forces of both North and South to less than 100,000 men 


UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 233 

and an agreement not to use arms against the other. On several 
occasions, the DPRK has offered to receive South Korean un- 
employed and orphans — to give them jobs and guarantee their 
livelihood, to grant scholarships, and extend relief to victims 
of natural disaster. 

Recently, the Third Session, Third Supreme People’s As- 
sembly of the DPRK, on the instance of the government, 
proposed a joint conference of political parties and mass 
organizations of North and South to encourage national unity 
and cooperation through contact and exchange of opinions. 
Also, North Korea offered two million suk of rice every year, 
100,000 tons of steel products, one billion kwh of electric 
power, 10,000 tons of chemical fiber, and large quantities of 
cement, timber and machinery to South Korea to rebuild its 
destroyed economy and contribute to stabilizing the condi- 
tions of the people. 

All the proposals reflect the unanimous desire of all the 
Korean people for national unification. However, the U.S. 
imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique rejected 
them outright. They are opposed to any form of contact be- 
tween South and North and have refused adamantly to accept 
any proposal that will contribute to the unification of the 
fatherland. Moreover, the South Korean authorities also sup- 
press the rising aspiration among the South Korean peo- 
ple for national unification. People are charged with com- 
mitting an “act of treason” or an act prejudicial to what is 
called “national policy” for promoting economic or cultural 
exchanges and mail or personnel exchanges, let alone com- 
plete unification of the fatherland; they are arrested and im- 
prisoned at random in frantic acts of fascist terrorism. 

If the puppet authorities of South Korea do speak about 
“unification,” they speak about “unification through a UN- 
supervised election.” This is only silly twaddle that ignores 
the principle of national self-determination and is aimed at 
introducing an external force into the internal affairs of the 


234 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


nation. The UN is not qualified to meddle in the Korean 
question, nor does it have any right to do so, especially since 
the UN is used by the United States as a cover to justify its 
aggression against Korea. In this connection, Kim 11 Sung says: 

We consider that the United Nations has neither the right to dis- 
cuss the Korean question nor the right to meddle in the interna 
affairs of our country. The Korean question should not be discussed 
by foreigners in New York or Washington, but should be discussed 
by Koreans in Pyongyang or Seoul . 4 

What the United States and the South Korean puppets mean 
by “unification by a UN-supervised election” is merely an 
attempt to expand to the North the U.S. imperialist system of 
colonial domination established in the South. Recently, a new 
obstacle was placed in the path of unification, the traitorous 
ROK- Japan Treaty concluded in 1965 between the puppet 
regime of South Korea and Japan to draw the Japanese 
militarists into South Korea. Japanese imperialists, who have 
infiltrated as a result of the treaty, are now a dangerous ob- 
stacle to unification. 

All facts show that the ROK puppets are walking the anti- 
people, traitorous road of dependence on external forces in- 
stead of the road of sovereignty and independence and that 
they are not at all interested in national unity or national 
unification. They are very much afraid of national unification 
being solved by the Korean people themselves. They are so 
anxious to have U.S. armed forces occupy South Korea and 
want to live under this protection because they are afraid ol 
the people. Otherwise, why do they oppose a free North-South 
election and why do they obstinately refuse to accept ex- 
changes of personnel and mail? 

In spite of the desire of all the Korean people today, moie 
than 20 years after the defeat of Japanese imperialism, oui 
fatherland still remains divided because of the U.S. imperial- 
ists and the South Korean puppets. Kim 11 Sung says: 


UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 


235 


At present, the traitorous clique of South Korea, faithful henchmen 
of U.S. imperialism, stubbornly oppose the peaceful unification of 
the country and recklessly arrest and imprison people, and severely 
punish them, merely because they have spoken in favor of peaceful 
unification. The peaceful unification of our country can be attained 
only after the present puppet “regime” is overthrown and progres- 
sive forces seize power in South Korea . 5 

The developments of the past 20-odd years since the Liber- 
ation show that the Korean people consistently have sought 
sovereignty, independence and peaceful unification, whereas 
U.S. imperialism and the South Korean puppets have sought 
only enslavement and aggression. The actual situation shows 
that unification can never be attained by kneeling to the 
United States and begging for it, but only by winning it through 
the struggle of the Korean people themselves. 

The DPRK’s stand on peaceful unification is based on anti- 
imperialist struggle and has nothing in common with a 
compromise with the United States or with the theory of 
“peaceful transition” of the social system. When the South 
Korean people overthrow U.S. imperialism and its puppets 
and seize power, unification will be achieved peacefully 
through the united strength of the forces of socialism in the 
North and the democratic forces in the South. 

If the United States, which is intensifying war maneuvers, 
should provoke a war against North Korea or unleash a global 
war, the conflict on the side of the Korean people would be a 
national liberation war, a war for national unification and fora 
nationwide victory of the Korean revolution. Kim 11 Sung says: 

The Korean people do not want war but are never afraid of it. If the 
enemy forces a new war upon us, all the people will rise as one in a 
heroic struggle to defend the great socialist gains in the northern half 
of the Republic, attain the complete liberation and unification of the 
fatherland and safeguard peace in Asia and the world, and they will 
deal annihilating blows to the enemy . 6 


236 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


The only Korean state is the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea, and only its government can represent the genuine 
national interests and will of the people, South and North. 
The DPRK represents the future of a unified Korea and em- 
bodies the unanimous aspirations of all the Korean people for 
complete unification and independence of the fatherland. 

2. UNIFICATION AND THE KOREAN REVOLUTION 

In order to hasten the day of triumph and glory, the South Korean 
people should expedite preparation of the revolutionary forces and 
wage the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle more vigorously on a 
mass scale. Meanwhile the people in the northern half should fur- 
ther consolidate our revolutionary base politically, economically 
and militarily, continue to render active support to the South Korean 
people in their revolutionary struggle and steadily strengthen mili- 
tant solidarity with the international revolutionary forces . 7 

This strategic line advanced by Premier Kim II Sung takes 
into account that the revolutionary forces for national unifica- 
tion and an all-Korean victory are threefold: the forces of the 
socialist revolution in the northern half, revolutionary forces 
in South Korea, and international revolutionary forces. How- 
ever, in the light of their position, role and mission, these 
three factors do not have the same weight. Of decisive signifi- 
cance among the three are the internal revolutionary forces of 
the Korean people, because the Korean people themselves are 
the masters of the Korean revolution. According to Kim II 
Sung: “Revolutionary forces should be prepared equally in 
both South and North Korea, and only when all the Korean 
people in both North and South pool their strength and deal a 
blow at U.S. imperialism, can the national liberation revolu- 
tion successfully be carried out.” 8 

The Party established a democratic base of the revolution 
in the North after the Liberation, and saw this revolutionary 
base as the fundamental guarantee of the Korean revolution 


UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 237 

and unification. This scientific strategic line, reflecting the 
objective requirements of the Korean revolution, is being 
realized successfully, the powerful democratic base of the 
revolution having been created and consolidated in the 
northern half. This ensures the superiority of the revolution- 
ary forces over the counter-revolutionary forces and guaran- 
tees national unification with internal and independent forces. 
The invincible revolutionary forces, built up politically, eco- 
nomically and militarily in the North, exercise a great revolu- 
tionizing and inspirational effect on the South Korean people. 
Unification will be successful when the revolutionary forces 
in South and North fully are prepared and united. 

Consequently, it is important not only to continue to build 
the revolutionary base in the North but also to consolidate 
the forces in the South which constitute the other component 
part of the internal revolutionary power of the Korean peo- 
ple. Strengthening revolutionary forces in the South will 
strengthen the internal revolutionary forces as a whole and 
will isolate decisively the counter-revolutionary forces, has- 
tening the decisive moment of unification. Inasmuch as the 
South Korean revolutionary forces will engage directly in 
the South Korean revolution, strengthening them is important 
in creating conditions favorable for national unification. Need- 
less to say. North Korea will give powerful support to the 
South Korean revolution, but the people in the North cannot 
carry out the revolution for the South Korean people. The 
South Korean revolution can triumph only when the South 
Korean people themselves rise up. 

Kim II Sung says: “For an all-Korea victory of our rev- 
olution, it is necessary not only to strengthen domestic revolu- 
tionary forces but also to increase the international revolution- 
ary forces.” 8 

The Korean revolution is one front of the world revolution, 
a front of sharp anti-imperialist struggles directly confronting 
U.S. imperialism. The development of the revolutionary situa- 


238 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 

tion in Korea is closely related to the weakening ofU.S. impe- 
rialism. If the revolutionary forces are strengthened on a 
worldwide scale and if the United States is cornered in all 
parts of the world, its foothold in South Korea will be weak- 
ened and the victory of the Korean revolution will be has- 
tened. But the international revolutionary movement can only 
extend assistance to our internal forces, however strong it may 
be and whatever positive assistance it may extend. Moreover, 
the auxiliary role of the international movement depends to a 
large extent on how well prepared it is. 

In this way, the position concerning the relative importance 
of the three revolutionary factors is based firmly on the inde- 
pendent role of the government of the Republic and the prin- 
ciple of internationalism. 

Concerning the tasks of the Korean people, Kim 11 Sung 
wrote: “Today, there are two revolutionary tasks before the 
Workers Party of Korea and the Korean people. One is to con- 
struct socialism in the northern half of our country and the 
other is to liberate South Korea from the colonial rule ofU.S. 
imperialism and realize the unification of the fatherland.” 10 
Korea is one, and our nation is one. Actually, however, the 
South and the North have been separated and have funda- 
mentally different social systems. Consequently, each is in a 
different stage of the revolution. Unlike the North, where the 
socialist system has been established, the South is plagued by 
contradictions peculiar to itself, being a colonial, semi-feudal 
society. Therefore, the South Korean people are faced with 
revolutionary tasks different from those in the Noith. 

Socialist construction in the DPRK and the revolution in 
South Korea are both components of the Korean revolution 
and are closely related. But the nature of the South Korean 
revolution is defined by the contradictions inherent in South 
Korean society. To carry out this revolution successfully, it is 
important to strengthen decisively the struggles of the South 
Koreans. Consequently, the South Korean revolution cannot 
be equated with socialist construction in the North. 


UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH 


239 


Although the South Korea revolution is closely related to 
unification, these two questions should be strictly differen- 
tiated from each other. In the first place, there is a difference 
in geographical scope. Unification encompasses the entire 
area of North and South and its revolutionary task is to com- 
plete the Korean revolution on a nationwide scale. The South 
Korean revolution is concerned primarily with the southern 
half, and is subordinate to the completion of the all-Korea rev- 
olution. 

Further, the South Korean revolution and the unification of 
the fatherland have different contradictions to solve, based on 
different factors. Unification is based on the objective reality 
of the division of the country and the split of the nation, and 
the task is to reunify the severed land and people under the 
banner of the Republic. In contrast to this, the South Korean 
revolution is based on national and class contradictions in 
South Korea, and its task is to solve these contradictions. Be- 
cause of these differences, different strategy and tactics must 
be used to carry out the South Korean revolution and for the 
unification of the fatherland. 

For the unification of the fatherland, the revolutionary 
forces of the North and of the South and the international rev- 
olutionary forces — of which the most important are the revolu- 
tionary forces of North Korea — are needed. For the South 
Korean revolution, the necessary forces are the South Korean 
people, beginning with workers and peasants, whose purpose 
it is to solve the social and class contradictions of South Korea, 
to seize power and to overthrow the social system. Here vic- 
tory cannot be won without violent struggle. However, unifi- 
cation of the fatherland is an internal affair, and should be ef- 
fected peacefully after the South Korean people drive out the 
United States, recover sovereignty, and complete the South 
Korean revolution. 

This policy of the Workers Party of Korea for realizing the 
South Korean revolution and national unification is an em- 
bodiment of the Juche idea of Kim II Sung, based on Marxism- 


240 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


Leninism. Under his leadership the United States finally will 
be driven out of South Korea, and the day will surely come 
when the 40 million Korean people will construct a victorious 
new Korea and will live happily in a unified fatherland. 


CHAPTER IV 


The Struggle of the South Korean 
People 

Since the Liberation of August 15, 1945 the South Korean 
people, in defiance of the fascist terrorism of the United States 
and its agents, have fought heroically, following the strategic 
and tactical line of the South Korean revolution and national 
unification indicated by Kim II Sung. The course of this strug- 
gle has never been smooth; it has gone through many ups and 
downs, upsurges and temporary retreats and then upsurges 
again. Today the South Korean people are continuing their 
anti-American, national salvation struggles in various ways, 
including guerrila warfare. 


1. THE COURSE OF THE STRUGGLE 

Since Liberation, the South Korean people have gone 
through three periods of struggle until today they have 
reached a higher plane of struggle, including armed guerrilla 
warfare. 


(1) First period: From the August 15 Liberation 
to Installation of the Puppet Regime 

Of this, Kim II Sung says: 

Immediately after the August 15 Liberation, labor movements 
rapidly developed in South Korea and, under their influence, peo- 
ple’s struggles on various levels witnessed an upsurge. 


241 


242 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 

Encouraged by the results of the revolution in the northern half, 
the South Korean people fought unrelentingly against the U.S. impe- 
rialist policy to turn South Korea into a colonial dependency, de- 
manding sovereignty and independence for their fatherland and 
democratic reforms such as were carried out in the northern half . 1 

The struggle of the South Korean people immediately after 
Liberation was characterized by anti-imperialist and anti- 
feudal activities, clearly reflecting the basic tasks of the South 
Korean revolution and its rapid development as a mass-based, 
positive political struggle for power. 

The revolutionary forces launched a strong attack on the 
counter-revolutionary forces of U.S. imperialism and its agents 
(pro-Japanese and pro-American), and fought against the 
colonization of South Korea as a U.S. dependency. They 
fought against the dissolution of people's committees and 
against the repressive measures taken by the United States 
against democratic activities, demanding the guarantee of 
democratic freedoms, establishment of unified people s 
power, and democratic reforms such as had been carried out 
in the North. Raising these demands, they developed mass 
struggles involving people in all walks of life. 

The working class played a leading role in these revolution- 
ary struggles and the worker-peasant alliance was consoli- 
dated considerably. This is illustrated graphically by the Octo- 
ber People's Resistance, an anti-American action involving all 
strata of people, kicked off by the general strike of Pusan rail- 
way workers in October 1946, and also by the general strike 
of industrial workers. 

The general strike and the October People's Resistance 
clearly indicated the revolutionary character and fighting 
capacity of the South Korean people, who were determined to 
win freedom, independence and democracy, dhese struggles 
threw U.S. authorities and the military government into utter 
confusion and their foundation was shaken greatly, with the 
result that the revolutionary situation in South Korea reached 
a climax. 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


243 


The South Koreans who were politically mature and tem- 
pered in sharp struggle concentrated on establishing a unified 
democratic government, while the United States and its 
stooges intensified their attempts to turn South Korea into a 
colonial dependency and began openly to carry out their 
policy of perpetuating the division of Korea. The South Kore- 
an people concentrated on frustrating the maneuvers of U.S. 
imperialism to set up a separate puppet regime. 

In spite of terror and bloodshed, the February 7, 1948, 
national salvation action, in which two million people par- 
ticipated, was organized successfully and, following this, the 
May 10 struggle against the traitorous separate election was 
developed. The February 7 action and May 10 demonstration 
were sharp struggles over power and sovereignty — the basic 
questions of the revolution. There were 2,863 instances of 
struggle between March 3 and May 15, 1948, of which 2,251 
(78.6 per cent) were violent. The United States succeeded in 
setting up a separate regime (Syngman Rhee) at bayonet 
point and by fraud, but the elections were exposed as a fake 
by the efforts of the people. 

In the upsurge in South Korea during this period the politi- 
cal leadership of the Party gave a correct perspective to the 
struggle of the South Korean people. The political situation 
in South Korea immediately after Liberation was favorable 
to the revolution. However, the people were not sure what to 
do. They had a strong desire to win national sovereignty and 
independence, but they had, to a certain extent, illusions 
about the United States. In the early stage they did not under- 
stand the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism. 

Under these circumstances, the Party encouraged the South 
Korean people to give full play to their spirit of sovereignty 
and independence and to their strong desire to have a new 
system and lead a new life. It made clear the anti-imperialist, 
anti-feudal democratic nature of the South Korean revolution, 
while exposing the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism, and 
it led the struggle of the South Korean people in the correct 


244 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


direction by raising the goal of a unified, autonomous and in- 
dependent state. It was because of this dynamic policy and 
wise leadership of the Party that the South Korean people 
were able to make full use of the objective revolutionary sit- 
uation in those days and develop it to a high political level. 

Another factor in the rapid upsurge of revolutionary strug- 
gles in South Korea immediately after Liberation was that 
while the counter-revolutionary forces were extremely iso- 
lated and weakened, the revolutionary forces rapidly were in- 
creasing and becoming stronger, resulting in a major change 
in the relations of class forces. 

The August 15 Liberation put an end to Japanese imperialist 
colonial rule and, at the same time, a shattering blow was 
dealt to domestic counter-revolutionary forces which were 
allied with the Japanese and had followed the road of national 
betrayal. They were extremely weakened and lost their po- 
tency as a political force. In contrast, after the collapse of 
Japanese domination, the enthusiasm of the working people 
soared and their forces grew rapidly. The middle classes then 
came over to the side of the revolution. This change in the 
relations of class forces was an important factor in the rapid 
upsurge of the revolutionary struggle. 


(2) Second Period: From Establishment of the Puppet Regime 
to the April 1960 Popular Uprising 

Kim II Sung has this to say: 

However, the struggle of the South Korean people entered a pe- 
riod of temporary decline after the concoction of a separate puppet 
regime in South Korea in May 1948, and the subsequent fascization 
policy of U.S. imperialism and the Li Sung Man [Syngman Rhee] 
clique. In order to suppress mass movements, U.S. imperialism and 
the Li Sung Man clique mobilized the U.S. armed forces, equipped 
with newest weapons, to commit barbarous acts of arresting, im- 
prisoning and murdering patriotic people at random. 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


245 


Further, U.S. imperialism perpetrated underhand maneuvers to 
split and disintegrate the revolutionary forces from inside by utiliz- 
ing factionalist elements and spies who had infiltrated the leader- 
ship of the South Korean Workers Party. As a result, party organiza- 
tions were completely destroyed and the revolutionary forces were 
split in South Korea. 2 

Pak Hong Yong and his followers, who were spies serving 
the United States, captured the leadership of the vanguard 
party in South Korea and deliberately drove Party members 
and patriotic people to reckless actions, making them suffer 
great losses in order to destroy the Party from within and 
stamp out the revolutionary forces. 

By the end of 1949, the Party and mass organizations were 
completely destroyed and revolutionary movements were 
forced into a temporary retreat. The retreat was gradual, in- 
dicating that even while the movement was declining, the 
South Korean people fought bravely and desperately against 
the offensive of enemy reaction. Thus, this period saw dem- 
onstrations in South Korea to support and welcome the 
establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic, struggles 
to hoist the flag of the Republic, a demonstration of South 
Korean workers in November 1948 to demand the immediate 
withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces, and a revolt of South 
Korean soldiers in October in Ryosu. These struggles were on 
a higher level than the previous struggles but were unable 
to expand and develop into a mass movement involving all 
parts of South Korea. 

However, the Fatherland Liberation War [the Korean War, 
1950-53] was a special period of temporary upsurge of the 
movement. During this period the powerful revolutionary 
forces of the North were combined with the revolutionary 
forces of the South. In those days, as a result of the victorious 
advance of the Korean People’s Army, a large part of South 
Korea was liberated and Party organizations and people’s 
committees were again organized in the liberated areas, vari- 


246 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


ous democratic reforms were carried out, and revolutionary 
enthusiasm of the masses ran very high. 

Groups of South Korean youth joined the volunteers and 
fought bravely to annihilate the enemy, and the people in the 
rear actively supported the fighting ranks on the front. For a 
short period, the South Korean people directly experienced 
the policy of the Workers Party of Korea under a people’s 
government and, consequently, actively supported the Peo- 
ple’s Army even during the difficult time of the temporary, 
strategic retreat. Even after that, fierce struggles developed 
in South Korea, including the burning of transport materials 
in November 1951 by the Pusan dockworkers, the explosion 
of the First Arsenal of the Defense Department, and various 
guerrilla actions. However, because of the change in the mili- 
tary situation and betrayal by Pak Hon Yong and his followers, 
the revolutionary forces were not maintained or strengthened 
and the Party organizations were destroyed. The struggle of 
the South Korean people again stagnated. But the revolution- 
ary movement began to recover its former strength gradually 
during the period from the armistice to the April Popular Up- 
rising of 1960, 


(3) Third Period: From the April Popular Uprising 
to the Present 

Kim II Sung says: 

After the [Korean] war, the struggle of the South Korean people 
gradually followed a new course of development. The South Korean 
people, encouraged by the results of socialist construction in the 
North, continued to fight tenaciously against U.S. imperialism and 
its stooges, demanding democratic freedoms and rights. 

The Popular Uprising, centered on the students and youth of South 
Korea in April 1960, finally toppled the Li Sung Man [Syngman 
Rhee] puppet government which had long served as agents of U.S. 
imperialism. This was the first victory in the struggle of the South 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


247 


Korean people and dealt a shattering blow to the colonial domination 
of U.S. imperialism. 3 

During this period the South Korean people struggled 
against the increased war provocations of the United States — 
against the growing burden of military spending and particu- 
larly against the ruthless plunder and fascist repression by the 
Syngman Rhee clique. The successful results of socialist con- 
struction in the North and the correctness of the policies of 
the Party encouraged struggles against the United States and 
its puppets. Thus, for seven years after the war, the struggles 
of the South Korean people followed a steady upward curve; 
in 1959, the number of actions rose five-fold to 891, compared 
with 176 in 1954. The South Korean people, in this period, 
fought for democratic rights, which they combined with strug- 
gles for a solution to the immediate problems of livelihood, 
using anti-fascist and democratic slogans. These struggles 
finally led to the historic April Popular Uprising, in which 
pent-up indignation at extreme suppression and vicious 
plunder by the United States and its stooges flared up. Partici- 
pating in the mass uprising in April 1960 were more than a 
million city people — workers, peasants and intellectuals, with 
patriotic students as the core. Syngman Rhee’s fascist dictator- 
ship was overthrown in this, the first victory of the South 
Korean people in their anti-American national salvation strug- 
gle. It was a serious blow to U.S. imperialism’s colonial rule. 

The collapse of the puppet regime meant the bankruptcy 
of its anti-people policy and especially of its policy to “unify 
Korea by marching north.” And it reflected a serious crisis in 
the colonial domination system of U.S. imperialism. In this 
heroic struggle the people demonstrated their revolutionary 
mettle and acquired valuable experience. The April Popular 
Uprising showed that further revolutionary advances of the 
South Korean people could not be prevented even at bayonet 
point. 


248 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 

The South Koreans were awakened politically by this strug- 
gle and they were convinced that they could storm success- 
fully any imperialist stronghold if they were united and 
fought tenaciously. Their revolutionary fervor was great after 
their first victory. Although the Syngman Rhee clique was 
toppled by the April Popular Uprising, colonial domination 
by U.S. imperialism continued. The United States imposed 
Chang Myon as its new placeman, set up a new puppet regime 
and intensified the suppression and plunder of the people, 
while promising them a democratic government. 

Thus, the people’s demands in the April Popular Uprising 
were completely trampled upon, and economic crisis and 
political confusion were aggravated further. Consequently, 
the South Koreans conducted a more positive struggle, espe- 
cially for national unification and national prosperity. Kim II 
Sung made this clear in his 1960 report at the celebration of 
the 15th anniversary of the August 15 Liberation and at the 
Eighth Session, Second Supreme People’s Assembly, where 
the program was spelled out, giving a new impetus to the 
struggle after the April Popular Uprising. 

Under the slogan, “Unity is the only way to live, the South 
Koreans advanced their fight for independent unification and 
gradually turned the thrust of their struggle against U.S. impe- 
rialism, shaking the foundations of colonial domination. 
Alarmed by this critical situation, the United States instigated 
fascist elements within the South Korean Army to carry out a 
military coup in an attempt to establish a military- fascist dic- 
tatorship and strangle the people’s revolutionary struggle. In 
less than one week after the coup, 23 progressive parties and 
238 social organizations were ordered disbanded, while over 
2,300 publishing establishments forcibly were closed down; 
hundreds of thousands of patriotic people were arrested, many 
imprisoned and murdered. 

However, suppression by the dictatorship did not strengthen 
the position of the United States in South Korea; rather it 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


249 


deepened the crisis of the system of colonial domination. The 
imposition of the dictatorship meant that the United States 
and its agents could maintain their colonial domination only 
at bayonet point. No suppression can stamp out the struggle 
of politically awakened people, and the worse the suppression 
and poverty, the greater are the will and strengthen to resist. 
This was clearly demonstrated after the coup. 

There were a series of protests against the ROK-Japan talks 
and the ROK-Japan Treaty, on March 24 and June 3, 1964, and 
in August 1965. Hundreds of thousands of people, including 
youth and students at 53 universities and at 173 middle and 
high schools, participated in the protests, which continued 
for more than 70 days from March 24 to June 5, 1964. The 
demonstrations frequently assumed the character of riots and 
were the first large-scale mass struggles since the fascist sup- 
pression imposed after the coup. As a result, the sixth ROK 
Japan talks were frustrated and U.S. imperialism and its Pak 
Chung Hi clique were dealt another blow. 

However, the United States and its puppets tried to resume 
the talks with Japan by declaring a virtual state of emergency, 
mobilizing the armed forces and resorting to fascist suppres- 
sion, including the closure not only of universities but also of 
middle and high schools. After the initialling of the ROK- 
Japan Treaty at the end of February, more and more struggles 
took place until, in August, the people engaged in large-scale, 
mass-based demonstrations against the ratification of the 
treaty. Anti-treaty protests continued for more than a year in 
defiance of fascist suppression. More than 200,000 youth and 
students were the center of the movement. The colonialist 
policy of the United States and the maneuvers of the Japanese 
to enter South Korea were exposed. 

The dispatch of South Korean puppet troops to South Viet- 
nam aroused even stronger anti-American, anti-government 
feelings. There is also wide-spread resentment among the 
puppet troops against dying in South Vietnam as a shield for 


250 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


the United States. With the defeats of U.S. troops in Vietnam, 
the setbacks suffered by the troops of other countries, includ- 
ing South Korea, and the sharp increase in the number of war 
casualties among them, the number of draft evaders increased 
rapidly, alarming the puppet authorities. 

Protests against the incursions by Japanese monopoly capi- 
tal and the increased robbery by the puppet authorities also 
spread, especially since the conclusion of the ROK-Japan 
Treaty. Workers in the coal, power and railway industries, 
and in the docks, especially employees at U.S. military instal- 
lations, participated in struggles. More than 200,000 took part 
in protest actions from late 1965 to early 1966; and in 1966 
there were 560,000. The people fought not only for higher 
wages, better working conditions and other economic de- 
mands but also for trade union rights, for the abolition of ex- 
traterritorial labor regulations, and against national discrimi- 
nation. They fought stubbornly in defiance of suppression by 
U.S. military and puppet police and succeeded in winning 
several of their demands. Peasants fought against eviction 
from their land required for military operations and opposed 
low prices for farm products, demanding guaranteed accept- 
able prices. 

Through these struggles for existence, the South Korean 
people gradually came to understand better the real cause of 
their starvation and difficulties, and the need to increase their 
fighting capacity. At the same time, the demand for sover- 
eignty and independence became more and more widespread 
during the struggle against sending troops to Vietnam and the 
economic struggles of the working people. Demands for the 
expulsion of foreign forces, both American and Japanese, 
for sovereignty, independence and national unification, were 
voiced more and more often. 

Despite fascist suppression and control of the press, jour- 
nalists and writers criticized and condemned the false argu- 
ments of the Pak Chung Hi clique that Korea would be unified 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


251 


in the latter half of the 1970's by the UN. They urged that 
Korea should be unified by the Koreans themselves and that 
exchanges between North and South should be activated, so 
that Korea could assert national identity in her relations with 
the United States. 

The anti-American, anti-fascist struggles flared up violently 
in a political action against the unfair elections of June 8, 1967. 
Participating between June 6 and July 10 were more than 
200,000 students at 145 universities, high schools and middle 
schools, and a large number of ordinary citizens. They fought 
courageously in defiance of school suspension orders and 
arrest warrants, police clubs and tear-gas bombs, shouting 
“Remember April 19!” “The Unfair Election Is Invalid!” 
“Arrest the Ringleaders of the Unfair Election!” “Stamp Out 
Corrupt Government!” “Let us Defend Democracy to the 
Last!” and “Let Us Defend People's Rights!” As these slogans 
show, this was not only a protest against the unfair election but 
also a patriotic struggle to restore democracy and freedom. 
The struggle spread to many parts of the country in a very 
short period of time. 

The students used various tactics, including condemnation 
meetings, burning effigies of government leaders, demon- 
strations and sit-downs, turning their schools into strongholds 
of struggle, going on a hunger strike, and stoning the police. 

Since the end of 1967, the struggle of the South Korean peo- 
ple has developed into a new, active phase on a qualitatively 
higher plane, including armed guerrilla warfare. 


252 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


2. THE PRESENT STRUGGLE 
AND ITS PROSPECTS 

In a recent major report, Kim II Sung said: 

The revolutionary struggle of the South Korean people is now ex- 
panding and developing into various forms of active anti-U.S., na- 
tional salvation struggles, including armed struggle. Their struggles 
are becoming organized gradually and are taking deep root among 
the workers and peasants, the main forces of the revolution, and are 
vigorously growing among broad sections of the masses of all strata. 
While further expanding their revolutionary organizations, the revo- 
lutionary and patriotic people of South Korea are waging an unyield- 
ing struggle against the enemy in towns and villages, underground 
and in the mountains, even in prisons and in “courts.” The activities 
of the revolutionary armed groups operating in various parts of South 
Korea and the revolutionary vanguard of different groups of people, 
including workers, students, newsmen, educators, and even con- 
scientious national capitalists, have alarmed the U.S. imperialists 
and their lackeys and thrown them into utter confusion . 4 

The most important problem to be solved in carrying out 
the revolution is that of the political leader. The political 
leader is the center of unity and cohesion of the masses, and 
the leader's revolutionary ideas arc the ideological basis on 
which all the people are to be rallied. The South Korean 
people have great respect for Premier Kim 11 Sung, who is the 
foremost leader of the Korean revolution and is loved by the 
40 million Korean people who regard him as the beacon of 
the revolution, and are determined to entrust their destiny 
to him. 1 he invincible unity of all the people with this great 
revolutionary leader is the decisive guarantee for victory. 
And this is the most characteristic feature of the present stage 
of the South Korean revolution- the conviction that victory 
will be won, whatever difficulties and ordeals may ensue, if 
they follow the teachings of Kim 11 Sung. 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


253 


Many individual instances can be cited of the public ex- 
pression, despite the fascist repression, of widespread respect 
for Kim 11 Sung among the South Korean workers, peasants, 
youths and students, and intellectuals. And there is a growing 
tendency among them to accept his revolutionary ideas and 
to prepare themselves for struggle, according to the strategic 
and tactical line of Kim II Sung on the South Korean revolu- 
tion and national unification. 

Thus, the struggles of the South Korean people are develop- 
ing among the broad masses, including workers, peasants, 
youth and students, intellectuals, and urban petty-bourgeoi- 
sie; the spearhead of these struggles is gradually being di- 
rected at U.S. imperialism. 

According to incomplete statistics, actions involving all 
strata totaled 1,030 between January and October 1968, and 
the number of people who participated in these struggles 
was 1.3 times larger than in the comparable period of the 
previous year. 


(1) Workers ' Struggles 

Workers have participated in an increasing wave of actions 
in defiance of the U.S. -puppet regime. According to incom- 
plete statistics, there were 125 workers' actions in the first 
half of 1968, participated in by 198,000 workers, a 2.3-fold 
increase over 1967, including railway workers, coal miners, 
dock workers and seamen, textile workers, and others. 

The regime tightened the low- wage policy in early 1968 
and tried to revise the Labor Standards Law to the detriment 
of the workers, to secure more profits for foreign monopoly 
capital and comprador capitalists. It also enacted a fascist 
Labor Dispute Mediation Law to take more repressive meas- 
ures against the struggles of workers. However, the South 
Korea workers have been developing their resistance, linking 
their struggle for better living conditions and democratic 
freedoms with anti-war actions. A characteristic of the struggle 


254 REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 

in 1968, was its increased scale, better organization and the 
higher political consciousness of the workers. 

Early in 1968, more than 30,000 railway workers organized 
a committee to work for better conditions in Seoul and in 
different districts under its wing, dealing a sharp blow at new 
war provocations by conducting the movement under a uni- 
fied leadership. About 3,000 clothing workers in Pusan or- 
ganized a labor disputes committee with representatives from 
more than 30 enterprises and gradually intensified their strug- 
gle from a dispute to a strike under a unified leadership. Start- 
ing in June 1968, large-scale struggles, each involving more 
than 10,000 workers, were continuous. Among these were the 
struggle of 13,000 workers of the ROK Public Coal Corpora- 
tion who fought for higher wages in June; the struggle of 
20,000 postal and telecommunication workers who demanded 
higher wages and other benefits in August; and the struggle of 
over 40,000 employes at U.S. military bases and installations 
in October. 

Another important characteristic was that the workers fought 
more positively and tenaciously, moving more and more to- 
ward formation of an anti-American, national salvation united 
front. The 13,000 workers of the ROK Public Coal Corpora- 
tion, who had a long dispute demanding a 30 per cent wage 
increase, called a 48 hour general strike at all mines in 11 dis- 
tricts. When the puppet authorities adamantly refused to ac- 
cept any of their demands, they called a strike of indefinite 
duration at the end of August. At Pusan, 8,000 dock workers 
who conducted a demonstration early in June, launched 
another action on October 16. 

South Korean workers are moving toward joint struggles in 
related industries, or may join an action launched by workers 
elsewhere. For instance, early in March 1968, over 30,000 
railway workers demanded better living conditions. This was 
followed by the struggle of 13,000 workers in monopoly enter- 
prises. When the Pak Chung Hi regime attempted to revise 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


255 


the Labor Relations Law to suppress the struggles of the 
workers in monopoly enterprises, the South Korean workers 
arose, on March 5, against it. In an expression of solidarity, 
railway, telecommunication and government monopoly work- 
ers were determined that “one million workers will rise as 
one, at any risk, if the Pak Chung Hi clique does not give up 
their fascist plots and maneuvers. ” In another instance, 56,000 
textile workers in many parts of South Korea adopted a resolu- 
tion in mid-June to support actively the struggle of the workers 
of Jonnam Paper Manufacturing Co. and spread the struggle 
throughout South Korea to help the workers win their de- 
mands early in July. 

A remarkable thing about the struggles of the South Korean 
workers is that they are being developed into struggles against 
the United States and the puppet “government.” Workers em- 
ployed at U.S. and Japanese installations conducted 15 pro- 
tests in the first four months of 1968, the total number of 
workers involved reaching 74,000. More than half of the strug- 
gles waged by workers in the first quarter of 1968 were 
directed against the Pak Chung Hi clique. About 1,000 dock 
workers at Inchon completely stopped the transport of mili- 
tary supplies during their struggle for higher wages. At about 
the same time, some 600 workers employed by the U.S. Army 
in the same city joined the struggle and succeeded in winning 
their demands. Recently 2,000 workers employed at the U.S. 
base in the Osan area carried out a firm anti-American demon- 
stration in protest against repressive measures against South 
Korean workers. This touched off mass anti-American strug- 
gles in Seoul, Inchon, Buchon, Bupyong, Uijongbu, Taegu 
and other parts of South Korea. 

In this way, South Korean workers, inspired by the develop- 
ing revolutionary armed guerrilla actions, are expanding and 
strengthening their struggles, led by workers in railway, coal 
mining, telecommunication, longshore and textile, which are 
key industries of South Korea. Through their difficult strug- 


256 


RE V01UT,0S IN SOUTH KOREA AND UH.E.CAT.OM 


gles, the workers deve.op 

battle for higher wages, ■ «* stnlgg i e against the war 
p^cy Z and"fascUt Suppression, and for denrocratic freedom. 

® s r — -• — 

South Korean P easai V ’ the couvse of their struggles, aie 

conscious and tempeie main revolutionary force, a 

f^ortog class, and are contributing great V 

to tL cause of South Korean revolution^ J46 peasant 

According to incomplete d ^ ^ first half of 1968, 

actions in many parts of ^ & 3 7 . fold gain over the 

involving a total of 1-6 * year. The Honarn district 

comparable penod o ^ for more than half 

particularly haid h > quar ter of 1968. 

the peasant actions in ^ ^ ounty . North Cholla province, 

Some 2,000 peasants mlmsi et National As- 

staged demonstrations in hont ^ ^ forcib l y reqmsr- 
sembly demanding P a >'^ wh ile in the Ulsan area, 

tinned by the puppet farmland they cultivated 

some 300 peasants squatte . South Chungchong 

S^rL“ion, for the purpose of building » 

military road. North Kyongsang province, ioi me d 

Poor peasants in Taegu, N ts > plan to evict them 

an organization to Konyang-myon and 

from their land to bui Kyongsang province, and 

ttSSZZS * ^s which le^fees and rrrr. 

gation taxes on the peasants. 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


257 


The scale of struggle is also increasing. The number of ac- 
tions in which more than 100 peasants participated comprised 
48.9 per cent of all actions in the first three months of 1967. 
This was increased to 68 percent in the same period of 1968. 
The number of actions involving more than 500 peasants 
totaled 31 in the first half of 1968, a 3.9-fold increase over the 
comparable period in 1967. These peasant struggles are mani- 
festations of the pent-up indignation over the policy of the 
U.S. -puppet regime, which is forcing them to the brink of 
complete ruin, and are a logical result of the contradictions in 
South Korean society under the occupation of U.S. imperial- 
ism. 


(3) Youth and Students 

South Korean youth and students are actively developing 
struggles to democratize the campuses against fascist efforts 
of the Pak Chung Hi regime to coordinate the campuses as 
their private institutions. In April 1968, the 1,500 students of 
Masan Commercial High School adopted a resolution express- 
ing opposition to the repressive measures taken by the regime 
and staged protest demonstrations. The 600 students of Dong- 
jung High School in Chunchon city, Kangwon province, called 
a “strike” in opposition to the fascist measures taken by the 
school authorities and waged stubborn struggles against the 
anti-people educational policy, and against high tuition fees 
and various other impositions. 

I heir attempts to oppose and boycott mandatory military 
training are directed at U.S. imperialism. On September 25, 
1958, the Pak Chung Hi clique formulated an Education En- 
loreement Ordinance to send students to war as soon as they 
gmduate from school. Under the ordinance, military training, 
which had so far been given to students at 11 high schools, 
was to be given to 400,000 students at 800 high schools 
lluoughout South Korea, starting in 1969, for two hours a 
week — a total of 40 hours (20 weeks) a year. (University stu- 


258 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


dents were to be given military training as before). The South 
Korean students fought vigorously against this militarization 
policy. Particularly noteworthy in this respect was the strug- 
gle of the Taegu High School students, who fought stubbornly 
against the school’s plan to convert three hours of physical 
culture to military training, in addition to the two hours speci- 
fied for that purpose. 

Although the struggles of the youth and students were not 
as widespread as at the time of the April Popular Uprising or 
of the June 3 and March 24 actions, their potential was greatly 
increased. They have learned by experience that they cannot 
win a decisive victory unless their struggle is linked up with 
that of workers and peasants, and they are making efforts to 
strengthen this solidarity. 

(4) Urban Struggles 

The South Korean people in urban areas are also playing a 
role in isolating U.S. imperialism and its agents and in 
strengthening the anti-U.S., national salvation united fiont. 
Characteristic of the struggles of ordinary city people is then- 
mass base and the fact that they are assuming a violent nature. 

At the end of March 1968, inhabitants of Chungong-dong, 
Sudaemun ward in the city of Seoul, fought against the Pak 
Chung Hi clique’s edict to forcibly clear the area of shacks. 
They occupied the dong office and assaulted several police- 
men, including an officer, of the Sudaemun police station, who 
were imprisoned at the dong office. There are countless other 
such instances. 

It is also characteristic of the urban struggles that the city 
people arc becoming more and more indignant at the policies 
of the Pak Chung Hi clique. In January 1968, some 2,000,in- 
habitants of Ryongtaek-dong and Dodu-dong in Cheju Island 
held a meeting, adopted a resolution against the expansion of 
the Cheju airstrip, and submitted the resolution to the puppet 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


259 


government. The people of Ryosu had demonstrations de- 
manding compensation and an immediate stop to construction 
of the naval port and military roads on which they were forced 
to work daily without adequate safety measures. 

(5) Guerrilla Struggles 

The revolutionaries and patriots of South Korea are develop- 
ing diverse forms of struggle, and even combining them with 
armed actions. 

The form and method of revolutionary struggle are deter- 
mined by actual subjective and objective conditions, and par- 
ticularly by the resistance of the reactionary, ruling classes. 
In conditions where all democratic rights are denied and liv- 
ing conditions depressed, the people have no alternative but 
to turn to armed struggle to fight counter-revolutionary force. 

I hey use as their guide the historical lessons learned in the 
anti-Japanese armed struggles led by Kim 11 Sung under 
Japanese colonial rule. 

The guerrilla struggles, which began in South Korea in the 
latter half of 1967, have been expanding rapidly since the 
armed attack on the Presidential Residence in the central 
l nu "t of Seoul on January 21, 1968. Even according to data re- 
leased by the puppet authorities, there were more than 200 
attacks by armed guerrilla units in various parts of South Korea 
between January and the end of October 1968, wounding, 
killing and executing more than 2,000 U.S. aggressors, puppet 
military police and their agents. 

Guerrilla units showered hand grenades on the building 
of the International Telephone and Telegraph office in the 
central part of Seoul on the night of April 30, 1968, and took 
notions in Wonjon Wonsong county, Hweng county, Kosong 
county and other areas of Kangwon province on June 22, 23 
and 24. Since November 1968, armed guerrilla units have 
been activated in Susan, South Chungehong province; Wuljin 


260 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


and Bonghwa counties, North Kyongsang province; Samchok, 
Myungju, Jongson, Pyangchang and other areas of Kangwon 
province. On November 3, a guerrilla unit in the eastern part 
of South Korea ambushed a small enemy squad on the move, 
rained hand-grenades and bullets on the enemy and left 
quickly. The guerrilla forces are increasing their equipment 
with arms and weapons taken from the U.S. Army and the 
puppets, with the help of the people. 

Armed struggle is also being directed against U.S. forces in 
frequent raids on military trains. On September 3, 1968 South 
Korean patriots rained bullets on a military train between 
Komo Station and Kyongsan Station in North Kyongsang prov- 
ince, and on November 3 they derailed a military train in a 
tunnel at Sangwol-ri, Sinrim-myon, Wonsong county, Kang- 
won province. 

From early in 1968, as in 1967, armed struggles were de- 
veloped in various areas of South Korea, particularly in the 
provinces of Kyonggi, Chungchong, South Kyongsang, and 
Kangwon. Guerrillas fought fierce battles with the enemy in 
66 places in about 10 days after the thrust into Seoul on Jan- 
uary 21, killing 104 U.S. soldiers and puppet military police 
and destroying a number of military vehicles and other war 
materials. 

Guerrillas have the active support of broad sections of the 
people and rapidly are increasing their ranks. Guerrillas, 
who moved into Buk-myon, Wuljin county, South Kyongsang 
province on November 2, 1968, held the village all night and, 
after executing traitors and puppet military police, appealed 
to the villagers to “establish genuine people’s power.” They 
praised enthusiastically the northern half of the Republic, and 
the villagers, greatly impressed by their speeches, received 
them warmly. They volunteered to join the guenillas, pledg 
ing “to fight to the end, risking their lives, in the struggle to 
w’in a new government, a new system and a new life. 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


261 


South Korean revolutionaries and patriots are actively re- 
cruiting forces, as was demonstrated by the guerrillas who 
thrust into Wuljin and Bonghwa counties of North Kyongsang 
province in early November. While dealing a heavy blow at 
the enemy in these counties, they organized a revolutionary 
party and formed a National Salvation Youth League and a 
Revolutionary Women’s Association, mass organizations to 
cement kinship among the people. In Bonghwa county, a 
people’s committee was organized on the basis of the unity of 
the revolutionary organizations with broad sections of the 
people. 

These instances indicate that the revolutionary struggles of 
the South Korean people are beginning to enter a new phase. 


3. THE UNITED REVOLUTIONARY PARTY 
OF SOUTH KOREA 


With great appreciation of the heroic struggles of South Ko- 
rean revolutionaries and patriots, Kim 11 Sung said: 

The priceless achievements of struggle gained by the revolution- 
aries and patriotic people in South Korea in their dedicated fight for 
Ihe freedom and liberation of the people, for the unification and 
independence of the fatherland will shine forever in the proud his- 
lory of revolution in our country. 5 

An important place in the proud struggles of the South 
Koreans is held by members of the United Revolutionary 
I’arty (URP), including the late Choi Yong Do, chairman of the 
South Cholla Provincial Committee of the Party, and Kim 
long Tae, chairman of its Seoul City Committee. 

The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the 
I )I’RK conferred the title “Hero of the Republic,” the Gold 
Mar medal and the National Flag, First Class, on the late Choi 


262 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


Yong Do, in recognition of his heroic and devoted struggle. 
He was arrested and imprisoned in July 1968 in connection 
with the Imja Island “incident,” and was barbarously mur- 
dered in prison on January 25, 1969. 

The URP is a militant underground organization, based on 
the ideas of Kim 11 Sung regarding the South Korean revolu- 
tion and all-Korea unification. The Party has developed rev- 
olutionary anti-American, national salvation struggles on a 
large scale. 

The basic policy on the South Korean revolution at the present 
stage [says Kim 11 Sung] is to make preparations for an impending 
great revolutionary event by preserving the revolutionary forces 
from suppression by the enemy and, at the same time, by constantly 
strengthening and enlarging them. Most important for this purpose is 
to build a solid revolutionary party and to build the main contingent 
of the revolution in South Korea. 6 

After a long period of preparation, in which Choi Yong Do 
played a leading role, the URP was founded on March 15, 
1964. At that time, just before the March 24 struggle against 
the ROK-Japan Treaty, class and national contradictions were 
extremely acute in South Korea. The Party necessarily started 
as an underground organization and remains so to this day in 
the midst of blatant fascist terrorism. Represented in this or- 
ganization are progressive people in all walks of life, but work- 
ers and peasants are the main force. For example, Choi Yong 
Do and Kim Jong Tae, both of poor peasant origin, were chair- 
men of the South Cholla Provincial Committee and the Seoul 
City Committee, respectively, around which rallied workers, 
peasants, youths and students, writers, teachers, journalists, 
doctors, company employees, national capitalists, politicians 
and even puppet army officers. 

The Party’s program calls for building up powerful revolu 
tionary forces, driving U.S. imperialism out of South Korea, 
overthrowing their agents, and completing the national lib 
eration democratic revolution through unification of the 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


263 


fatherland. The program defines the 14 tasks necessary to 
achieve success, among which are included: “to prepare to 
secure hegemony in armed struggle,” i.e., to secure decisive 
superiority over the counter-revolutionary armed power; “to 
organize academic study groups and train leading cadres of 
the Paity, and to arm all organizations ideologically so that 
they may be developed into guerrilla units in the future.” 
Kim II Sung says: I he leading core of Party organizations 

must consist of competent revolutionaries who are capable 
of judging a situation accurately and of skillfully leading the 
movement on the basis of the tactical and strategic principles 
of Marxism-Leninism in any complicated circumstances.” 7 
On this principle, revolutionaries, beginning with Choi Yung 
Do, concentrated on picking outstanding cadres from among 
the workers, peasants, youth and students, and intellectuals 
and on training them as competent revolutionaries. The URP 
now has a core of several hundred leading cadres in South 
Korea. 

While building its own organization, the Party also built 
democratic mass organizations around itself, in conformity 
with the teaching of Kim II Sung, who said: 

Mass organizations must include the broad masses; they must be 
democratic organizations that truly defend class interests, and they 
must be legal organizations in principle. When the workers and 
peasants are gathered together and alerted by their organizations and 
united around the Party, the revolution in South Korea will have a 
powerful main force. 8 

Under the leadership of the URP, a number of mass organ- 
izations were formed, including the following nine democratic 
gioups in Seoul: the New Culture Study Society, Young Lit- 
erary Writers’ Society, Buddhist Youth Society, Donghak So- 
ciety, Youth Association, Society for the Study of National- 
ism, Christian Youth Economic Welfare Association, Kyongyu 
Society, and the Bachelors of Art Pub. 


264 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 

The New Culture Study Society was formed around the 
graduates of the Literature and Science College of Seoul 
University. The society had six subcommittees -on history, 
politics, social affairs, economics, culture, and law -and its 
aim was to “relate problems in all these areas to the theories 
of communism and to acquire communist ideas.” 

Im Jung Sam, a literary critic and graduate of Songgungwan 
University, was the leading figure in The Young Literary 
Writers* Society; among its members were progressive nov- 
elists, critics, poets and journalists from various universi- 
ties who helped spread its revolutionary influence among the 
masses. 

The Buddhist Youth Society was made up of graduates of 
Songgungwan and Tongguk universities, with Kim Hi San, oi 
Songgungwan, as its leader. It organized the Sangsan Culture 
Association to train leading cadres and at the same time 
worked with ordinary Buddhist believers, organizing and 
mobilizing them in revolutionary struggles by training them 
politically and ideologically. 

The Ponghak Society was a group of graduates and under- 
graduates of Seoul University, with Ro In Yong, a graduate ol 
the Literature and Science College, as its leader. 

It is also important, in forming the main contingent of the 
revolution, to build a united front ot people of various social 
strata. Kim 11 Sung has this to say: 

To win victory for the revolution, it is necessary to mobilize all 
forces that are interested in the revolution while building up its main 
force. Only by winning over all forces that can be won over and unit- 
ing them into a single political lorce will it be possible to fully isolate 
the counter-revolution, secure overwhelming superiority over it for 
the revolutionary forces, and lead the revolution to victory. 

It is one of the most important tasks in strengthening the revolu- 
tionary forces and advancing the revolutionary struggle to form a 
broad anti-U.S. united front for national salvation that embraces the 
patriotic democratic forces of all circles and strata in South Korea 
today . 9 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


265 


In accord with this policy, the URP built the national lib- 
eration front and the fatherland liberation front, uniting people 
in all walks of life and developing active struggles to form a 
broad-based anti-U.S., national liberation united front. 

Kim II Sung teaches that it is important to develop the polit- 
ical and ideological consciousness of the masses in order to 
preserve and increase the revolutionary forces: “The first 
and foremost task in isolating the counter-revolution and in- 
creasing the revolutionary forces is to awaken the masses 
politically and ideologically.” 10 

It is especially important today, when the United States and 
its puppets are intensifying daily the reactionary ideological 
offensive in South Korea to lull the class and national con- 
sciousness of the masses, to carry out political, ideological 
and educational activities. It is only in this way that the South 
Korean people will be convinced of victory in their struggle 
for freedom and liberation. It is also essential for the South 
Koieans to be educated in the revolutionary traditions of anti- 
Japanese armed struggle. 

Members of the URP worked to implement the tasks re- 
gal ding political and ideological education. First, they con- 
centrated on learning Kim 11 Sung’s revolutionary ideas by 
studying his writings and his biography. They published 
Ilyokymong Jongson (Revolutionary Front) as their party 
newspaper and Chong Mack (Blue Range of Mountains) as 
the party magazine, and they established study circles. 

Hyokmyong Jongson carried revolutionary articles and news 
items, and Chong Maek published stories to encourage and 
hearten the masses so as to arouse their anti-U.S. imperialist 
and anti-“government” feelings and to inspire them to fight 
vigorously for a new government, a new system and a new 
life. The first issue of the Chong Maek was published in 
August 1964, and 44,000 copies had been published by June 
1967. The political and ideological activities of the members 
ol the United Revolutionary Party reached not only the basic 
masses of South Korea but even into the puppet army. 


266 


REVOLUTION IN SOUTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION 


Kim II Sung wrote: “Revolutionary forces cannot be pre- 
pared automatically, without any struggle. They can grow in 
strength only through arduous struggles. It is through the or- 
deals of struggle that leaders and the nucleus of revolution 
are reared, the masses of people awakened and revolutionary 

forces increase.’’ 11 , 

In conducting mass struggles, the URP searched for meth- 
ods appropriate to the constantly changing revolutionary sit- 
uation in relation to the goals, and combined these factors ac- 
cording to the teachings of Kim 11 Sung. In this way, rt was 
possible to maintain the strategic and tactical princip e of 
dealing blows at the enemy from all sides. Thus, political and 
economic struggles, legal and illegal struggles, violent an 
non-violent struggles were all combined and carried out as 
part of the preparations for the decisive battle to overthrow 
the colonial rule of U.S. imperialism and recover sovereignty 
for the people. 

For instance, the URP carefully organized and led large- 
scale demonstrations against the fake election of June 8, 1967, 
and against the inauguration of the “President, dealing^ 
smarting blow at the enemy. It also led a demonstration 
against the visit of the former U.S. Vice-President to South 
Korea. These struggles continued for more than 20 days in 
30 places in South Korea, and involved over 200,000 persons 
in 145 universities, middle and high schools and 32,000 other 
citizens. In addition, the Party led other struggles; Choi Yong 
Do obtained weapons in Imja Island in South Cliolla province 
and organized the training of military leaders in preparation 
for the South Korean revolution. 

“People who make a revolution should not permit theii 
political lives to be sullied even when their physical lives may 
be ended,” 12 Kim II Sung said. Bearing this dictum in mind, 
Choi Yong Do fought to the end and remained a faithful Ko- 
rean communist even though he was subjected to barbarous 
torture after he was arrested and imprisoned. He continued 


THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 


267 


to fight resolutely against the enemy, turning prison and 
court into a new arena of struggle, the murderous court into a 
tribunal where the aggressors and the traitors to the nation 
were put on trial. 

Afraid of his revolutionary struggle and his devotion to his 
cause, the puppet authorities sentenced Choi Yong Do to 
death on December 27, 1968, under the national security law 
and the anti-Communist law, and he was murdered in a prison 
cell on January 25, 1969. He was 47 years of age. 

If U.S. imperialism and its agents kill a revolutionary, thou- 
sands of other revolutionaries and patriots will replace him in 
the ranks of the revolution. This is the law of development of 
revolution. The revolutionaries and patriots of South Korea 
will surely overthrow the U.S. aggressors and their stooges 
and win ultimate victory in the South Korean revolution. As 
Kim II Sung said: 

In spite of fascist suppression and all kinds of fraudulent artifices 
of the U.S. imperialists and their puppet clique, the South Korean 
people will be further awakened and steeled through the struggle 
and will grow into an invincible revolutionary force which will even- 
tually overthrow U.S. imperialist rule. In due course they will surely 
drive out the U.S. imperialist aggressors and overthrow their lackeys, 
and thereby emerge victorious from the revolution . 13 


PART THREE 


The Korean Revolution 
and the World Revolution 


In his report at the celebration of the 20th anniversary of 
the founding of the Republic, Premier Kim 11 Sung made it 
clear that the Korean revolution is a part of the world revolu- 
tion and that the struggle of the Korean people to drive U.S. 
imperialist struggles against the leader of world imperial- 
being developed in close relation to the anti-imperialist, espe- 
cially anti-American, struggle being waged on a worldwide 
scale. 

South Korea is not only a total colony of the United States 
but is also its military base for aggression against the whole of 
Korea and Asia. Our country is a front in the sharp anti- 
imperialist struggles against the leader of world imperial- 
ism. The Koreans are fulfilling their national and international 
duties by fighting to drive U.S. imperialism out of South 
Korea and unify the fatherland. 

In this report, Kim 11 Sung gives clear Marxist-Leninist 
explanations on the question of strategy and tactics for the 
anti-imperialist, anti-American struggles. He projects a strat- 
egy for the revolutionary peoples of the world, and particu- 
larly for the peoples of small revolutionary countries, to de- 
stroy U.S. imperialism. It is a positive strategy, directing the 
spearhead of struggle at the main enemy, U.S. imperialism, 
and concentrating attacks on it from all sides to drive it com- 
pletely onto the defensive. 


269 


CHAPTER I 


Kim II Sung on Acceleration 
of the World Revolution 

1. THE FIGHT AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM 

Kim 11 Sung wrote: All the events taking place in the inter- 
national arena prove more and more clearly that U.S. im- 
perialism is the main force of aggression and war, the inter- 
national gendarme, the bulwark of modern colonialism and 
llie most heinous enemy of the people of the whole world.” 1 

What is most important today, therefore, is for all the 
world’s anti-imperialist forces to concentrate their attacks 
on U.S. imperialism. This is the unquestionable course of the 
historical development of the world revolution and of the ob- 
icetive process of the anti-imperialist struggle. It is the con- 
' fusion necessarily derived from a Marxist-Leninist analysis 
ol t he development of the international situation at the present 
lage, the class nature of U.S. imperialism, the position and 
mle of the United States in the system of imperialist aggres- 
sion and its strategy for world domination. 

All the anti-imperialist forces of the world should unite to 
spearhead their struggle against U.S. imperialism because it 
r. the ringleader of aggression as head of world imperialism. 
Since the end of World War II, the system of imperialism has 
I icon reorganized with the United States at its center, polit- 
ir. illy and militarily, as well as economically. 

I he United States was the only imperialist power that was 
mil directly hit by World War II. On the contrary, in the 


271 


272 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


course of the war, American monopoly capital was able to rake 
in fabulous wartime superprofits. In contrast, Germany, 
Italy, Japan and other imperialist powers were defeated and 
the economic power of the victors, Britain and France, was 
decisively weakened. Consequently, the United States 
emerged as the most powerful reactionary force in the capital 
ist system after the war. 

Moreover, U.S. imperialism used the war boom to over 
come the effects of the serious economic crisis of the 1930’s, 
and for easing the problems arising from the general crisis ol 
capitalism. However, the general crisis continued to deepen 
in the postwar period, as U.S. imperialism engaged in military 
provocations in all parts of the world, strengthened its arma 
ments, and heightened international tension. U.S. monopoly 
capital temporarily averted a major crisis of overproduction, 
largely by maintaining military production on a wartime or 
near- wartime footing. U.S. monopolies were thus able to pom 
their huge superprofits into the renewal and expansion ol 
fixed assets, continuously increasing the productive forces, 
and further strengthening their economic power. Supported 
by huge industrial power, U.S. imperialism by far surpassed 
other nations in military capability, and boasted of its alleged 
global military supremacy. 

Under these conditions -overwhelmingly superior econoni 
ic and military power and the relative weakening of othei 
imperialist powers -the United States emerged as the bid 
wark of world colonialism, whatever the form. It also set up 
under its control various aggressive military blocs to serve its 
ambition of world domination, and adopted its so-called “aid 
policy for the same purpose. 

The network of U.S. military bases extends throughout the 
capitalist world, threatening the independence and freedom 
of the host countries and world peace. The United States 
revived and reactivated West German and Japanese militarism 
in order to reorganize the world system of imperialist reae 


ON ACCELERATION OF WORLD REVOLUTION 


273 


lion, of which it is the international gendarme. As the ring- 
leader of aggression and war and the main enemy of peace, 
democracy, national independence and socialism, the United 
States has become the prime target of anti-imperialist forces 
llie world over. 

The setback suffered by U.S. imperialism in the Fatherland 
Liberation War of the Korean people (1950-53) marked the 
beginning of the decline in its relative power. Since then, 
and especially in recent years, it has lost ground to other impe- 
rialist countries and especially to the socialist camp in eco- 
nomic and military strength. 

However, U.S. imperialism remains by far the strongest 
power, especially militarily, in the capitalist world. The very 
laet of its declining relative position spurs it to lash out more 
viciously in the vain attempt to achieve its world domination 
aims. Kim II Sung says: 

U.S. imperialism is working desperately to find a way out of its 
impending doom by aggravating international tensions, stepping up 
I In* arms drive and unleashing a new war of aggression. . . . U.S. 
imperialism extends its talons of aggression to all parts and all 
countries of the world— Asia and Europe, Africa and Latin America, 
and big and small countries. 2 

During the present period the strategy of U.S. imperialism 
is to concentrate on attacking smaller and weaker countries, 

• •specially newly independent countries and divided coun- 
tries which are partly socialist. It speculates on hoped-for 
plits in the socialist camp to prevent adequate aid to these 
countries in their resistance to U.S. imperialism. At the same 
lime, U.S. imperialism continues to prepare for a possible sud- 
den global nuclear aggression against the USSR, China and all 
peoples of the world. 

following this strategy, the United States is expanding 
military preparations, strengthening its foreign bases and 
military alliances to attack socialist and progressive countries. 

I ol ^stance, in fiscal 1968 direct U.S. military spending 


274 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


reached $76,200 million which, together with indirect mill 
tary expenditures, accounted for more than 50 per cent of the 
total national budget of the United States. Defense accounts 
for 20 per cent of the total production of U.S. heavy industry. 

As part of its war policy, the United States today maintains 
more than 2,000 military bases in more than 90 countries <>l 
Asia, Oceania, Europe, Latin American and Africa, with 1.5 
million members of the U.S. armed forces stationed there 
Since the end of World War II, there have been more than 200 
large and small wars, all caused directly by U.S. imperialism 
It continues to make large-scale preparations for global <» 
nuclear war, and has engaged in barbarous aggressive wars. 

The maneuvers of U.S. imperialism al the present stage arc 
designed, in the first place, to intensify aggression and sub 
versive activities especially against the socialist countries. II 
is stepping up the barbarous war of genocide in Vietnam, Laos 
and Cambodia. Occupying the Cuban territory of Guantanamo, 
it continuously perpetrates aggressive and provocative maneu 
vers against the Republic of Cuba. Its efforts to provoke a new 
war in Korea have reached a grave stage, with new wai 
preparations in South Korea and more open military provoca 
tions against the DPRK as the anti-American, national salva 
tion struggle grows in South Korea. 

Pursuing a policy of suppressing national liberation move 
ments of Asian, African and Latin American peoples, it is try 
ing to strangle national independence everywhere. The 
United States instigated the Israeli expansionists to launch 
an aggressive war against the Arab peoples and is malicious I \ 
attempting to stifle their struggle for national independence 
and a new life. 

In recent years, the United States has been more open in its 
subversive activities against newly independent national 
states. It has penetrated countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, with “aid” as a bait, meddles in their internal affairs 
and, having bribed and gathered reactionaries to oppose 


ON ACCELERATION OF WORLD REVOLUTION 


2 75 


progressive forces, engineers reactionary military coups. In 
this way it plots to sway these countries to the right and 
prevent their firm adhesion to the anti-imperialist camp. 

As a result of the revival by the United States of Japanese 
imd West German militarism, they have grown into dangerous 
aggressive forces in Asia and Europe, menacing the peace 
imd security of the world. 

I here can be no question that U.S. imperialism is the main 
loiee of aggression and war, the main enemy of the peoples. 

• he most urgent revolutionary task is to defeat the world 
strategy of U.S. imperialism. Then, the anti-imperialist 
struggle will develop by leaps and bounds, and the world 
revolution will be accelerated decisively. 

2. THE SIMULTANEOUS FIGHT AGAINST 
ALLIES OF U.S. IMPERIALISM 

In order to fight against U.S. imperialism and defend world 
peace [Kim II Sung says], it is imperative to fight against the lackeys 
"I U.S. imperialism and its allies. 

An important factor in U.S. imperialist strategy is to induce all 
loiccs of reaction to oppose socialism and the national liberation 
movement. In executing their policies of aggression and war, the 
I S. imperialists count on the reactionary forces in many countries 
ili.it use U.S. imperialism as a guide for aggression. Typical examples 

Japanese and West German militarism . 3 

While U.S. imperialism is the main target of all the peoples 
"I I he world, this does not mean that the struggle against other 
imperialist powers, particularly against the lackeys and allies 
"I U.S. imperialism, can be underestimated. On the contrary, 
decisive blows can be dealt only when the principal target 
umI its allies are correctly specified and the struggles against 
l hem are linked. The power of socialist countries is increasing, 
ond vigorous national liberation movements are developing in 
V.iu, Africa and Latin America. As a result, the U.S. strategy 


276 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


of attacking socialist and progressive countries one at a time 
is being dealt hard blows in all parts of the world. Confronted 
by an overall collapse of its system of colonial domination, 
the United States seeks a solution to this crisis in open aggros 
sion and war. In these circumstances, it is important for it In 
induce all forces of reaction to oppose socialism and the 
national liberation movement, and to carry out its aggressive 
world strategy. 

Today, Japanese and West German militarism are the mosl 
loyal allies of the United States and are active agents of ils 
aggressive policy. They have become “shock brigades” <>! 
U.S. imperialism and are creating dangerous hotbeds of wai 
The struggle against them should be strengthened, as an im 
portant part of the struggle against U.S. imperialism. 

It is of special importance to intensify the struggle againsl 
Japanese militarism. Kim II Sung puts it this way: 

Today the U.S. imperialists are directing the spearhead of aggie, 
sion particularly to Asia, and Japanese militarism is faithfully sen 
ing the U.S. as its “shock brigade” in Asian aggression. . . . The Jap.t 
nese militarists, at the bidding of the U.S., are making active prepai u 
tions for anew war and Japan is serving the U.S. imperialists as a sup 
ply base and military base for aggression against Asian countries. In 
these circumstance, the struggle against Japanese militarism can l>\ 
no means be neglected . 4 

Concentrating its military forces in Asia, the United Stales 
is integrating Asian anti-communist dependencies into il 
plan, reorganizing them and utilizing the power of revived 
Japanese militarism to which is assigned a leading role in (In 
anti-communist military bloc. 

The Japanese, with the backing of the United States, an 
trying to realize their old dream of Asian aggression and an 
working up war plans against Korea and other socialist conn 
tries of Asia. They are also increasing economic and cullui.il 
infiltration into Asian, African and Latin American counh i< 
under the slogans of “aid,” “joint development” and “cm 


ON ACCELERATION OF WORLD REVOLUTION 


277 


nomic and technical cooperation.” An example of these 
maneuvers is Japan’s reentry into South Korea. Under the 
T^'so f the United States, the Japanese, in collusion with the 
a \ . lung Hi regime, have again penetrated South Korea, 
especially since the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty! 

hey have interfered in politics, the economy, military affairs 
mid culture and all other spheres, with the intention of re- 
ducing South Korea again to the status of their own colony. 

In military affairs, Japan is reinforcing U.S. domination 
ovoi South Korea. The plan is to use South Korea as a military 
. e in an anti-communist Pacific military alliance (PATO) 
will) Japan at the center, by linking the Northeast Asian 
reaty Organization (NEATO) with the Southeast Asian 
"■aty Organization (SEATO) in a reorganization of these 
alliances into a “vertical military relationship” with the U.S. 

• il the apex. This is clearly seen in the establishment of a 
•milled system of command and telecommunications- with 

U,S> Army at t,le core -unification of military equipment 
mid joint military maneuvers of South Korea, the United States’ 
unci Japan. 

Concerning establishment of a unified system of command 
mid telecommunications we cite the Japan-U.S. secret agree- 
mrnt concerning “mutual exchange of directions and informa- 
mn among the Air Force Commands of South Korea, the 

il "u Irso tGS an< * J apan ” wllich was exposed in March 1967, 

. “ ‘ DGE system which went into operation in March ] 969 

dm opening of diffirsed wave communications between South 

Korea and J a P an > and the construction of a large long-wave 
ii.msmitter in Pusan. 

I he standardization of military equipment was started long 
.-go. Recently, since the escalation of the war in Vietnam 

I il oeurement of military supplies from Japan has increased 

• n.irply. 

Japanese militarism is also lightening the burden of U.S. 
military aid by providing so-called “property claims funds” 


278 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


and granting credits to South Korea. These funds have been 
invested in strengthening the military potential of South 
Korea, e.g., the Taejon Engineering Arsenal and the Pusan 
Arsenal, and in constructing ports and harbors, military roads, 
explosives manufacturing factories and communications 
equipment, as well as investing funds to supply military 
vehicles and various kinds of weapons to the puppet army of 
South Korea. The expressway between Seoul and Pusan, on 
which construction is being expedited with aid from Japan, 
is designed wide enough to serve as an emergency air strip, 
and it is specially reinforced to withstand heavy tanks. 

Under directions from the United States, the Japanese 
frequently conduct military maneuvers in anticipation of 
actual operations in Korea. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are 
trained in mountainous areas with climatic conditions similar 
to Korea; they study U.S. Army records of the Korean War 
and learn the Korean language. The Japanese are concentrat- 
ing land, sea and air units of the Self-Defense Forces in areas 
close to Korea and openly conduct large-scale straits-blockade 
and anti-submarine training maneuvers, with the naval forces 
of the United States and South Korea, in the East Sea and near 
the straits of Korea; the Seventh Fleet of the United States is 
the central force. 

As has been widely exposed, Japanese militarism has al- 
ready worked out a number of operational plans in anticipa- 
tion of a second Korean War, including Operation Three Ar- 
row, Operation Flying Dragon, and Operation Bull Run.* 
Puppet Prime Minister Chung 11 Kwon of South Korea stated 
that if a war breaks out in Korea, Japan will aid the ROK as a 
participant with the UN forces. This statement indicates the 
main purpose lor which the Japanese are accelerating their 
remilitarization. 

Japan s place in the world strategy of the United States is 
*See, for example, Wilfred G. Burchett, Again Korea, New York, 1968. 


ON ACCELERATION OF WORfD REVOLUTION 


279 


not confined to Korea. It plays an active role in the war in 
Vietnam -as a supply base, as a front line base where weapons 
and arms are repaired, as a direct operational base for B-52 
strategic bombers and the Seventh Fleet, and as a base for the 
transport of military personnel. 

U.S. imperialism utilizes Japan as a nodal point connecting 
Vietnam to Korea, for military provocations, and for escalation 
of the war in Vietnam. Both the RB-47 reconnaissance plane, 
which violated the territorial air space of Korea and was shot 
down in August 1964, and the spy ship Pueblo, which invaded 
the territorial waters of the Republic and was captured in 
January 1968, were based on Japan. 

The ROK-Japan Treaty is essentially a military alliance and 
naturally requires political domination and subjugation in 
support of it. The seven-article treaty gives a legal basis for 
establishing the Japanese role in the political domination of 
South Korea, in conjunction with the United States. In other 
words, it is intended to guarantee and justify the political role 
of the Japanese as an ally of the United States in Korea. 

On the basis of this legal system, a Japanese embassy and 
consultate have already been established in South Korea, 
staffed by political, diplomatic, military, police and informa- 
tion officers experienced in the colonial domination of South 
Korea. Other permanent organizations, such as a ministerial 
conference of the ROK and Japan, have been established. The 
joint colonization of South Korea by the United States and 
Japan is supported, as we have seen, by the export of state 
capital in the name of “property claims funds” and also of 
private monopoly capital; through the “yen collateral fund” 
the Japanese have obtained a voice in the control of the 
finances of the puppet regime- Economic penetration by Japa- 
nese monopoly capital has been stepped up since the conclu- 
sion of the ROK-Japan Treaty, reflecting the desire to convert 
South Korea into an economic appendage and to control its 
market for the export of capital and commodities. 


280 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


Elsewhere, the Japanese support the aggressive acts of the 
Israeli expansionists in the Middle and Near Eastern areas, 
and oppose the righteous struggles of the Arabs. A revived 
and remilitarized Japan has become a dangerous aggressive 
force threatening the peace of Asia and of the world and the 
struggle against Japanese militarism cannot be neglected. 

“We must be aware of the danger of Japanese militarism in 
Asia along with that of West German militarism in Europe,” 
wrote Kim II Sung. “As all the socialist countries struggle 
against West German militarism, along with U.S. imperialism, 
in Europe, so they should fight against Japanese militarism, 
along with U.S. militarism, in Asia .” 5 

It is erroneous, in terms of the anti-imperialist and anti- 
American struggle, to emphasize only the danger of West* 
German militarism and ignore the danger of Japanese mili- 
tarism, which may lead to a policy of unprincipled compromise 
with Japanese militarism instead of fighting against it. 

To underestimate the danger of Japanese militarism and 
take a negative attitude toward fighting against it, is tanta- 
mount to encouraging its aggressive ambitions and strengthen- 
ing the position of the United States in Asia. To be sure, there 
are certain contradictions in the relations between the United 
States and Japan, but since these imperialisms have a common 
interest in aggression against Asia, they are closely linked 
politically, economically and militarily. To underestimate the 
alliance of the Japanese with the United States, to overesti- 
mate contradictions between them, is to deviate from the class 
principle that must be upheld in strengthening anti-imperial- 
ist, anti-American struggles. 

At the same time, of course, the contradictions between 
Japanese and American imperialism are growing, and if 
properly utilized, can aid the struggle for national liberation. 


CHAPTER II 


Revolutionary Strategy of 
Anti-Imperialist, Anti-U.S. Struggle 


The peoples of all countries making revolution should tear the 

imbs from the U.S. beast and behead it all over the world [Kim II 
Sung said] The U.S. imperialists appear to be strong, but when the 
peoples of many countries attack them horn all sides and join to 

mu l ate them in that way, they will become impotent and bite the 
dust in the end . 1 

Regarding the basic strategy of the United States and the 
present stage of the anti-imperialist, anti-American struggle 
Kim II Sung says: ’ 

For the successful defeat of U.S. imperialism, it is necessary to 
understand its world strategy thoroughly. 

The basic strategy of U.S. imperialism for world aggression at the 
present stage is to destroy by armed force the small and divided 
revolutionary socialist countries and newly independent countries 
one by one, while refraining from worsening its relations with big 
powers and avoiding confrontation with them as far as possible and 
to intensify the ideological and political offensive against, and sub- 
vert from within, those countries which are weak ideologically and 
unwilling to make a revolution, spreading illusions about imperial- 
ism among the people clamoring only for unprincipled coexistence 
lm P enallsm , a nd a desire to live on good terms with imperial- 

On the basis of its world strategy, the United States, while 
making large-scale preparations for global or nuclear war has 
been committed to the policy of waging “local wars” ’and 


281 


282 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


“special wars” in different areas in the world, including 
Vietnam. While bribing unstable elements that are afraid of 
revolution, e.g., among labor leaders, and utilizing them as 
their agents, the U.S. imperialists actively pursue a cold war 
of a new type, promoting sham “liberalization” and “demo- 
cratic developments” in certain countries. Under this cover, 
they engage in subversive activities, trying to detach newly 
independent countries one by one from the anti-imperialist 
front. They offer “aid” as a bait and meddle in internal affairs, 
seeking to foment counter-revolution by uniting rightist 
reactionaries in opposition to the progressive forces. How- 
ever, as Kim 11 Sung says, “Like any other imperialism on the 
globe, U.S. imperialism, too, is declining steadily and becom- 
ing moribund. The intensified aggressive maneuvers of U.Sh 
imperialists are not signs of strength but, on the contrary, 
prove their vulnerability.” 3 

Setbacks in the aggressive war in Vietnam and the bank- 
ruptcy of its war policies show that the United States is no 
longer a symbol of strength but, on the contrary, a symbol of 
weakness; its crisis is deepening in the face of the upsurge of 
worldwide anti-imperialist, anti-American revolutionary 
struggles. The more the United States holds to its policy of 
aggression and war, the stronger will be the counter-attacks 
it evokes; the contradictions inherent in its world position will 
intensify and precipitate its downfall. It is in its aggressive 
Asian policy that the weakness of U.S. imperialism and its 
structural crisis are revealed most clearly, especially in 
Korea and Vietnam where it most blatantly conducts aggres- 
sive war and war provocation. 

While the United States has been conducting the unde- 
clared war in Vietnam, it has sharpened its antagonisms with 
the socialist camp, newly independent countries and other 
peace-loving forces of the world. At the same time, it is now 
isolated more and more from capitalist countries in Europe, 
which are afraid that the escalation of the Vietnam war will 


STRATEGY OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE 


283 


have unfavorable political and economic repercussions on 
them, and even from its Southeast Asian satellites which are 
opposed to the expansion of the war. The isolation of US 

S*" If *?**-*: , Pak Chung Hi regime of Sou* 
f a ailc ^ u * of colonial dependencies in Asia are the 

on y countries that support actively the aggression in Vietnam. 

n. , oleov ® r > * e war in Vietnam is deeply dividing the United 
States itself. Distrust of government leaders, especially of the 
resident ! S spreading rapidly among the American people 
over the Vietnam policy. As a result, contradictions between 
ruling circles and the people of the United States are growing. 
ie escalation of the Vietnam war by reactionary ruling cir- 

terv’- he T ] lta T lndUS i rial COmplex ’ and the jingoistic mili- 

IcuteTht^L iV i S ° CiaI C ° ntradictions morc and more 
Hn r v Sr ° hberatlon movement, in which the opposi- 
ion to the \ietnam war and the struggle for civil rights are 

S a ;- r C °T g SHaiPer; eCOnomic difficulties and moral 
g ation, with a great increase in criminal offenses are 
causing deepening social unrest and disaffection. 

Practically the entire student body of the country is engaged 
in mounting struggle against U.S. aggression in Southeast 
Asia and against the militarization of the country. The youth 
are in revolt against the military, with large numbers of those 
called for service failing to report, or refusing to accept induc- 
tion when they do report. Tens of thousands have deserted 
and gone into exile. 

J he working class is struggling increasingly against the 
ie uc ion in its living standards due to soaring wartime prices 
an taxes, and against the growing repressive activities of the 
government. Millions of workers are going on strik^gainri 
the monopolies, and undermining the positions of the pro- 
lmpenahst right-wing union leaders. 

of die In kne ' SS ; f l h l Umted States is aIso seen in die crisis 
of the dollar and of the international monetary system, es- 

sen 1a e ements in U.S. imperialism’s aggressive global 


284 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


strategy. Enormous sums are spent for U.S. overseas military 
bases and support of its puppet armies and wars of aggression. 
Huge sums of capital are exported to create the basis for bil- 
lions of dollars of superprofits in areas where it has military 
domination. 

Before War II gold was the world currency for inter- 
national transactions; regardless of the strength of the United 
States, it would have been impossible to obtain enough gold 
to sustain world expansion on the scale now required. It was 
the Breton Woods agreement, the International Monetary 
Fund, that provided the monetary framework for its world- 
wide operations after World War II. 

Utilizing the IMF, the United States has been able to mobi- 
lize the necessary funds for its world strategy by making the 
dollar an international currency to take the place of gold. 
This international monetary system of the capitalist world, 
based on the dollar, was supported by the economic and mili- 
tary superiority of the United States, and particularly by the 
huge gold reserves which amounted to more than $24 billion. 
(In 1948 the United States held about TO per cent of the total 
amount of gold in the capitalist world.) 

But today, more than 20 years after the end of World War 
II, the gold reserves of the United States have been re- 
duced to about $12 billion, which is less than one-third of the 
$40 billion overseas liabilities of the United States. This in- 
dicates the real state of the dollar crisis and threatens a virtual 
downfall of the IMF, established on the basis of the dollar. 

The seriousness of the crisis is shown further by the U.S. 
balance of trade, which had been favorable and made up for 
the deficit in the international balance of payments, but 
which has now deteriorated to the point that, on a month by 
month basis, it is now in the red for about half the year. The 
deficit in the U.S. trade balance has now come to assume a 
structural character. 

A further weakening of the imperialist monetary system 


STRATEGY OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE 


285 


was^the forced introduction of the two-tier price system for 
gold, major currency devaluations and revaluations, and the 
vntual ending of the convertibility of the dollar into gold in 
international transactions. Thus, the dollar crisis has sharp- 
ened further the conflicts among the capitalist powers- the 
sharp demand of France that the price of gold be raised, clashes 
letween b ranee and West Germany over revising parity values 
at the time of the crisis of the franc in November 1968, Japan’s 

Tfu /T a T? rational redistribution of monetary gold, 
and the failure of the United States to exercise its influence in 
the settlement of the crisis of international currencies. 

ie c irect cause of the dollar crisis was the outflow of gold 
rom the United States and a consequent sharp decline in the 
amount of its gold holdings, kicked off by the growing deficit 
in the U.S. international balance of payments. Mainly respon- 
sible was the large deficit in capital transactions, due par- 
ticularly to overseas military spending and military and 
economic aid and export of private monopoly capital. In 
othei words, the dollar crisis is caused basically by U.S. 
imperialism’s policy of war and plunder which, in turn 
accelerates inflation in the U.S. economy and is indirectly 

responsible for the decline in its competitive position and its 
trade balance. 

When did the dollar crisis emerge and what made it break 
into the open. This is an important question, relating to the 
turning point in world history when the disintegration of 
L.J). imperialism was indicated clearly. 

The dollar crisis began during the Korean War. This was 
the first step of U.S. imperialism on the road to its downfall 
not only politically and militarily but also economically. It 
was in 1 050, the year of the outbreak of the Korean War, that 
t ie international balance of payments of the United States 
changed from surplus to deficit and its gold reserves began to 

Wo C Id W H TT g °i M r6S T eS had continued to nse, even after 
Woild War II; but at the end of 1950, they sank from $24.6 


286 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


billion to $22.8 billion, a decrease of $1.8 billion that year. 
With some fluctuations, this decline continued, falling to a 
low of $10.4 billion in May 1968. Thus, the struggle of the 
Korean people in the Fatherland Liberation War shook the 
imperialists and started them on their downward course. 

Although the United States developed its world strategy, 
relying on the dollar, the very development of this strategy 
led to the disintegration of the dollar and accelerated the bank- 
ruptcy of the world strategy itself. Furthermore, if we analyze 
relations among the capitalist powers, we find that the dollar 
crisis has led to the relatively strengthened position of West 
Germany, France, Italy and Japan. It also has revealed the 
sharpening antagonisms among the imperialist powers, ip 
connection with the crisis of the dollar, the pound, the franc 
and the gold crisis that raged throughout Europe. But, as Kim 
II Sung warns: 

We must neither underestimate nor overestimate the strength of 
the United States. U.S. imperialism can still commit many more 
crimes. 

But U.S. imperialism is on the decline. Today when the U.S. is 
acting most outrageously, its weakness is revealed more clearly than 
ever before. The Korean people are aware what U.S. imperialism is. 
Our people have had experience fighting the U.S. and have defended 
their motherland from its aggression. The Korean War revealed that 
U.S. imperialism is by no means invulnerable, but can be beaten in 
fighting. The triumph of the Cuban revolution proved this truth 
again under circumstances different from ours. The Vietnamese 
people's resistance war of national salvation, too, clearly confirms 
this truth. U.S. imperialism is doomed to complete destruction . 4 

For all the peoples of the world to develop a powerful strug- 
gle against the world strategy of U.S. imperialism, it is neces- 
sary for all anti-imperialist forces to unite for maximum 
strength. However, the actual situation falls short of this goal. 
There are right opportunist forces attempting to obtain “fa- 
vors” by making concessions to U.S. imperialism. And there 


STRATEGY OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE 


287 


are extreme leftist adventurists who actually abandon the 
struggle, while paying lip service to anti-imperialism. 

It is important to overcome these obstacles, and especially 
o es a is principled unity in the world communist move- 
ment. However, peoples oppressed by U.S. imperialism can- 
not wait for all problems to be solved before combatting their 
enemy. Moreover, small countries pitted against U.S. impe- 
rialism can achieve much by rendering mutual assistance and 
combining their forces in joint struggle. 

This can create favorable conditions for overcoming dif- 
erences in the international communist movement and for 
accelemting development of an anti-U.S. imperialist united 
front ol the peoples of the world. Even if there are differences 
among fiaternal parties, no party is in a position to evade joint 

s^hdifeeLer 88 l ° drfeat US ' ‘ mPeiiaIiSm ° f 

The world anti-imperialist forces are extremely diverse and 
include political parties and organizations in different social 
and political systems and individuals with diverse political 
and religious beliefs. Nevertheless, regardless of composition 
the ant, -imperialist forces share the common objective of 
destroying American and world imperialism. 

The revolutionary struggles of the peoples of European and 
other highly industrialized capitalist countries are closely 
connected with those of the newly independent countries of 
Asia Africa, and Latin America. The national liberation move- 
ments are particularly active in this period. Kim 11 Sung says: 

The invariable policy pursued by the Democratic People’s Repub- 
bc of Korea in international relations is to cement the unity and co- 

onTwdb T T deVdOP fdendly and co °Perative rela- 

tions with newly independent states in Asia, Africa and Latin Amer- 

■c^ and render acbve support and encouragement to the peoples of 

sc aieas in t leir liberation struggles against imperialism and to 

the peoples of all countries in their revolutionary struggle. We re- 

ffat end * “ internationalist d "ty to do so and to spare no efforts to 


288 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


The Workers Party of Korea and the government of the 
Republic have tried consistently to strengthen the unity and 
cohesion of the socialist camp, to support and encouiage, and 
increase solidarity with, the revolutionary peoples of the 
world. This correct policy contributes greatly to the accelera- 
tion of the Korean revolution. 

The Party and the DPRK government are making every 
effort to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the socialist 
camp and consolidate internationalist friendship and unity 
with the peoples of the socialist countries. They support es- 
pecially the just, heroic struggles of the Vietnamese people 
against aggression by the United States, and the heroic strug- 
gle of the Cuban people. 

At the same time, they develop cooperative relations with 
newly independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America and render active support to their struggles against 
imperialism and colonialism, for national independence and 
prosperity. They support fully the Laotian and Cambodian 
peoples in their fight to preserve their independence against 
U.S. intervention. 

The revolutionary struggles of the people of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America are interrelated. When Latin America suffers 
under the yoke of imperialism, the peoples of Asia and Africa 
cannot possibly live in peace, and if the United States is de- 
feated decisively in Asia and Africa, a favorable phase will be 
opened for the national liberation movement of the Latin 
America peoples. 

The Party and the government of the Republic w’ill make 
efforts in the future, too, to strengthen and develop militant 
solidarity with the revolutionary peoples of the world. The 
consistent policy of support for peoples making revolutions 
and of cementing solidarity with them is based on a strong 
sense of responsibility to the world revolution and on the firm 
determination to advance revolutionary str\’"gles until im- 
perialism is completely wiped off the earth. 


strategy of anti-imperialist struggle 


289 


oppression and 2 ( c °untnes against exploitation and 

u i j- . . , deavor to strengthen solidarity with them 

Mdmg h.gh the banner of proletarian internationalism 

II S f f 88 C ° f the Korean P e °P'». led by Premie, Kim 

1 Song, for peace and democracy, for national independence 

surely triumph, and the down-' 


CHAPTER III 


Kim II Sung on Ultimate 
Victory of World Revolution 


The International Conference on the Tasks of Journalists 
of the Whole World in Their Fight against the Aggression of 
U.S. Imperialism was held in Pyongyang, the "capital of the 
DPRK, from September 18 to 24, 1969. The conference was 
attended by 1 14 delegates from 90 countries, and representa- 
tives of 13 international democratic organizations, 221 in all. 
This was the first international press conference held under 
the banner of opposing the aggression of U.S. imperialism. 

The meeting of representatives of the world’s progressive 
press to discuss their common struggle against the United 
States and its intensified aggression was a great event in the 
annals of the anti-imperialist struggle of the journalists. 

In his speech at the conference, Kim 11 Sung clarified the 
tasks facing all the peoples of the world. He analyzed con- 
temporary imperialism, particularly that of the United States, 
and the historical position of contemporary imperialism in the 
phase of decline. 

Kim 11 Sung made clear the position and role of the national 
liberation movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the 
revolutionary movements of the world, and the need to 
strengthen the militant unity and solidarity of all the revolu- 
tionary peoples, the need mutually to support and assist each 
other. Further, he outlined the position and role of the social- 
ist countries in strengthening and developing the world rev- 
olution and anti-U.S. imperialist struggles, and the need to 
strengthen unity and solidarity among themselves. 


290 


ON ULTIMATE VICTORY 


291 


1. HISTORICAL POSITION OF 
CONTEMPORARY IMPERIALISM 

20*'LXvT h ° f "“Jr*’* «*• " ,e la “« half of the 
Uth centuiy, is basic in defining the line and policy of the 

ild revolution in general, including the strategy in the 

the q U eXr t ofT ri f i!m ' 'T 0 **" 5 ’ WA im e eriali sm; and 
question °f developing the international communist 

of~ d is r point in 

f if ™ ". Sun8 “ ade a Uarxist-Leninist assessment of our era 
wIm.I'T 8 tW co " tra dictions, tho balance offerees in the’ 
world, the basic trends, tho decisive factors in the develop 

Regarding 1 th/ ISt | 0iy °/ mankl ” d ’ and various other factors. 

Prefer Kim , ™ C,ens % <*»«”<» of the present time, 
remie, Kim II Sung says: “Today we are living in a glorious' 

age of revolutionary change when the colonial system of 

age whenThe nT^m b<,y °" d " eCOVe,y ' in a grand historic 
age when the national liberation revolution of the oppressed 

peoples is gaining great victories.”' PP 

In our era irresistible tides of world revolution are rising 
ppiessed peoples and nations are struggling for liberation’ 

fact oTthe Tl a r ld C ;° l0nialiSm Wdl be swe Pt from the sur- 
ar ^, f , He ear . th - In the international arena, sharp struggles 

revolutin° Pingb ^ Ween SOcialism and capitalism and between 
evo utionaiy and counter-revolutionary forces, in which the 
revolutionary forces are scoring great victories. 

Indeed the ultimate victory of the world revolution is on 
the W Clia —cs of the latter 

rhe ultimate victory of world revolution and the downfall of 
modern imperialism is a realistic prospect for our era, as shown 
y le development of the forces of socialism, of the labor 


292 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


and democratic movements, and particularly by the rapid 
development of national liberation struggles. In defining the 
characteristics of the present age Kim II Sung attaches im- 
portance to the collapse of colonialism and the great upsurge 
of national liberation struggles: 

In the world arena, along with the revolutionary struggles of the 
people in socialist countries, the liberation struggles of the people in 
colonial and dependent countries are forging ahead vigorously. 
Today, in vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America, mighty flood- 
tides of national liberation revolutionary movements are surging with 
an irresistible force, and great revolutionary storms are sweeping 
across the continents, wiping out imperialism and colonialism. Hun- 
dreds of millions of people in these areas, oppressed and plundered 
by imperialism for centuries, have thrown off the cursed yoke of 
colonialism and have risen proudly to emerge in the new arena of 
history as heroes; they are achieving brilliant victories in tearing 
down the old system of imperialism and colonialism and carving out 
a new life. The peoples of the countries still groaning under the 
colonial yoke of imperialism heroically are taking up arms against 
the aggressive forces of foreign imperialism. Under the powerful 
impact of the national liberation movement, the chains of colonial 
slavery are falling apart everywhere, and the colonial system of 
imperialism, which has spelled so much misery and suffering for 
humanity, is crumbling to dust. There no longer exists any “safe 
rear' or “quiet backyard” for the imperialists, and imperialism is 
breathing its last . 2 

The struggles of Asian, African and Latin American peo- 
ples against imperialism and colonialism together with the 
struggles of the international working class for socialism, are 
the two main revolutionary forces of our era. Such tremendous 
forces have never before been mobilized against imperialism, 
nor has the struggle ever been as strong as it is now. 

At the same time, the revolutionary struggles of the pro- 
letariat in capitalist countries against oppression and exploita- 
tion and for good living conditions and democratic freedoms 
are also being developed vigorously. Political and economic 


ON ULTIMATE VICTORY 


293 


the progress of mankind Th^ i n6W force which advances 

okiLei i h r: m ? bc "r merabie »d 

' > e running amuck in an attempt to check the sum' 11 
fon struggles, it is only the death-bed rattle f U, * llW 

demned to destruction The f ? ° f those who are con- 

act, the more difficult their posTifberom^'u S^fn 

going downhill and , confront wlth “ 

of it will 

Ais question. Kin, H Su ” , 1 ,^° Regarding 

£ u , V" — 

SpeteXm 8 to itS OM P °?° nS - ****** *■ - Zl 

aesperate efforts to recover its lost foothold and is tryinc to 
fmd a way out in aggression and war to save itself from doom « 

actTv^V nit6d Stat f S iS intensif y in S aggressive and subversive 
tmties against the socialist countries. It is committed to at- 
tacking small and divided countries such as Vietnam Korea 
Cuba and the German Democratic Republic, one by one. As 

Asii ° *] r Stlategy ’ creates dangerous hotbeds of war in 
and Europe by remilitarizing Japan and West Germany. 


294 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


While paying lipservice to the “independence” and “free- 
dom” of peoples, the imperialists are actually set on main- 
taining their colonial rule by cunning and nefarious means, 
and are trying to bind the peoples of newly independent na- 
tions with the fetters of neo-colonialism. 

We should pay particular attention to the nature and con- 
crete aspects of neo-colonialism, a fonp of dependency em- 
ployed especially by the United States to deceive the people 
and to maintain and expand its domination, under conditions 
where peoples of colonial and dependent countries are 
awakened and join in the great upsurge of struggle for national 
liberation. In such circumstances, the old forms of colonialism 
based on direct political rule can no longer be maintained. 

The imperialists bribe the reactionary oligarchy, and top 
military or tribal chieftains, bringing together right-wing 
groups to maintain the essence of colonial enslavement. 
Whenever the puppets they install become even slightly un- 
cooperative in fulfilling the colonial policy, they hatch a 
reactionary military coup and establish a military fascist dic- 
tatorship, sometimes carrying out open military interventions. 
These machinations are intended to swerve the newly inde- 
pendent countries to the right and make it impossible for them 
to emerge from their colonial or semi-colonial status. 

The policy of dominating economically the newly develop- 
ing countries is one of the most important features of neo- 
colonialism. The U.S. imperialists, utilizing “foreign aid” as 
an important instrument for overseas expansion, pave the way 
for greater investments of monopoly capital. The imperialists 
control the economic arteries of not a few countries of the 
world by exporting large sums of capital and by obtaining 
vested colonial-type interests. Through “economic aid,” they 
not only place obstacles in the way of the development of 
independent national economies but also meddle in the in- 
ternal affairs of developing countries, rendering their political 
independence ineffective and nominal. Side by side with 


ON ULTIMATE VICTORY 


295 


blackmail and peaceful infiltration, oppression and appease 
men t, political subversion and ideological-cultural infiltration. 

viously the road to the ultimate victory of the world 
evolution is by no means a smooth peaceful transition It will 

££ "Z t°t ^ tlW 6ni " g »f world revolti™" 

reaedoii * S1 ™ Struggle against lh « citadel of world 


2. THEORY OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST 
ANTI-U.S. UNITED FRONT 

Pyongyang?"^ “ "' e j ° Urn,>liStS “* the '™ rid oonference in 

th^ar^ofon* aSPeC J 0i tHe Struggle is t0 establish clearly 
the airay of opposing forces. Imperialism, its puppet regimes 

and subservient countries constitute the counter-revolution 

liberation'' lib S °° ia ' iSt COU "'"c< a ” d «>* national' 

on, labor and democratic movements constitute the 
forces for world revolution in our era. the 

in^VTri'Jn" 0 ^ l '? VOlu,i ° n have a " 'Entity of interests 
• uggle against imperialism, and they assist one 


296 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


another in the struggle. However, the various revolutionary 
forces do not have an identical role in the development of the 
world revolution. Regarding the role and tasks to be fulfilled 
by the socialist camp in organizing forces for world revolu- 
tion, Kim 11 Sung states: 

In this the peoples of the socialist countries, before anyone else, 
should play a leading role. The peoples of the socialist countries 
should not only expedite the building of socialism and communism 
vigorously in their own countries, exercising vigilance to smash the 
subversive activities and sabotage of the imperialists and the rem- 
nants of the deposed exploiting classes, but also should regard it as 
their internationalist duty to render active support to the national 
liberation movement, proceeding from the Marxist-Leninist sense of 
revolutionary ethics. The socialist countries, as bases of the world 
revolution, should resolutely oppose the war policy and colonial 
predatory policy of the imperialists, and energetically assist the op- 
pressed nations in all their revolutionary struggles. This will strength- 
en the allied forces of the socialist countries and the international 
working class, and is the way to hasten the victory in the anti-im- 
perialist revolutionary struggle. 6 

The socialist camp is the most powerful base and the most 
important and decisive of all the anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. 
forces promoting world revolution. The forces of the socialist 
camp comprise the total political, economic, military and other 
potentials of the countries within it, and represent a class 
alliance of the states of proletarian dictatorship; it is decisive 
in determining the historical development of mankind, in 
accelerating the world revolution. The existence and the 
strength of the socialist camp, encourage the revolutionary 
struggles of the people of the world — inspiring the peoples of 
colonial and dependent countries in their liberation struggles, 
and creating favorable conditions for and influencing the 
struggles of the working class in capitalist countries. Conse- 
quently, the socialist camp is the most powerful of all forces 
for world revolution. 


ON ULTIMATE VICTORY 


297 


Concerning the struggles of the working class in capitalist 
countnes, Kim 11 Sung says: “Together with the peoples of the 

s'honW TTZ thS WOrkingclass in the capitalist countries 
should also fight more vigorously against imperialism and 

ere J > S lve strong support and encouragement to the libera- 
tion movement of the oppressed nations.” 7 

In the capitalist countries, the working class opposes ex- 
ploitation and oppression through the trade unions, and seeks 
to achieve its class emancipation. Today, labor movements 
n most countries tend toward communism. Militant labor 
movements can weaken imperialism and thereby deal a blow 
to world aggression and also create conditions favorable to the 
national liberation movements. The working class of sover- 
eign capitalist states and oppressed nations have common in- 
terests in fighting monopoly capital. Therefore the imperia- 
ls s mu er eiy effort to estrange the working class of the de- 
veloped capitalist countries from the colonial and dependent 
peoples in order to increase their plunder and exploitation. 
They foster racism and national chauvinism and subvert the 
militant ranks of the working class by bribing the labor aris- 

coIon°ies Wlth “ P ° rti ° n ^ *** superprofits ‘hey gain in the 

Regarding the position and role of the national liberation 
movement and its militant tasks, Kim II Sung says: 

Colonies are the lifeline of the imperialists, their last stronghold 

no 'mT 13 1StS W u n0t giVe UP their colonies of their own accord 
nor will they g.ve them independence. The peoples of colonial coun- 

, ? U f amte their ^rength and wage a resolute and do-or-die 
?nlp g endence7 ^ imperiaIiStS a " d Wi " complete ^edom and 

The anti-imperialist national liberation movement to- 
gether with the struggle of the international working class for 
socialism and communism, constitute the two great revolu- 
lonary forces of our era. The national liberation movement in 


298 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


its revolutionary struggle to cut the lifeline of the imperial- 
ists can contribute to the development of an overall world 
revolution by rapidly weakening the imperialist forces, ac- 
celerating their downfall and safeguarding world peace. 

Asia, Africa and Latin America account for 71 per cent of the 
earth’s total land area and more than two-thirds of the total 
population. These continents have tremendous resources. Im- 
perialism has fattened on the sweat and blood of their peoples 
and plundered their resources. Even today, imperialism rakes 
in profits amounting to billions of dollars annuallly from these 
areas. If colonialism, old and new, is wiped out in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America, a vital basis of imperialism will be de- 
stroyed. 

Kim 11 Sung says: “The newly independent countries that 
have thrown off the yoke of imperialism are confronted with 
the weighty task of safeguarding their national independence, 
carrying forward the revolution and assisting the liberation 
struggle of the peoples of the countries still in imperialist 
fetters.” 9 He points out that peoples who have won inde- 
pendence are faced with the task of abrogating all shackling 
treaties, agreements and military alliances concluded with the 
imperialists, liquidating the political and economic footholds 
which they and their domestic reactionary accomplices rely 
on for subversion, and rallying forces to effect a revolutionary 
society. 

On the role of the democratic movement in the mustering of 
forces for world revolution, Kim 11 Sung states: 

Today, the international democratic movement and the peace 
movement hold a very important place in the common anti-imperial- 
ist, anti-U.S. front. These movements unite hundreds of millions of 
working people and progressives in the world. AJ1 peace-loving peo- 
ple of the whole world must fight more stubbornly for a lasting peace 
and a bright future for mankind and for checking and frustrating the 
imperialist policy of aggression and war. 10 

The democratic movement is not directed specifically to- 
ward socialism, but it is one of the forces of anti-imperialist 


ON ULTIMATE VICTORY 


299 


struggle It fights to win democratic freedoms and rights to 
oppose fascist oppression. Today, all international democratic 

!£££ Ta ~ n T res ‘ in ,he 

i ipeiiansm, and U.S. imperialism in particular As Kim T 1 
Sung says: "When all of the worid’s'evoludo^fo”" 
igoiously wage an anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle on 
every front they hold, imperialism will he wiped out for good 
and the peopJes of all countries will come to achieve genuine 

.hi' ,ha, ' t hl ePenden r and S ° Cial »">*"»>•”" « « to preveM 
these forces. m ’ Pe ' la IStS are cng ‘ igt ' d ln maneuvers to split 

Today, differences within the international communist 
novement are obstructing internal unity. An anti-imperialist 
anti-U.S. united front formed as quickly as possible can foil 
maneuvers to split the ranks of the international communist 
movement, overcome “left” and right opportunism and 
achieve unity of the international communist movement thus 
accelerating the world revolution. 

Joint action is necessary not only to accelerate the world 

rTef A^toTvt ° t0 d T l0P ieVOlUti0nS in indK ' idual — - 

• A victory on one front against the United States will 
cl'dr S,r T h ° f U S ' imp “ ialism “ d -«1 create fa vor- 

pe S ^ ^ T °' her fr0nf5 ' T ° dag ' a " 

™l f V U ' S ; United front on an international scale is 

eahsbc because the United States is reaching out its tentacles 

o a countries, large and small, which consequently have a 
common interest in opposing U.S. intervention On the revo^ 
lutionary principle and concrete method for realizing an anti- 
lmperiahst, anti-U.S. united front, Kim II Sung says: 

It is necessary for us to bring together all the forces opposed to ini 

stmntTlt X CV6l0P toggles withT., u^iS 

strength. It is a basic principle for the strategy and tactics of the Com 
mumsts today to bring together as many lies as ptsibleXen'f 

istfront to frolate ' if Str ° ng forces > and expand the anti-imperial- 
it jointly. 12 ' ' lmpenallsm as mu ch as possible, and to attack 


300 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


A revolution is carried out by broad sections of the masses. 
Consequently, the greater the forces, the more successful the 
revolution will be. People with many different ideas are op- 
posed to imperialism — those who fight actively against im- 
pel ialism, and others who are forced to join the struggles un- 
der mass pressure in their own countries and from the peoples 
of the world. Whatever their motivations, all forces, even 
weak ones, should be united, as long as they are not agents 
of imperialism. Kim 11 Sung explains: “In realizing joint 
action, the Communists must stick to the principle of achiev- 
ing unity through struggle and conducting struggles through 
unity.” 13 

It is impermissible to make unprincipled compromise with 
any forces for the sake of unity to effect joint action or a united 
front. In launching a joint struggle, wavering and inactive ele- 
ments should be criticized to help them overcome negative 
tendencies and to support and develop their anti-imperialist 
leanings. It is also necessary to approach those who avoid or 
take a negative attitude toward anti-imperialist struggle and 
convince them. Today, it is most important to strengthen as- 
istance to the Vietnamese people in their struggle against 
U S. aggression. Only through practical actions can inactive 
forces be awakened and led gradually into more positive in- 
volvement. 

Kim 11 Sung says: Even small countries can defeat a big 

enemy, once they establish Juche, unite the masses of the 
people and valiantly rise in battle despite sacrifice.” 14 

To establish Juche is a fundamental requirement of a revolu- 
tionary struggle. No one can write prescriptions for revolu- 
tions in other countries, nor can he carry out a revolution for 
other counti ies. The Party and the people of each country are 
responsible lor their revolution. Needless to say, however, 
revolutionary struggles in each country are a component part 
of the world revolution and are closely related to those in 
other countries. Consequently, international unity and mili- 


ON ULTIMATE VICTORY 


301 


fcrces arc 

gainsTutvictory^deDend.f c o ns olidating revolutionary 
“nd revolutionary struggles PKpmUM 

m (.ghting against foreign aggressors"^ ' tmggieS> “ wel1 “ 
Kim II Sung says further: 

States. HistorVXarlyThow^thatb* 081 'll Usion about the United 
United States and advocating • spieadln 8 illusions about the 

only lead to dulling the revo1u3r CiP ^ C ° mpr ° mise with « will 
ing ti ie , t o • g C Ievolu t'onary vigilance of the people mak- 

and outrageous, ^and * will ^ inS ‘ >len, ' l ’ i * W “ nded 

and war. 15 encouiage their maneuvers of aggression 

inventing s^h te s^hiT^” a ! 1SI «- a,,e t0 whitewash it by 

«o„r™n^S;TwhXa‘ Sm , iS *. SyS,em ° f ' *-<» 

out in militarization of the economy tb TCmg * t0 S6ek 3 Way 
overseas expansion and wars /■’ e arms race > aggressive 
fascism. WarS> and ln the attemp t to establish 

longer L U irapl S in'“ '°,r ’’“T i,S na,ure ' « »°uld no 


302 


KOREA AND WORLD REVOLUTION 


to fight U.S. imperialism it is necessary to take a firm class 
stand, to cast off all illusions, and to fight. To fight, it is neces- 
sary not to overestimate the strength of U.S. imperialism and 
not to be afraid to oppose it. As Kim II Sung says, we should 
neither overestimate nor underestimate the United States. 
Like other imperialisms, it is already going downhill. 

• ^n^ ay ’ United States is carrying on aggression and war 
m all parts of the world. This is not an indication of strength 
but of the fact that it is in a more difficult position. If one loses 
sight of this, it can lead to yielding to U.S. imperialism. 

The historical mission of the working class is to eliminate 
exploitation on a worldwide scale and to construct socialism 
and communism, the highest ideal of mankind. The world 
revolution is the struggle of the international working class to 
realize its historical mission. 

Since subjective and objective conditions for the revolution 
do not ripen simultaneously in different countries, the ulti- 
mate victory of the world revolution is achieved through so- 
cialist triumphs in individual countries and through the gradu- 
al expansion and strengthening of the socialist camp. Kim II 
Sung formulates the law of development of the world’s revo- 
lutionary movement as follows: 

As the forces of capital are international, so the liberation struggle 
o t le peoples is an international movement. The revolutionary 
movements in individual countries are national movements, and 
constitute a part of the world revolution at the same time. The revo- 
lutionary struggles of peoples in all countries support and comple- 
ment each other, and unite in one stream of world revolution Vic- 
torious revolutionary forces should assist the revolutions of those 
countries which are not yet triumphant, using their experiences and 
examples. They should give active support to the liberation struggle 
of the world’s peoples, -with their political, economic and military 
power. At the same time, people in the countries which have not yet 
won the revolution should struggle more actively to defend the 
victorious revolutions of other countries against the imperialist 
policy of strangulation and hasten victory for their own revolutions. 


ON ULTIMATE VICTORY 


303 


revolu.,„„ and construction in its own J un ^ ToTtohf j 

rr 0 " Id* C T P ‘ e,e a “°' d “"''I- *. law oC, lev' op 
ment of the world revolutionary movement and also is to he 
faithful to proletarian internationalism 

I he ultimate victory of the revolution in individual coun 
es is impossible apart from the victory of the world revolu 

tin: « e ^ M r olutton 1 d «-iopet d h r :™t 

countries. evolutionary ^nation in individual 

■ I,, 1 " to accelerate the victory of the world revolution 

he working class of the countries which have achieved rev”-’ 
u ion and the working class of the countries that have not yet 

"r:t7u«or‘ St “° h ° lher “ nd j0i " « «** cuJn, 

Today imperialism is going downhill, toward final coliaDsc 
Z' WOr dWide t S , Cale ' °" " ,e “*<■•"*> »f world revolution’ is 

Prender Kim’lfsung^ay^f ng “ d 



f 



Reference Notes 


PART ONE 


CHAPTER I 

ihrR im 11 S ?r g ’ T ! ie Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Is 
the Banner of Freedom and Independence for Our People and a 

z e ti sr ” sccia,,sm zti 

.her. The DIRK), Japanese Edition, Foreign Languages PnhlKl,- 
House, Pyongyang, 1968, p. 3 . § Publ.sh.ng 

2. The DPRK, p. 6. 

3. Ibid , p. 6. 

4. Ibid, p. 6. 

5. Kim II Sung, Selected Works, (hereafter. Works ) Fnelish 

TZt FOre ' S " L ” 8l “ 8 “ P "“ Sh '"<= »«“«■ 

6. Works, Vol. 11 , pp . 560-70. 

7. The DPRK, p. 13. 

PmtZTv’ K0 T" editi ° n> VoL Polishing House of Workers’ 
Party of Korea, Pyongyang, 1968, pp. 40-41. 

9. The DPRK, p. 22 

mi COlhC,ei Wn ’ tS - E "‘ Ush '’o'- Mos- 

fl. The DPRK, p. 25. 

12 . Works, Korean edition, vol. II, p. 104 . 

13. W’orks, vol. II, p. 516. 

14. The DPRK, p. 2 . 

15. Works, Korean edition, vol. II, p. 177 

Pain- of? 4 ’ K p ean editi ° n ’ V ° L IV ’ Publishi "g House of Workers’ 
Pait> of Korea, Pyongyang, 1968, p. 354. 

CHAPTER II 

r \ Kl , m ^ Sun 8. On the Question of the Transitional Period from 
pi a ism to Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat 


307 


MODERN KOREA 

(hereafter, On the Question ), Korean edition, Publishing House of 
Workers’ Party of Korea, Pyongyang, 1969, p. 1. 

2. Ibid, p. 11. 

3. Works , Korean edition, vol. 1, Publishing House of Workers’ 
Party of Korea, Pyongyang, 1967, p. 501. 

4. On the Question, pp. 13-14. 

5. Works, Korean edition, vol. II, p. 257. 

6. On the Question, pp. 10-11. 

7. The DPRK, p. 41. 

8. On the Question, p. 41. 

9. The DPRK, p. 38. 

10. On the Question, p. 14. 

11. Ibid, p. 14. 

12. The DPRK, p. 47. 

13. On the Question , p. 16. 

14. The DPRK, p. 47. 

15. On the Question, p. 9. 

16. The DPRK, p. 36. 

17. Ibid, pp. 41-42. 

18. Ibid, p. 50. 

19. Ibid, p. 43. 

20. Ibid, pp. 55-56. 

21. Ibid, p. 56. 

22. Ibid, p. 62. 

CHAPTER III 

1. The DPRK, p. 33. 

2. Works, vol. II, pp. 47-48. 

3. Ibid, pp. 582-83. 

4. Ibid, p. 56. 

5. Ibid, p. 73. 

6. Ibid, p. 376. 

7. Kim II Sung, Let Us More Thoroughly Embody the Revolution- 
ary Spirit of Independence, Self-Sustenance and Self-Defense in All 
Fields of State Activity (hereafter, Let Us) Japanese edition, Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1967, p. 48. 

8. Works, vol. II, p. 376. 

9. Ibid, p. 380. 


REFERENCE NOTES 


309 


10. Works, vol. II, p. 381. 

11. Works, Korean edition, vol. IV, p. 252. 

12. Works, English edition, vol. II, p. 377. 

13. Kim II Sung, “Victory of the Socialist Co-operation of Agri- 
cukure and the Future Development of Agriculture in Our Coun- 
try, Works, English edition, vol. I, p. 456. 

14. W'orks, vol. II, p. 395. 

15. Ibid, pp. 399-400. 

16. W'orks, Korean edition, vol. II, p. 243. 

17. W'orks, Korean edition, vol. IV 7 , p. 249 

18. Ibid, p. 255. 

19. W'orks, English edition, vol. II, p. 547 

20. Ibid, pp. 545-46. 

21. Ibid, pp. 169-70. 

22. Ibid, p. 164. 

CHAPTER IV 

1. Kim II Sung, On Some Theoretical Problems of Socialist Econ- 
omy (hereafter, On Some), Korean edition, Central Standing Com- 
1969° ° f 3 General Association Korean Residents in Japan, Tokyo, 

2. On Some, p. 2. 

3. Ibid, p. 3. 

4. Ibid, p. 3. 

5. Ibid, pp. 3-4. 

6. Ibid, p. 8. 

7. Ibid, p. 5. 

8. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 

9. Ibid , p. 13. 

10. Ibid, p. 11. 

11. Ibid, p. 12. 

12. Ibid, p. 14. 

13. Ibid, p. 15. 

14. Ibid, p. 18. 

15. Ibid, p. 21. 

16. Ibid, p. 25. 

17. Ibid, p. 31. 

18. Works, Vol. IV, p. 255. 


310 


MODERN KOREA 


PART TWO 


CHAPTER I 

1. The DPRK, pp. 71-72. 

2. The DPRK, pp. 72-73. 

3. Kim II Sung, The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Partu 
(hereafter The Present Situation), English edition, Foreign Lan- 
guages Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1968, p. 104. 

4. Works, English edition, vol. II, p. 549 

5. The DPRK, p. 73. 

6. Ibid., pp. 75-76. 

CHAPTER II 

1. The DPRK, p. 76. 

2. Ibid, p. 42. 

3. r lhe Present Situation, p. 104. 

4. Works, Korean edition, vol. IV, p. 98. 

5. Ibid, pp. 91-92. 

6. Ibid, pp. 92-93. 

7. The DPRK, pp. 76-77. 

8. Works, English edition, vol. II, pp. 552-54. 

CHAPTER III 

1. The DPRK, p. 81. 

2. Kim II Sung, Answers to the Questions Raised by the Delega- 
tion of the Democratic Youth League of Finland for the “Kansan 
L utiset, Central Organ of the Communist Party of Finland, Fo- 
leign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1969, pp. 17-18 

3. Works, English edition, vol. II, p. 355 

4. Ibid, p. 355. 

5. The DPRK, p. 82. 

6. The DPRK, pp. 65-66. 

7. The DPRK, p. 83. 

8. Works, Korean edition, vol. IV, p. 81. 

9. Ibid, p. 81. 

10. Works, English edition, vol. II, p. 510. 

CHAPTER IV 

1. Works, English edition, vol. II, p. 554. 


REFERENCE NOTES 


311 


2. Ibid, p. 555. 

3. Ibid, p. 556. 

4. The DPRK, p. 78. 

5. Ibid, p. 78. 

6. Works, English edition, vol. II, PP . 557-58. 
'• 11 te Present Situation, p. 110. 

8. Ibid, pp. 110-11. 

9. Ibid, p. 111. 

10. Ibid, p. 114. 

11. Ibid, pp. 107-08. 

12. Works, Korean edition, vol. IV, pn 420-21 

13. The DPRK, p. 80. 


PART THREE 

CHAPTER I 

1. The Present Situation, p. 5 

2. The DPRK, pp. 63-64. 

3. Ibid, p. 66. 

4. Ibid, p. 66. 

5. The Present Situation, p. 8. 

CHAPTER II 

1. The DPRK, p. 68. 

” S " ng ’ G ;“‘ ^ti-ImpertaUs, R eeolutionary Cause of 

•tTr 

"TtTdprkZ Py ° ngyans - «>• ,3 -»- 

4 Kim II Sung, Let Us Intensify the Anti-Imperialist Anti n s 
Struggle (hereafter. Let Us Intensify), English edition Foreign ut 
guages Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1968, p. 10 
5. The DPRK, p. 69. 

CHAPTER III 

rore *" L “- 


312 


MODERN KOREA 


2. Ibid , pp. 2-3. 

3. The Great Anti-Imperialist, pp. 19-20. 

4. Progressive Journalists, p. 3. 

5. Ibid , p. 7. 

6. Ibid, p. 7. 

7. Ibid, p. 8. 

8. Ibid, p. 9. 

9. Ibid, p. 9. 

10. Ibid, p. 10. 

11. Ibid, p. 10. 

12. The Present Situation, p. 36. 

13. Ibid, p. 38. 

14. The Great Anti-Imperialist, p. 18. 

15. Progressive Journalists, p. 13. 

16. The Great Anti-Imperialist, pp. 5-6. 

17. Progressive Journalists, pp. 18-19. 


Index 


Agriculture 

collectivization of, 48-55 
in economic plans, 45, 57, 59 
management of, 113-18, 135-49 
mechanization of, 59-60, 
136-37, 141, 142 
policy for, 53, 54, 80, 100, 
114-18, 137-49 
productivity of, 29, 43, 46, 

58, 65, 66, 139 
South Korean, 193, 211, 212 
technological revolution and, 
113-14, 136, 140 
See also Collective farms; Farm 
management committees; 
Rt-unit farms 

Association for the Restoration of 
the Fatherland, 23, 25, 28 


Breton Woods Agreement, 284 
Buddhist Youth Society, 263, 264 

Cadres 

anti-Japanese guerrilla, 25, 26 
North Korean revolutionary, 
31, 33, 40, 115 
South Korean revolutionary, 
218 

technical, 42, 62, 66, 140 
United Revolutionary Party, 
263 

Capitalism 

industrial management of, 
121-22 


overproduction in, 165 
production relations of, 162 
technology in, 166-67 
Central Agricultural Commission, 
138, 143, 148 
Chang Myon, 248 
Chemicalization, 80, 85, 139, 140 
Choi Yong Do, 261-62, 266 
Chollima Movement, 20, 154-59 
Workers Party and, 58-59 
Chongsanri method, 112, 113-18, 
119, 138, 147, 153, 154 
Chung II Kwon, 278 
Class struggle, 72-76, 85-88, 
89-98, 99 

Classless society, 74-76, 77-79, 

80, 81, 83, 86, 97 
Collective farms, 24, 47, 50-55, 
59, 77, 100-101, 135, 140, 
147. See also Agriculture; 
Ri-unit farms 
Commodities 

definition of, 175-76 
money relations and, 161, 
173-74 

production of, 72, 77, 173-85 
Comprador capitalists 

South Korean, 194, 202-203, 
204-205, 214-16 
in transitional society, 79 
Consumer goods, 44, 45, 46, 59, 

66, 178 

Cuban Missile Crisis, 62 
Cultural revolution, 62, 95-101, 
136 


313 


MODERN KOREA 


314 

Daean Electric Machine Factory, 
119, 127, 129-30, 151 
Daean work system, 112, 119-34 
139, 146, 154, 183 
Democratic centralism, 119, 126 
134 

Democratic Peoples Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) see North 
Korea 

Distribution, 92-93, 102, 118 
Dogmatists, 43, 70, 86, 89 
Donghak Society, 263 

Economic management, 111-58 
agricultural, 112, 113-18, 
135-49 

Chollima movement in, 154-59 
democratic centralism in, 119 
industrial, 119-35, 140-42 
planning and, 149-53 
workers’ control and, 129, 130 
151 

Economic Planning Board, 211 
Economy 

planning of, 33, 38, 41, 134, 
149-53, 164-66 
policy for, 124, 149, 150-53 
scale of, 162-73 
See also Two-Year Plan; 
Three-Year Plan; Five-Year 
Plan; Seven-Year Plan 
Education, see Political Education 
Education Enforcement 
Ordinance, 257 
Electrification, 59, 136, 140 
Engels, Frederick, 174 

Factory committees, 126-27 
Farm management committees, 

116, 137, 138-42, 145, 147, 
148 

Fatherland Liberation War, see 


Korean War 

Five-Year Plan, 41, 48, 53, 56-60, 
158, 170-72 

Geneva Conference (1954), 231 
Grain production, 45, 65, 147, 148 
“Great East- Asia Co-prosperitv 
Sphere,” 6, 7 

Group management svstem, 
146-49, 154 

Heavy industry, 41-42, 44 45 
46, 65 

Hwanghae Steel Works, 155 

Ideological revolution, 98-99, 101 
Im Jung Sam, 264 
Imperialism, 78, 95, 96, 103, 109 
historic position of, 291-95 
Japanese, 194, 198, 199-201 
213, 216, 244 

United States, 34-36, 38, 39n, 
40, 105-106, 109, 191, 

193-95, 246-47, 271-80 
Industry 

heavy, 41-42, 44-46, 65 
light, 41-46, 65-66, 203 
management of, 119-35, 140-42 
nationalization of, 24, 28 
30, 51, 55, 79 

need for, 73, 75, 79, 101-103 
production of, 33, 45-46, 

58-59, 64-65, 92, 158 
South Korean, 34, 203 
International Monetary Fund, 284 
Irrigation, 46, 59, 80, 85, 136^ 141 

Japan, 22, 23, 24 
aimed struggle against, 22, 

25, 26 

imperialism of, 194, 198, 

199-201, 213, 216, 244 


INDEX 


315 


Korean colonialism of, 5, 55 
militarism of, 276-78, 280, 293 
Johnson, Lyndon B., 209 
Johnson-Sato agreement, 6 
Juche, 7, 10-11, 23, 70, 135, 

153, 239, 300-301 

Kangson Steel Works, 44, 155, 

156, 171 
Katsura, Taro, 6 
Katsura-Taft agreement, 6 
Kim Hi San, 264 
Kim II Sung 

on agrarian policy, 49, 100, 

141, 145 

on Chollima movement, 157, 

159 

on Chongsanri movement, 
114-15 

on class analysis, 73, 74-75, 

76 

on Daean work system, 125, 

127 

on the economy, 43, 80, 118, 

122, 123-2< 150, 152, 

165, 166, 177, 182, 186, 

189 

on Japan, 199, 216, 276, 280 
on political education, 116-17, 
134, 155, 264,265 
on political power, 71, 92, 287 
on proletarian dictatorship, 

83, 85, 90, 98, 100 
on revolution, 22, 71, 110, 

217. 219, 221, 237, 246-47, 

292, 296, 299 

on socialism, 92, 101, 105, 

129, 145 

on South Korea, 27, 191, 194, 

207.214.215.218.219, 

221, 236, 241-42, 244-45, 

252, 262 


on technology, 61, 80 
on United Nations, 234 
on United States, 191, 194, 
201,217,219,221,271, 
273,281,286,299 
on Workers Party, 28, 58, 

63, 159 

Kim Jong Tae, 261,262 
Korea, see North Korea; South 
Korea; Unification of 
Korea 

Korean War, 6, 7, 10, 19, 38-41, 
223, 231, 245, 273 
Chinese troops in, 39 
dollar crisis and, 285-86 
Soviet Union and, 39 
Kt/onghyang Shinmun, 211 
Kvongya Society, 263 

Labor Dispute Mediation Law, 
253 

Labor Law, 31 
Labor movements, 297 
Labor productivity, 33, 45, 133 
Labor Relations Law, 255 
Labor Standards Law, 253 
Land reform 

North Korean, 24, 28, 29-30, 
48, 49-50, 51, 79 
South Korean, 193, 204-206 
Law on Equality of the Sexes, 

31 

Law on Nationalization of 
Important Industries, 30 
Law of value, 160, 173-85 
Leftist deviation, 63, 77, 99 
Left opportunists, 27 n, 86, 89-91 
98 

Lenin, V. I., 53, 87-89, 169, 175 
Li Sung Man, see Rhee 
gov'emment 


MODERN KOREA 


316 

Light industry, 41, 42, 43, 45, 

46, 65-66, 203 

Marx, Karl, 86-87 

Mass line, 115, 119, 120, 129, 

131, 147, 150, 154 
Material incentives, 118, 119, 132 
Means of production, 45, 46, 59, 
92-95, 118, 160, 179-81 
Mutual-aid credit associations, 
135-36 

National Assembly of South 
Korea, 231 

National Economic Plan (1967) 
172 

National liberation movements, 
24, 290, 296, 297-98 
Nationalization, 24, 28, 30, 51, 

55, 79 

Neo-colonialism, 294-95 
New Culture Study Society, 
263-64 

Nixon-Sato talks, 7 
North Korea 

economic management in. 
112-59 

international policy of, 286-88 
South Korean revolution and, 
216-17, 223, 237 
transitional period of, 69-110 
Northeast Asian Treaty 

Organization (NEATO), 

277 

Nuclear War, 273, 281-82 

October People’s Resistance, 242 

Pacific Asian Treaty 

Organization (PATO),277 
Pak Chung Hi government, 11, 

193, 207-208,249, 250-51 


Pak Hong Yong, 245, 246 
Pearl Harbor, 6 
Peasants 

alliance with workers, 24, 28, 
32, 54, 79, 217, 219, 242, 
293 

class distinctions and, 74-75, 
76, 77, 78, 80, 86, 88 
land reform and, 29-30, 

51-52, 55, 146-47 
markets of, 185-89 
as revolutionary class, 217 
Russian, 88 

South Korean, 193, 204, 205, 
212, 256-57 

transitional economy and, 

185, 186 

Peoples’ Army of North Korea, 
38-39, 40, 64, 223, 245-46 
People’s committees 
North Korean, 28, 32-34, 
115-16, 135, 137, 140 
South Korean, 34, 245-46 
Petty bourgeoisie, 73, 74, 76, 

77, 85, 96 
Political education 

Chollima movement and, 154, 
156 

collectivization and, 145 
Daean work system and, 119, 
132, 133 

group management system and, 

importance of, 116-17, 140 
Ponghak Society, 264 
Popular Uprising (April 1960), 
200, 246-48 

Pi oduction development rate, 
162-73 

Production relations 
capitalist, 162 

Chongsanri method as, 113-18 


INDEX 


317 


Daean work system, 119-35 
Proletarian dictatorship, 20, 
32-33,37, 38, 69-70, 77 
Provincial rural economy 
committee, 142-43, 144 
Provisional Constitution of 
Korea, 35 

Provisional People’s Committee 
of North Korea, 28, 29, 

30, 31-32 

Pueblo incident, 67, 172, 209 
279 

Revisionism, 43, 57, 70, 86, 89 
Revolutionary Party for 
Reunification, 7 
Revolutionary Women’s 
Association, 261 

Rhee government, 195, 200, 230, 
231, 233, 246-48 
Ri - unit farms, 114, 115, 135, 
137-44 

Right deviationists, 63-64, 76, 

86 

Right opportunists, 27 n, 89, 

98, 99 

Ro In Yong, 264 
ROK-Japan Treaty ( 1965) , 6, 
198, 199, 200,210,216, 
234,249,250,262,279 
ROK-U.S. Administrative 
Agreement, 196-97 
ROK-U.S. Economic and 

Technical Agreement, 196 
ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense 
Treaty, 196-97 
Russo-Japanese War, 6 

Sangsan Culture Association, 264 
Seven-Year Plan, 10, 60-67, 

158, 170, 172 
Sexual equality, 28-29 


Shin Han Public Corporation, 34 
South Korea 

agriculture of, 193, 211, 212 
army of, 197, 219, 248 
culture of, 191, 199, 207 
economy of, 194, 196, 197-99 
202-203 

general strikes in, 229, 230, 
242, 254 

industry in, 34, 203 
Japanese imperialism and, 

194, 198, 199-201,2.13, 

216, 244 

labor groups in, 254-55 
land reform in, 193, 204-206 
militarization of, 194, 

197-98, 203, 204, 209, 
248-50, 278 

reactionary forces in, 195, 
201-202, 208, 228-29 
students, 257-58 
taxation in, 198, 206, 211 
unrest in, 256-61 
U.S. imperialism in, 26, 27, 

191, 193-212,213,231 
economic, 197-99 
202-203 

military, 197, 198 
political, 195-97 
workers in, 253-56 
South Korean revolution 
M arxist-Leninist party in, 
217-19 

motivating classes in, 213, 

217, 220, 236-38, 253-55 
North Korea and, 216-17, 223, 
237 

reactionary classes and 216, 

219, 220, 222 
Southeast Asian Treaty 

Organization (SEATO), 277 
Soviet-U.S. Joint Committee, 


318 


MODERN KOREA 


35, 228-29 
Stalin, Josef, 175 
State Planning Committee, 
150-51, 152, 153 
Supreme People’s Assembly, 36, 
230-31 

Taejon Agreement, 197 
Taxation 

North Korea, 67 
South Korea, 198, 206, 211 
Three Powers Foreign Ministers 
Conference (1945), 228-29 
Three- Year Plan, 41, 44-48, 60, 
170 

Toyo Takushoku Co., Ltd., 34» 
Technical revolution 
Chongsanri method and, 113 
defense and, 63-66 
need for, 80, 97-99, 100-101 , 
164, 166-72 

Seven-Year Plan and, 60-66 
See also Agriculture; 

Industry 

Tractors, 60,'' 136, 139, 141-42 
Transitional society, 69-110, 

161 

class structure and, 72-83, 

85, 88, 89, 91 

classless society and, 74-83, 

88 

description of, 71-82 
peasant market and, 185, 186 
proletarian dictatorship and, 
69-70, 77, 82-86, 89 
Socialism in, 91-110 
Two-Year Plan, 38 

Unification of Korea, 26-27, 

35-37, 192, 224-40, 248 
United Nations, 225-26, 229, 
233-34, 250-51 


United States 
Asian policy of, 194, 200, 

222, 281-83 
dollar crisis of, 284-85 
imperialism of, 34-36, 38, 

39n, 40, 105-106, 109, 

191, 193-95, 246-47, 

271-80 

internal conflicts of, 283 
Korean War and, 34, 38, 39 n, 
40, 273 

war economy of, 272, 273-74 
283-84 

t World War II and, 271-72 
U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), 196 
U.S. Economic Development 
Agency, 196 

U.S. Information Center, 196, 199 
L.S. International Development 
Agency, 196 

L S.-Japan-ROK military alliance, 
6, 7 

U.S. Military Command, 195, 196 
197, 222, 236 

United Revolutionary Party, 
261-67 
cadres of, 263 

mass organizations of, 263-65 
program of, 262-63 
USSR, 24, 88 

Vietnam war, 6, 7, 197, 249-50, 
278-79, 282-83 
Violence (revolutionary), 22, 

25, 213-14 

Women, equality of, 28-29, 31 
Worker-Peasant Alliance 
North Korean, 24, 28, 32, 54, 79 
South Korean, 217, 219, 242, 

293 


INDEX 


319 


Workers Party of North Korea 
Chollima movement and, 58-59 
collectivization and, 50-51, 

53, 126 

economic planning and, 33, 41, 
48, 60, 62-63, 65 
on Korean unification, 224, 

226, 239-40 
Korean War and, 38 
leadership of, 36, 119, 127, 

155, 159 

mass line of, 135, 227 
Workers Party of South Korea, 

245 

Working class 

class distinctions and, 

74-75, 76, 78, 80, 86, 88 
leadership of, 24, 25, 32, 92, 95 


political power and, 20-21, 
61-62, 77, 92 

production development and, 

102 

unity of, 99, 107-108 
World revolution, 84, 90, 

237-38 

imperialism and, 272-80, 
291-92 
Marx on, 87 
outlook for, 290-303 
socialism and, 103-10 
united front for, 224, 298-99 
World War II, 6, 27, 35, 39n, 
194, 271-72 

^ oung Literary Writer’s 
Society, 263, 264